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Executive summary
This collection of scholarly articles reflects the main topics of a 
dialogue and research programme between the Shanghai Institutes for 
International Studies (SIIS) and the German Development Institute / 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) on the post-2015 global 
development agenda. The contributions cover a wide range of critical 
issues for the design and implementation of the new framework at 
national and international levels. As Jiang Ye and Thomas Fues argue, 
China has already taken a pro-active interest in the post-2015 agenda. 
The country could further enhance its influence by modifying certain 
positions, for instance with regard to unified goals and security concerns 
as well as by increasing support for developing countries. Chun Zhang 
underlines that China could and should strengthen its efforts in light of the 
great success in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
at home and the country’s experience in global partnerships, especially 
with Africa. He calls on the Chinese leadership to provide more human 
and intellectual resources in order to counter Western dominance of the 
post-2015 process.
Hongyuan Yu points to the growing commitment of China to the principles 
and goals of sustainable development. Building an ecological civilisation 
has become a strategic priority. Using climate policies as a case study, 
Yu Ye demonstrates how China is actively contributing to the provision 
of global public goods by domestic action and international activities. 
Still, the country could do more through mainstreaming climate change 
concerns into its aid and investment programmes. Jing Wang sees rapid 
urbanisation in China as a powerful driver for sustainable development. 
In order to fully realise the potential of urban centres, the household 
registration system should be reformed, so that farmers can enjoy the 
same benefits as the original urban residents.
SIIS scholars have undertaken extensive research on the post-2015 policies 
of other BRICS countries, particularly Brazil, India and South Africa, 
comparing them to Chinese concepts. Chuankai Jiao finds that China’s 
and India’s substantive positions are basically the same but that there are 
significant differences in diplomatic style such as India’s confrontational 
stand against the West. Analysing Brazil’s positions, Haibin Niu realises 
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the strong commitment of the government to Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs), a legacy of world conferences in 1992 and 2012 which 
focused on the link between development and the environment. Ming 
Zhu shows how South Africa uses the post-2015 process to represent 
interests of the whole continent while fostering its global role as the only 
African country included in the G20 and BRICS. Christine Hackenesch 
and Heiner Janus underline the importance of including rising powers 
in a global deal on Post-2015, but remain sceptical about progress in 
this regard, since dynamics in South-South cooperation provide few 
incentives for these countries to actively support a new agenda.
Several contributions to the volume from DIE focus on German 
and European perspectives on the post-2015 process. Imme Scholz 
identifies a critical shortcoming of Germany’s official position. While 
the government, in principle, supports a universal agenda it does not 
adequately address the need for structural transformation at home and 
in other high-income countries but rather focuses on challenges of the 
developing world. Mark Furness et al. bemoan the lack of political will by 
the European Union to engage more deeply in international cooperation 
due to domestic austerity and economic crisis. They see the need for 
a developmental reconfiguration of European policies in areas such as 
agriculture, fisheries, trade and investment, taxation, migration, and 
international security. Also with an eye towards the European level, Niels 
Keijzer and Adam Moe Fejerskov distil lessons from past international 
negotiations for the post-2015 process. On the basis of such findings, 
they advise European policymakers to seek broad-based alliances and 
convince with action, not with words.
A major section of this publication addresses conceptual challenges for 
the post-2015 agenda. In his profound analysis of the dynamics around 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Markus Loewe explores a 
wide range of arguments which speak for the separate treatment of an 
enhanced MDG approach (MDG+) and Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). In his opinion, poverty reduction and human development as 
overarching objectives of international cooperation would suffer if they 
were mixed up with the provision of global public goods. In the first of 
her two contributions, Nicole Rippin also covers the lessons to be learned 
from the MDG experience. Key factors in this regard are to avoid silos 
while ensuring fairness and measurability. As she argues in her second 
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piece, avoiding silos can be accomplished in two ways: the first approach 
builds on the Correlation Sensitive Poverty Index which she herself 
designed; the second alternative is a people-centred model which forms 
clusters according to, for instance, the three main transition phases of 
human life.
Thomas Fues deals with major risks and side-effects of global frameworks 
which the post-2015 process should avoid, where possible, or otherwise 
manage effectively: the trap of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), the disconnect between international commitments and 
domestic implementation and, finally, gridlock due to intergovernmental 
power games and dysfunctional negotiating dynamics. In his second 
contribution Hongyuan Yu emphasises the need to design SDGs in a 
fair and balanced manner. A key point he makes refers to the concept 
of a ‘green economy’. While an authoritative global definition has not 
yet been adopted, all countries agree that they have to achieve low-
carbon development in the future. Clara Brandi, Carmen Richerzhagen 
and Katharina Stepping demonstrate how the water-energy-land nexus 
concept aims at simultaneously transforming management systems in 
order to satisfy the growing demand for these resources, while operating 
within environmental limits. Better results are reached by increasing 
efficiency, reducing trade-offs, building synergies, and improving 
governance across sectors.
Benjamin Schraven and Niels Keijzer reflect on the fact that the MDGs do 
not include human mobility although development without migration is 
hard to imagine. To accomplish an appropriate inclusion of migration into 
the post-2015 agenda, stakeholders need to confront widespread negative 
perceptions and misconceptions about migrants in receiving countries as 
well as the tendency to frequently exploit migrants for short-term gains. 
According to Christian von Haldenwang and Uwe Kerkow, tax fraud and 
evasion should become key elements of the post-2015 agenda because 
illicit capital outflows lie on an order of several magnitudes above inflows 
from ODA, not to mention their negative impacts regarding governance 
and corruption.
The final two texts address critical actors on the global stage. Timo Mahn 
and Pio Wennubst examine the role of the United Nations for the post-
2015 agenda. They argue for strengthening the UN system’s institutional 
Thomas Fues / Jiang Ye (eds.)
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)4
setting, way of working and funding in response to a clearly spelt out 
system-wide mandate. Referring to the potential contribution of club 
governance, Haibing Zhang sees a key role for the G20 in promoting 
universal consensus-building. She suggests that the G20 could create a 
new institution to fill an institutional gap, a Global Development Council.
The volume demonstrates a surprising degree of convergence in German 
and Chinese analytical approaches but also points to substantive areas 
of disagreement. Naturally, views and standpoints within the respective 
groups are also far from homogenous. Scholars from both institutions 
emphasise the historic significance of the post-2015 agenda which aims 
at defining a universal paradigm of sustainable development. Yet, both 
sides maintain that poverty eradication and the unfinished business of 
the MDGs must stand at the centre of the new framework. Low-income 
countries will continue to need substantial external assistance since they 
cannot cope with the dual challenge of inclusive growth and low-carbon, 
resource-light transformation on their own. Scholars from SIIS and DIE 
also concur in underlining the critical role of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ (CBDR) as guiding principle for burden-sharing in the 
post-2015 agenda.
Differences between the scholars relate to the meaning of national 
sovereignty. While SIIS scholars emphasise the voluntary nature of 
national commitments aligned to specific conditions and capabilities, 
DIE contributions focus rather on the objective requirements for 
global transformation within planetary boundaries. The Chinese 
authors are also more concerned than their German colleagues about 
the existing distribution of power within the global system which 
favours industrialised countries. Differing nuances on certain aspects 
notwithstanding, the contributions offer a wide range of valuable insights 
and policy recommendations in support of closer cooperation between 
China and Europe in the post-2015 process.
Introduction
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Introduction
Thomas Fues / Jiang Ye
Negotiations around the post-2015 global development agenda of the United 
Nations have increasingly attracted interest in all parts of the world. It is not 
only governments and non-governmental organisations that have begun to 
address the opportunities and limits of this historic undertaking. Working 
in ‘track-two diplomacy’ parallel to the official process, think-tanks have 
become important sources of knowledge-creation relevant for the process. 
Sensing the relevance of the issue at an early stage, the Shanghai Institutes 
for International Studies (SIIS) and the German Development Institute / 
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) initiated a joint research 
project on the post-2015 agenda in early 2013. The contributions to this 
volume document the ongoing efforts in both institutions and reflect the 
insights gained from numerous exchanges between them.
This publication focuses on scholarly discourses and policy challenges in 
China and Germany. Articles from DIE also cover European perspectives 
while chapters from SIIS extend to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa), although no article specifically touches upon Russia. The 
contributions demonstrate a surprising degree of convergence in German 
and Chinese analytical thinking but also point to substantive areas of 
disagreement. Obviously, the views and standpoints within the respective 
groups are also far from homogenous.
Major aspects of common understanding are the following:
 • Scholars from both institutions emphasise the historic significance of the 
post-2015 agenda which moves into the unchartered territory of defining 
and operationalising a universal paradigm of sustainable development. 
Both sides maintain that poverty eradication and the unfinished business 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) must stand at the 
centre of the post-2015 agenda. Low-income countries will continue to 
depend on substantial external assistance since they cannot cope with 
the dual challenge of inclusive growth and low-carbon, resource-light 
transformation on their own.
 • Reaching far beyond the traditional ‘aid’ discourse which characterises 
the MDGs, the new agenda is uniformly perceived as a comprehensive 
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roadmap for structural transformation which applies to all countries. 
Domestic implementation is seen as a task equally important, or even 
more important, than international efforts.
 • In order to gain universal acceptance and ownership, the goals and 
targets of the post-2015 agenda must build on voluntary commitments 
by all member states of the United Nations. While impartial and fair 
mechanisms of performance assessment and mutual accountability are a 
necessity, coercion and conditionality are not admissible.
 • The post-2015 agenda must also address the need for fundamental 
changes in the system of global governance. This implies strengthening 
the role of developing countries in international institutions as well as 
establishing a regulatory framework for sustainable development in the 
world economy.
 • Scholars from SIIS and DIE concur in underlining the critical role of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) as a guiding 
principle for burden-sharing in the post-2015 agenda. Industrialised 
countries will need to realise their old commitment of providing 0.7 
percent of gross national income (GNI) for developing countries while 
rising powers and other middle-income countries will increasingly be 
expected to contribute to international efforts, in line with their respective 
capabilities. Chinese contributions to this volume indicate that China 
as an emerging power should be ready for enhanced leadership in this 
regard, although North-South cooperation remains as the core of the 
global partnership, with South-South cooperation serving as a useful 
supplement. The fact that references to CBDR in this volume remain 
relatively abstract indicates that future research on the operational 
meaning of the principle in the context of the post-2015 process is 
needed.
 • While national governments are the indispensable drivers for adopting 
and implementing the post-2015 agenda, they cannot succeed without 
including a wide range of non-state, non-executive actors. Such dynamics 
will enlarge existing, and create new spaces for multi-stakeholder, 
collaborative constellations within and outside the institutions of formal 
global governance.
 • All authors are cautious, and partially sceptical, regarding the prospects 
for global consensus-building towards a transformative post-2015 
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agenda. The odds against a substantive agreement in intergovernmental 
negotiations taking place at the United Nations seem enormous. Still, 
the scholars represented here unanimously underline the overriding 
common interest of all societies in a new global compact on sustainable 
development which brings genuine prosperity for all within planetary 
boundaries.
Significant differences between the authors of this volume refer to the 
following issues:
 • Chinese contributions tend to put more weight on the poverty-related 
aspects in developing countries while German authors emphasise 
sustainable consumption and production patterns at home. Accordingly, 
SIIS voices call on traditional donors for renewed efforts in official 
development assistance, whereas DIE thinking is more focused on the 
‘beyond ODA’ narrative.
 • Chinese scholars are more explicit about overcoming Western dominance 
in the world order and, to a limited extent, put their hope in the BRICS as 
an evolving centre of global power. However, this side does not call for 
new multilateral arrangements which would replace, or work in parallel 
to, existing institutions. German positions also build on the existing 
institutional global framework, supporting the call for a larger role of 
rising powers and developing countries.
 • Chinese scholars emphasise that the post-2015 agenda should serve as a 
guide and frame of reference for national development strategies which 
means that sovereignty still has to be respected. They also stress that, 
although peace and security are clearly a prerequisite to development, 
such topics should not be listed as explicit goals in the new agenda. In 
their view, it would be acceptable, however, to create some indicators 
related to peace and security issues. In contrast, German scholars 
generally attribute greater importance to political concerns in the post-
2015 context.
As the UN General Assembly begins negotiations over content and 
implementation of the post-2015 global development agenda, we hope that 
this volume will deepen the understanding of the critical issues at stake. All 
authors are driven by the aspiration of contributing to a meaningful agenda 
for global transformation which will guide all societies in their search for 
Thomas Fues / Jiang Ye
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)8
inclusive sustainable development at local, national, regional and global 
levels.
We thank all colleagues at our two institutes who contributed time and effort 
to make this publication possible. Some of the DIE contributions build 
on texts that have been published as part of the Institute’s Briefing Paper 
series. Special thanks go to the German Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development which supported the research through its 
programme “Managing Global Governance” (MGG). We also thank the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China for supporting our research on the post-
2015 development agenda. Special thanks are due to UN Under-Secretary-
General Wu Hongbo who kindly attended our joint Shanghai conference 
on the post-2015 agenda in early 2013 and delivered an important keynote 
speech.
Part I
Chinese and BRICS perspectives  
of the post-2015 agenda

A strong voice for global sustainable development:  
how China can play a leading role in the post-2015 agenda
Jiang Ye / Thomas Fues
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A strong voice for global sustainable development:  
how China can play a leading role in the post-2015 agenda
Jiang Ye / Thomas Fues
1 Introduction
To the surprise of many, China has taken a pro-active stance in negotiations 
on the post-2015 agenda for global development at the United Nations 
(UN). In September 2013, the government issued a comprehensive position 
paper that aptly addresses a wide range of global challenges, from poverty 
eradication, inclusive growth and ecological conservation to international 
trade and the reform of global economic governance. The statement also 
impresses with a candid assessment of domestic advances and deficiencies, 
for example, income disparities and environmental degradation.
China’s position converges with major UN reports in key aspects, such as 
the overriding concern for poverty eradication and sustainable development. 
The paper diverges from these documents by rejecting the integration of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and by excluding political factors such as good governance 
and human rights.
The position paper of September 2013 may not be China’s final word on the 
post-2015 agenda. Shortly after its publication, the country demonstrated 
considerable flexibility by agreeing to a resolution of the UN General 
Assembly which emphasises the need for a single set of goals and underlines 
the significance of political framework conditions for development – 
positions which China had previously rejected.
China’s early intervention represents an exemplary case of articulating 
national priorities. The country should now move to the second stage of 
pro-active policy formulation by specifying its contributions and ambitions. 
Recent statements of the communist party leadership signal a heightened 
interest in global governance. The ongoing negotiations on post-2015 
offer a historical opportunity for China to demonstrate its commitment 
by increasing material support for South-South development cooperation 
and the provision of global public goods. The government should support 
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the integration of MDGs and SDGs and open up to the concerns of fragile 
and conflict-affected countries, as articulated by the African Union and the 
interstate alliance G7+.
Also, China should use its influence in the global South to work for an 
ambitious post-2015 agenda, thus breaking the persistent gridlock in 
international affairs. In parallel, the country’s leadership should accelerate 
domestic transformation towards a low-carbon, resource-light model of 
prosperity and overcome social disparities.
Propelled by theses priorities, China’s leadership could significantly 
enhance the country’s soft power and inter-national reputation. Acting as 
a bridge between the G77 and industrial countries, China could strengthen 
the authority of the United Nations as the legitimate guardian of global 
well-being. Advanced countries like Germany should follow the Chinese 
example by providing a comprehensive plan of action for international and 
domestic policies aligned to the post-2015 agenda.
2 Key points of China’s position paper
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China issued its 
“Position Paper on the Development Agenda beyond 2015” in September 
2013, shortly before the special event of the United Nations which reviewed 
progress on the MDGs. A comparison of the Chinese document with key 
UN reports reveals convergence, but also divergence on critical issues.
China and four important UN bodies (the UN System Task Team; the High-
Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda; the 
Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development 
Goals; and the Sustainable Development Solutions Network) concur on the 
following points: Poverty eradication is a core element of the post-2015 
agenda. Sustainable development and inclusive growth are pre-requisites 
for prosperity and social welfare. All countries share responsibilities in 
addressing global challenges according to their capabilities. Finally, South-
South cooperation is a useful supplement to North-South cooperation, but 
traditional donors must not renege on their commitments.
Chinese views are also close to policy statements of the European 
Commission and the European Report on Development 2013, prepared 
by a think tank consortium. This proves that there has been a considerable 
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degree of convergence between China and the international com-munity on 
the design of the post-2015 agenda.
However, disagreement between China on the one side and UN and European 
voices on the other prevails with regard to the following aspects: China is 
not in favour of replacing MDGs by SDGs and even has reservations about 
the merger of the two concepts. The country is opposed to the inclusion 
of political factors like human rights, democracy and good governance 
and does not support linking peace and security issues to the post-2015 
framework.
3 Underlying principles of China’s views
The position paper makes the case that four underlying principles should 
shape the post-2015 agenda. They represent core elements of China’s foreign 
policy with regard to non-interference and equitable burden-sharing. They 
also reflect the strategic objective of consolidating China’s alliance with 
developing countries (G77) by emphasising the primacy of growth and 
development.
a) Respect sovereignty and diversity in development models: The post-
2015 agenda should serve as a guide and frame of reference for national 
development strategies, not as a tool for interfering in internal affairs. 
Although peace and security clearly are a prerequisite to development, the 
Chinese government is convinced that such topics should be excluded from 
the new agenda, because this would detract from genuine development 
goals and violate the sovereignty principle.
b) Manage international burden-sharing: The principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) which was formally established in 
1992 at the Rio Earth Summit is a manifestation of equity in international 
law. In fact, the principle can be traced back to the early 1970s when the UN 
General Assembly established a target for industrial countries to contribute 
0.7% of their national income as assistance to developing countries. 
However, the position paper falls short of spelling out how CBDR could be 
made operational in the context of post-2015. Nor does it provide specific 
information on China’s future transfers to low-income countries or to the 
provision of global public goods.
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c) Build on the MDGs: Although the 2000 Millennium Declaration which 
serves as legitimation of the MDGs stresses the close relationship between 
development and political factors like human rights, democracy, good 
governance and rule of law, the MDGs as such do not include these elements 
due to insurmountable dissent among UN member states. In continuation of 
the MDG tradition, China wants the post-2015 framework to refrain from 
incorporating contested political targets.
d) Avoid an overloaded agenda: China’s position paper does not explicitly 
refer to SDGs which the General Assembly wants to adopt in 2015, based on 
a decision at the 2012 Rio+20 Summit in Brazil. This signals an objection 
to the integration of MDGs and SDGs. The lack of support for a common 
framework of MDGs and SDGs may be of diplomatic, not principled 
nature owing to sensibilities of developing countries, since the Chinese 
text pays considerable attention to the promotion of economic, social and 
environmental development in a balanced way.
4 Driving forces of China’s policies
China’s position in the post-2015 process is shaped by a variety of normative 
factors and practical considerations. To better understand China’s role 
in intergovernmental negotiations on post-2015, it is useful to examine 
the drivers which determine the country’s foreign policy as well as the 
transformation of its economy and society.
Five principles of peaceful co-existence
The five principles of peaceful co-existence – mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence 
– are the fundamental normative framework for China in international 
affairs. They were proposed by former Premier Zhou Enlai in 1953 and 
to this day guide the country’s foreign policy. The principles have been 
accepted by most countries in the world, especially by developing countries, 
and have become an important norm of international relations.
China considers its participation in the setting of the post-2015 development 
agenda as an important diplomatic action. The fact that China’s position 
paper was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is evidence of this. 
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It is, therefore, only natural for China to acknowledge the five principles 
of peaceful coexistence by emphasising the autonomy of all countries in 
pursuing their own national development strategies and targets.
However, China’s expanding links with the developing world may soon lead 
to a critical examination of strict non-interference since political instability 
and violent conflicts in partner countries not only erode the foundations for 
domestic prosperity but also threaten the economic interests and personal 
safety of foreign actors. In shaping its future foreign policy, China should 
therefore pay increased attention to the internal conditions of developing 
countries and consider appropriate ways of fostering stability and crisis 
prevention.
China’s identity as developing country
China’s government insists on its international status as largest developing 
country although its economy ranks number two in the world. The 
communist party openly admits that the country struggles with meeting the 
ever-growing material and cultural needs of the population. In 2009, more 
than 100 million people still lived in extreme poverty. Measured by 2012 per 
capita income, China ranks 93 in international comparison. 
The identity of China as a developing country is one of the reasons why 
the position paper emphasises poverty eradication and development as core 
of the new frame-work. However, as China’s prosperity and international 
weight continue to grow, its rising capabilities and power resources call for a 
reconsideration of identity. The country should prepare for the moment when 
the world no longer shares the view of China as a developing country, but 
rather expects an international performance commensurate to its status as a 
global leader. And it should define its objectives and streamline its practices 
as the most important provider of South-South development cooperation, 
for example in regard to transparency and accountability.
Achievements in implementing the MDGs
The country’s focus on poverty eradication is shaped by its successful track 
record at home. Extreme poverty in China dropped from 60 per cent in 1990 
to 16 per cent in 2005 and 12 per cent in 2010. Since 2003, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry, working together with the UN system, released a total 
of five reports on “Progress in China’s Implementation of the Millennium 
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Development Goals” which demonstrate the country’s achievements. The 
latest report states that in 2013, two years ahead of the finishing line, China 
had achieved nearly half of the MDGs. However, the impressive progress 
may be more a result of domestic priorities independent of global goals.
Promoting domestic and global governance
In November 2013, the third plenary session of the eighteenth central 
committee of the communist party initiated a novel discourse about 
transforming the traditional top-down style of state rule into a new mode of 
interactive, multi-stakeholder governance. This signals long-term changes 
in China’s development philosophy. The meaning of social progress will 
no longer be confined to economic growth and material improvement but 
framed by a holistic concept of multi-dimensional sustainable development.
Parallel to internal changes, China’s leadership is determined to strengthen 
international efforts because the boundaries between domestic and world 
affairs are becoming blurred and the country has become an important actor 
at the centre of the global system.
From a series of documents approved at recent meetings of the communist 
party, we can see that the promotion of national governance and participation 
in global governance have become dominant trends in China’s policies. It 
is, therefore, logical that China will pay more attention to environmental 
protection, climate change and other issues of sustainable development 
related to global challenges.
5 Outlook
As China becomes more influential on the world stage and plays a more 
important role in the field of international development cooperation, the 
international community needs to pay more attention to differences of 
opinion with China and try to find ways to address them in a constructive 
way. Similarly, China needs to listen to the concerns of others. China should 
use its enormous influence in the global South (e.g. G77 and BRICS) 
but also in the G20 to promote a consensus of developing and industrial 
countries on cooperative responses to global challenges.
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The fact that China agreed to a landmark resolution of the UN General 
Assembly on post-2015 shortly after the publication of its position paper 
demonstrates a high degree of flexibility since member states spoke out in 
favour of merging MDGs and SDGs and wanted to include political factors. 
Future negotiations will show to what extent China will modify its positions 
to facilitate a meaningful universal consensus and what commitments the 
country will undertake at home and abroad to support the post-2015 agenda.
Policy recommendations
In order to demonstrate its heightened interests in global governance and to 
play a leading role in the post-2015 agenda for global development China’s 
leadership should consider the following recommendations:
 • Support the integration of MDGs and SDGs into a single framework and 
set of goals.
 • Strengthen the universal character of the post-2015 agenda by 
demonstrating how China will accelerate structural transformation of its 
economy, aligned to the requirements of planetary sustainability.
 • Lift the remaining 120 million people from extreme poverty in China in 
the next 15 years.
 • Issue a concrete statement on the expansion of assistance to developing 
countries over the next decades. The average quota of OECD countries’ 
ODA to GNI should be the point of reference for China and other rising 
powers (official development assistance to gross national income).
 • Support the position of fragile and conflict-affected countries, as 
articulated by the African Union and the interstate alliance G7+, on the 
inclusion of peace and security in post-2015, under the prerogative of 
the Security Council.
 • Specify future contributions of China to the provision of key global 
public goods, like climate protection, economic stability, UN peace 
keeping, health etc.
 • Assume political and intellectual leadership in the South, including the 
G77 and BRICS, to facilitate a global consensus on an ambitious post-
2015 frame-work.
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Given the fact that there are less than 800 days left for the implementation of 
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the discussion about what 
succession goals should be in force after 2015 – now under the umbrella of 
the post-2015 international development agenda (post-2015 agenda) – is 
increasingly heating up. Various reports have been publicised and special 
events held since 2013, for example, the report by the High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (HLP) for the UN 
Secretary-General (UNSG) issued on 30 May 2013, and the special event 
on September 25 by UN General Assembly (UNGA), just to name a few. All 
these reports and events have set up the basic framework for the post-2015 
agenda, for which intergovernmental negotiations will start in September 
2014. The UN will need to deepen and identify the exact goals, targets, 
and indicators for the post-2015 agenda. While China has issued an official 
policy paper, the country needs to closely follow the related discussions, 
update and further clarify its policy, and contribute more to the building of 
the post-2015 agenda.
2 The state discussions on the post-2015 agenda
The resolution of the 65th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) from 
20 to 22 September 2010, “Keeping the promise: united to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals”, requests the UNSG to report annually 
until 2015 on the progress in the implementation of this Declaration and 
to make recommendations in his annual reports for further steps to realise 
the United Nations Development Agenda beyond 2015 (UN 2010, 29). 
1 This research is supported by the DFID (Department for International Development/
United Kingdom) Research Project entitled “China International Development Research 
Network (CIDRN)”.
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The three most important reports are: the HLP report entitled “A new 
global partnership: eradicate poverty and transform economies through 
sustainable development” that sets the roadmap for eradicating extreme 
poverty (under USD 1.25 per day) and meeting sustainable development 
promises by 2030 (UNHLP 2013). The Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network (SDSN) report published on 6 June 2013, “An action agenda for 
sustainable development: report for the UN Secretary-General”, identified 
ten priorities for sustainable development (SDSN 2013, 8-26). And the third 
is the report by UNSG Ban Ki-moon, “A life of dignity for all: accelerating 
progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and advancing the 
United Nations development agenda beyond 2015”. However, the report 
of the Secretary-General on 26 July 2013 implied that in fact four reports 
are of great importance, including the HLP report, the SDSN report, and 
reports from the Global Compact Office and the United Nations System 
Task Team on the Post-2015 United Nations Development Agenda. Besides 
the above mentioned reports, various other reports from various different 
regional organisations, national governments, civil society groups (CSGs), 
and NGOs exist.
It is important to note that there is an emerging consensus on the post-2015 
agenda, with the Western values and preferences at the core, as articulated 
by governments, civil society groups (CSGs) and non-governmental 
organisation (NGOs). Such a consensus has three special features that are 
not beneficial to developing countries as a whole.
First of all, while under the umbrella of post-2015 agenda, the real 
development of the discussion is that the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) advocated by the Rio+20 Summit in June 2012 have already 
gradually taken the place of post-MDGs. At the very beginning, the 
discussion was framed by post-MDGs with the intention of building a 
new goal system to continue what the MDGs had done and to supplement 
the MDGs by adding some missing elements. With the discussions about 
global climate change and sustainable development, the Rio+20 Summit 
issued the outcome document named “The future we want” and created far-
sighted goals, the SDGs (UN 2012). More importantly, these two parallel 
processes will come to an end by the end of 2015, with only one month 
time difference between them, a fact that calls for a single set of goals. For 
example, a mid-term report by the Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals (OWG-SDGs), issued in July 2013, called for a single 
post-2015 United Nations development framework containing a single set 
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of goals. The special event on 25 September 2013 made a similar resolution. 
With such a consensus for a single set of goals established, the emphasis 
on SDGs gradually substituted the discussion about post-MDGs with three 
concurrent developments, namely: greater discussion about international 
development goals in foreign affairs; greater emphasis on environment and/
or conditions of development; and greater concerns about the role of the 
South and the universality of the new goals.
Secondly, what makes the SDGs possible as a core of the post-2015 agenda, 
is that this is in effect an effort of international norm-building, not the 
setting of international development goals such as the MDGs. The most 
important difference between the MDGs and the post-2015 agenda is that 
MDGs were decided upon by the developed world and then imposed on the 
developing world, while the SDGs have not been. Thanks to the rising clout 
of emerging powers and the spillover effects on the rest of developing world, 
there is no possibility that the developed world will dominate the post-2015 
agenda. Inviting the developing world, especially the emerging countries, to 
contribute to the building of the post-2015 agenda is unavoidable. Thus a new 
issue has emerged for the developed world: how to maintain its influence on 
the international development agenda? To level up such an effort from setting 
short-term development goals, like the MDGs did in 1990s, to building 
long-term development norms, is a promising strategy for maintaining such 
a role. Under the conditions of the twin crises – the global financial crisis 
and global climate change – the imbedding of sustainable development, as a 
development norm, into the post-2015 agenda is universally welcomed and 
ethically irrefutable. The logic behind replacing the MDGs by SDGs lies in 
the fact that MDGs have failed to serve the strategic purpose of changing 
the discourse on development in the developed world, even if they were seen 
as a significant step towards an international social norm that views extreme 
poverty as morally unacceptable thereby changing international values, 
because the values reflected in MDGs were too trivial to be an alternative 
(Bandara 2013). Thus, it is important to integrate the three dimensions of 
sustainable development (economic, social, and environmental) and to avoid 
‘competition to the bottom’. By doing so, the new system of goals, with 
SDGs at the core, claims universality (SDSN 2013, Par. 16–33). To raise 
acceptance from most countries and for the sake of a moderate appearance, 
the developed world has to declare poverty reduction to be one of the main 
pillars under the post-2015 umbrella. And to call it by a good name, the post-
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2015 agenda emphasises that it should combine negative growth (poverty 
reduction) with positive growth (sustainable development) (UNHLP 2013).
Thirdly, with sustainable and inclusive development as core norms for 
the post-2015 agenda, the controversy of conditionality in international 
development discourse would now disappear because the ethical 
requirement of sustainable and inclusive development is undeniable. It is 
universally accepted that to realise sustainable development, one country 
has to combine economic, social, and environmental development and this 
lays the foundation for almost all important reports about the post-2015 
agenda. For example, there are three goals among the twelve advocated by 
the HLP report that refer to conditions of development, namely managing 
natural resource assets sustainably, ensuring good governance and effective 
institutions, and ensuring a stable and peaceful society (UNHLP 2013, 16). 
And the tenth goal, to “transform governance for sustainable development”, 
advocated by the SDSN report also implies integrating conditionality 
into the post-2015 agenda (SDSN 2013, 8). Given that good governance, 
human rights and aid conditionality are too sensitive to become goals of 
the post-2015 agenda, more efforts to hide such conditionality behind the 
mechanisms of supervision and reporting have been generated: 
For the world to follow a sustainable development trajectory, all countries 
and businesses must agree to a set of rules and values, and then live up 
to their responsibilities under a system of transparency, monitoring, and 
accountability (Wennubst / Mahn 2013, 3). 
The proposed mechanisms for monitoring include, for example, a data 
revolution for sustainable development, creating a new monitoring agency, 
establishing a global peer-review mechanism, etc.
3 China’s participation: advantages and disadvantages
Despite its significant advantages, China’s participation in the discussion of 
the post-2015 agenda has been fairly moderate while internationally such an 
effort is increasingly heating up. China can claim at least two very important 
advantages in participating in the discussion: On the one hand, as most 
observers have pointed out, the great success of the MDGs has to a very 
large extent been because of China’s achievements. Generally speaking, 
China has made great progress in economic and social development and 
other areas in the past 20 years. China has already met seven targets under 
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the MDGs ahead of schedule. China’s human development index (HDI) saw 
a rapid growth from 0.495 in 1990 to 0.699 in 2012, higher than the world 
average of 0.694 (MOFA / UNDP 2013, 9).
On the other hand, China has a rich experience in the building of global 
partnerships for the implementation of the MDGs, especially with Africa. 
As a developing country, China is not bound by the obligation (prescribed 
by Goal 8) of assisting other developing countries. Nevertheless, China has 
always regarded strengthening cooperation with other developing countries 
as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. China’s involvement in South-South 
cooperation takes various forms and covers a wide range of fields, such 
as trade, investment and development cooperation, and constitutes an 
important part of the global South-South cooperation. Since 2000, while 
being dedicated to achieving the MDGs domestically, China has striven to 
provide assistance to more than 120 developing countries within the South-
South cooperation framework, so as to help them improve their capacity 
for independent development to achieve the MDGs. Assistance has been 
delivered in many ways, such as construction of infrastructure, agricultural 
and industrial projects, provision of various goods and equipment, dispatching 
experts for technical cooperation, medical teams and volunteers, offering 
emergency humanitarian assistance, holding human resources trainings and 
so on. From 2000 to 2012, China has provided more than RMB 250 billion 
in aid to foreign countries (MOFAS / UNDP 2013, 51). The ‘best practice’ 
example of this effort is the cooperation between China and Africa under the 
framework of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in the field 
of the MDGs (Zhang 2013, 27–44).
Without a sense of urgency, China has not pro-actively participated in the 
discussions about the post-2015 agenda. Generally speaking, a strange trend 
exists, namely that China lays importance on this issue at the strategic level 
while ignoring it at the operational level.
Strategically, China has always attached great importance to international 
development, especially the building of the post-2015 agenda. The Chinese 
government has issued several documents in this regard. At the 5th FOCAC 
ministerial conference in July 2012, the Beijing Declaration calls on 
the international community to, under the leading role of the UN, take 
seriously the inefficient implementation in the field of sustainable 
development, show the political will and commitment to build consensus, 
and reach agreement on the implementation plan of the post-MDG 
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framework of sustainable development. We also urge the developed 
countries to honor their assistance commitments to developing countries, 
African countries in particular (FOCAC 2013).
As an inward-looking event, the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) 
National Congress in November 2012, advocates establishing ‘a new type 
of global development partnership that is more equitable and balanced’, a 
concept proposed even earlier and more comprehensive than the concept of 
‘new global partnership’ advocated by the United Nations for the post-2015 
agenda.
At the BRICS Summit in March 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping called 
for 
jointly participating in the setting of [the] international development 
agenda, fully harnessing the productivity and material resources 
accumulated in the past, fulfilling the UN Millennium Development 
Goals, narrowing the North-South gap in development, and making global 
development more balanced (Xi 2013).
Shortly after his speech, the BRICS Summit Declaration confirmed this call 
collectively. On 22 September 2013, the Chinese government publicised 
its position paper on the post-2015 agenda (MOFA 2013), a leading action 
among emerging powers, while still lagging behind most of the developed 
world.
However, at the operational level, China’s participation is quite slow 
compared to its policy statements; part of the reason lies in the fact that 
there are too many urgent challenges ahead while the intergovernmental 
negotiations of the post-2015 agenda will go on over a while. Such 
reservation in terms of preparing for the post-2015 agenda has three 
explanations. Firstly, China is not thinking thoroughly about how to transfer 
its experience of MDGs implementation into a theory for guiding its future 
participation. Domestically, China did not develop a comprehensive theory 
from its successful poverty reduction which it could then contribute to 
the discussion about the Post-2015 agenda. Internationally, China always 
limits the cooperation in MDGs to development assistance, not under the 
framework of global partnership building (MDG 8); and such cooperation 
is more thought of as bilateral cooperation and not from the perspective of 
South-South cooperation.
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Secondly, the human resource and intellectual contributions for the post-
2015 agenda are too limited given the importance of China as an emerging 
power. The SDSN has only 3 Chinese experts, too few to participate 
in the discussion of 12 topics; and there was only one Chinese person, 
Ambassador Wang Yingfan, included in the HLP, with no academic 
support. Another example: No Chinese transnational company participated 
in the drafting of the UN Global Compact report for the post-2015 agenda 
(UNGC 2013). While there were two consultations by UNDP in China, 
one local consultation in Kunming in December 2013 and another national 
consultation in Beijing in March 2013, the sponsor for these two events was 
the Chinese Association of United Nations, a semi-NGO in China, proving 
the inaction of the Chinese government in this regard.
And, finally, although academic research in China is lagging behind, it to 
a very great extent welcomes the universality of the SDGs ignoring the 
potential disadvantages mentioned above.2
4 What should China contribute to the post-2015 
agenda?
With the expiration of MDGs approaching, China’s strategy for participating 
in the building of the post-2015 agenda should be based on the norm 
framework established by previous discussions, combine negative growth 
(poverty reduction) and positive growth (sustainable development), and 
contribute intellectually to the building of a new global partnership.
Firstly, as to the goal framework, China should ensure the integrity between 
the norms and goals of the post-2015 agenda, and avoid confusion between 
the goals and the means.
The fact that most voices advocate a period of 15 years indicates that the 
discussion about the post-2015 agenda should not be too broad nor too long-
term based. Keeping this in mind, China should emphasise the link between 
2 It is important to note that the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS), a 
leading Chinese think-tank, has contributed a great deal to this effort. It has completed a 
project for the FOCAC, drafted a background paper for the EU (Grimm / Zhang 2013), 
held two international conferences in January and November 2013 respectively, and 
organised two special issues of its publications, one in Chinese (Global Review 3/2013) 
and another in English (Global Review, Spring Issue 2013).
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short-term goals and long-term norms. The post-2015 agenda should lay out 
a set of goals by consensus to guide international development cooperation 
and national development in a spirit of equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, 
mutual learning and ‘win-win’ cooperation, without hidden objectives.
Given that the MDGs have made significant achievements but that much 
needs to be done to fully meet the goals set in 2000, China should insist 
on the continuation of the post-2015 agenda through comprehensively 
assessing the current state of international development cooperation, 
reviewing the progress and challenges in implementing the MDGs and, on 
this basis, exploring the possibilities of and developing a single set of goals 
for the post-2015 agenda. Meanwhile, given the fact that poverty eradication 
will be one of the key goals of the post-2015 agenda and that the other 
goals of MDGs are facing the risk of abandonment, China should argue for 
harmonising the remaining MDGs into the new goals system.
The post-2015 agenda will set a universal goal system for the whole world; 
however, differing countries and regions have different contexts for future 
implementation. Thus, China should advocate a goal-zone approach, to 
set both floors and ceilings for each field, and set different stages of goals 
between the floor and ceiling for countries and regions at different levels of 
development. Such an approach is, to some extent, similar to that advocated 
by the HLP report to set a zero framework that all countries should abide by 
along with a goal zone combining “absolute goals and boundaries coupled 
with differentiated targets” (Nayar et al. 2013).
China needs to develop further its theoretical framework for the post-
2015 agenda based on its experience of cooperation with other developing 
countries, especially Africa, in implementation of the MDGs. One point 
that must be noted is that such experience proves that development is 
the foundation of everything and that only development achievements 
can address the unfavourable conditions of development. China and the 
developing world should strengthen their public diplomacy for promoting 
such experience and advocate that the post-2015 agenda should see 
development goals rather than conditions of development as primary.
More profoundly, both China and the rest of the developing world should 
broaden their eyes to perceive the post-2015 agenda from the perspective 
of human development rather than international development assistance, 
for improving their capability to build international norms and rules. China 
and the rest of developing world should not only think about the agenda 
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from their own context, but also from the context of the developed world; 
and think about the possibility of providing public goods for the developed 
world, especially intellectual public goods on development options, pushing 
the developed world to rethink the deficiencies of its own development path 
and theory.
Secondly, as to the time framework, China should advocate making 
the best use of the limited time and setting for a reasonable schedule of 
implementation.
It is important to note that one reason for the imperfectness of MDGs lies in 
the time limitation. If there were another five to ten years, the performance 
of the MDGs would definitely be better. Another important issue is that 
many international negotiations proceed on the basis that “nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed” which becomes a recipe for gridlock (SDSN 
2013, 25). Such gridlock is the biggest potential obstacle for reaching an 
agreement on the post-2015 agenda. If necessary, China should advocate an 
approach of ‘starting from agreed and leaving disagreed for other processes’ 
in order to save the negotiation framework and leave more time for further 
negotiation.
Combining the two points above, China should also advocate for a longer 
time framework for the implementation of the post-2015 agenda, if necessary. 
The appropriate period could be 20–30 years with a multi-speed and multi-
track framework. Such a longer time framework could be structured as four 
phases, each of five years:
 • Phase 1: Initiate the first phase of the post-2015 agenda for the developed 
world, and adapt and move from MDGs to the post-2015 agenda for the 
developing world;
 • Phase 2: Move to the second phase of the post-2015 agenda for the 
developed world, and start the first phase for the developing world, and 
launch the building of a new global partnership;
 • Phase 3: Finish the floor goals for the developed world, and move to the 
second phase for the developing world;
 • Phase 4: Finish the ceiling goals for the developed world, and finish 
the floor goals for the developing world, and start the discussion and 
negotiation over the new goals (post-2035 or post-2040).
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Thirdly, as to the implementation framework, China should join hands with 
the international community to ensure that the voices of the developing 
world are heard and its reasonable rights respected.
Armed with the experience of successful domestic implementation and 
international cooperation, China should contribute to a larger voice and the 
equal participation of the developing world through pro-active participation, 
both individually and collectively. However, as the United Nations has 
recognised, more fundamental reform in funding will not occur without a 
dramatic change in perspective. In particular, what is needed is a collective 
effort to overcome the recipient-provider discourse that reinforces the 
North-South dichotomy in UN circles. Furthermore, concrete steps should 
be taken to broaden and diversify donor bases and reduce reliance on a 
limited number of member state donors that primarily contribute earmarked 
funds (Wennubst / Mahn 2013, 3).
As to the building of a new global partnership, it is important to keep a 
balance between the rising South-South cooperation and the traditional 
South-North cooperation. While noting the rising capabilities of providing 
more public goods from the South, China should insist on the key role of 
South-North cooperation. Thus, the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ ought to be applied to the funding platform of the post-
2015 agenda. Meanwhile, China should also remind the world of the risks 
of the developed world using ‘universal responsibility’ as an excuse for 
shirking the responsibility of public goods provision. This points to the 
importance of identifying the proper division of labour between the South-
South cooperation and the South-North cooperation.
Fourthly, as to the monitoring framework, China should emphasise the 
combination of voluntary and universal principles to avoid the quiet 
attachment of political and social conditions. It is important to say that 
the illustrative goals and targets would not be legally binding, but must be 
monitored closely. Thus, while emphasising an independent and rigorous 
monitoring system, China should insist that monitoring must be seen by 
everyone as a way of motivating progress and enhancing cooperation, not as 
a tool for conditionality.
Fifth and finally, China should strengthen its capability towards the design of 
the post-2015 agenda. China should combine better its domestic development 
strategy with the post-2015 agenda, especially on how to combine negative 
with positive growth. China needs to improve its participation in the post-
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2015 agenda building, through establishing an intellectual community 
consisting of governmental officials, academic researchers, think-tank 
analysts, civil society groups, and NGOs activists, etc. And a coalition should 
be built before the intergovernmental negotiations starting September 2014, 
for which some existing platforms are highly relevant, including the United 
Nations, G20, FOCAC, BRICS, G77+China, etc.
Chun Zhang
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)38
Bibliography
Bandara, A. (2013): What have we learned?, in: The Broker 15 Aug. 2013; online: 
http://www.thebrokeronline.co.uk/Blogs/Post-2015-shaping-a-global-agenda/
What-have-we-learned (accessed 25 Jul. 2014)
Grimm, S. / C. Zhang (2013): South-South cooperation and the Millennium 
Development Goals : preparing for a post-2015 setting, in: Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) / German Development Institute (DIE) / European 
Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM): European Report on 
Development, post-2015 : global action for an inclusive and sustainable future, 
Brussels: European Commission
FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) (2012): Beijing declaration of the 
Fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa cooperation, 23 Jul.; 
online: http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/dwjbzjjhys/hywj/t954245.htm (accessed 
25 Jul. 2014)
MOFA (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (2013): China’s position paper on the 
development agenda beyond 2015, Beijing; online: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
eng/wjdt/2649/t1078984.shtml (accessed 25 Jul. 2014)
– / UNDP (2013): China’s progress towards the millennium development goals, 
2013 report, Beijing
Nayar, A. et al. (2013): Towards a framework of universal sustainability goals as part 
of a post-2015 agenda, Civil Society Reflection Group on Global Development 
Perspectives; online: www.annd.org/english/data/post/file/8.pdf (accessed 25 
Jul. 2014)
SDSN (Sustainable Development Solutions Network) (2013): An action agenda 
for sustainable development : report for the UN Secretary-General, New York; 
online: http://www.unsdsn.org (accessed 25 Jul. 2014)
UN (United Nations) (2010): Keeping the promise : united to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals, resolution adopted by the General Assembly, New York (A/
RES/65/1)
– (2012): The future we want, outcome document, adopted at Rio+20, New York
UNGC (United Nations Global Compact) (2013): Perspectives from UN Global 
Compact participants on global priorities and how to engage business towards 
Sustainable Development Goals, report to the United Nations Secretary-General, 
New York
UNHLP(United Nations High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda) (2013): A new global partnership : eradicate poverty 
and transform economies through sustainable development, New York: United 
Nations
On China’s participation in the post-2015 international development agenda
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 39
Wennubst, P. / T. Mahn (2013): Post 2015 : what it means for the United Nations 
Development System, Bonn: DIE (Briefing Paper 13/2013)
Xi, J. P. (2013): Work hand in hand for common development, keynote speech by 
H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China, at the fifth BRICS 
leaders meeting; online: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/xjpcf1/t1027968.
shtml (accessed 25 Jul. 2014)
Zhang, C. (2013): Building a new type of global development partnership : China-
Africa cooperation contributes to international development cooperation, in: 
Global Review 5 (3), 27–44

China and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Hongyuan Yu

China and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 43
Contents
1 China and sustainable development 45
2 China’s leadership in global sustainable development 47
3 China and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)  47
3.1 Actively promote the development of green economy and 
emphasise a package solution 47
3.2 Reaffirm common responsibilities and fairness 49
3.3 Strengthening multifaceted international cooperation  
as well as promoting the global green transformation 50
Bibliography 51

China and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 45
China and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Hongyuan Yu
Since its participation in the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment held at Stockholm in 1972, China has made significant progress 
in its sustainable development. As a developing country, China is fully aware 
of its responsibility and role in promoting a healthy growth of the world 
economy and protecting the global environment and climate. China has paid 
close attention to addressing the environmental problems that have occurred 
in the process of economic and social development on the one hand and has 
also attached great importance to and actively participated in international 
cooperation on sustainable development. China always advocates that all 
countries should explore sustainable development paths according to their 
own characteristics, with the view of introducing resource-efficient and 
eco-friendly production and consumption patterns and lifestyles in order 
to achieve sustainable economic, social and environmental development. 
China always pushes for regional and global cooperation and takes the 
initiative to share responsibilities for sustainable development.
1 China and sustainable development
China’s population has reached 1.3 billion people, and its economy is one of 
the world’s largest and fastest growing. Any successful international effort to 
global sustainable development must inevitably include China (Pew Center 
on Global Climate Change 2007). Consequently, China is experiencing 
widespread and often acute environmental challenges with severe local, 
national and regional consequences (Smil 1993; Japan Environment Council 
2000, 98-100; World Bank 1997). China’s role in contributing to global 
sustainable development derives from changing its energy mix. The 12th Five 
Year Plan begins to put some flesh on the bones of the 40% to 45% carbon 
intensity reduction target for 2020 which Beijing laid out in Copenhagen 
in 2009, starting with the interim goals for 2015 of reducing the country’s 
carbon intensity per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% and energy 
intensity by 16%. The 12th Five-year Plan has adjusted the construction 
goal of pumped-storage hydroelectric plants from 50 to 80 million kilowatts 
(kW) (BP 2011). In 2009, China’s installed capacity for hydropower reached 
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197,000 megawatts (MW), the highest in the world. By the end of 2012, 
the full calibre power installed capacity of China was 1.144 billion kW, of 
which thermal power amounted to 0.819 billion kW and 12.57 million kW 
nuclear power. The total installed capacity of thermal power accounted for 
72%; nuclear power accounted for 1%; renewable energy accounted for 27%. 
China has the world’s biggest renewable energy power generation installed 
capacity and the second-largest power generation capacity.
In the post-Rio era, what policies and countermeasures should be adopted 
to realise a green economy and raise the level of ecological civilisation is of 
great strategic significance to the Chinese people. China is a strong supporter 
of sustainable development and also an active practitioner, feeding more 
than 20% of the world’s population with less than 10% of the world’s arable 
land and only 28% of its water resources. Since the reform and opening-up 
phase, China had been relying on the extensive economic growth mode 
which is focused on increasing investment and the material input, resulting 
in a large expansion of consumption and waste of resources and energy. As 
a consequence, China has been confronted with serious challenges.
In the report of the Communist Party leadership to the 18th National 
Congress, the construction of ecological civilisation was elevated to higher 
strategic level. Promoting ecological progress is seen as a long-term task 
of vital importance to the people’s wellbeing and to China’s future. Faced 
with increasing resource constraints, severe environmental pollution and a 
deteriorating eco-system, the country’s leaders recognise that they must raise 
ecological awareness and foster a mindset which respects, accommodates 
for and protects nature. In their view, the country must give high priority 
to making ecological progress, incorporate it into the whole process of 
advancing economic, political, cultural, and social progress, work hard to 
build a beautiful country, and achieve the lasting and sustainable development 
of the Chinese nation. Thus, the overall arrangements for the cause of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics have been changed to ecological 
construction ecological construction ecological constructiona ‘five-in-one’ 
systematic project of community building, economic construction, political 
construction, cultural construction and ecological civilisation. This overall 
orientation also needs to guide scientific development. Concepts such as 
environmental protection, resource conservation and recycling the economy 
have been incorporated into the Party’s report. Developing the economy and 
improving people’s livelihoods are tough challenges for China. In short, 
China is still a developing country and has a long way to go.
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2 China’s leadership in global sustainable development
In the area of global sustainable development, following the 1992 Earth 
Summit, the Chinese government devised a national sustainable development 
plan based on the summit’s ‘Agenda 21’ objectives. This plan served as 
a guide to China’s national economic and social development plans. In 
addition, the government has issued a number of environmental regulations 
and laws, such as the Environment Protection Law (1989), the Law on the 
Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution (1987), the Forest Law 
(1989) and the Energy Conservation Law (1997). The government has also 
issued the Renewable Energy Law (2005).
China has always tried to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with a vast 
number of developing countries, especially in the course of negotiations 
over conventions and related issues. In 1991, China and most developing 
countries reached a common position on environmental protection 
and adopted the Beijing Declaration at the Ministerial Conference on 
Environment and Development. China insisted on the principle of ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities’ and stressed that developed countries 
should fulfil more obligations than developing countries in environmental 
protection and should take the lead in undertaking action to protect the 
global environment. China believes that the right of developing countries to 
development should be protected. Environmental threats have increasingly 
become economic, political, security and strategic issues. Developed 
countries have been profoundly impacted by environmental threats, though 
there is a trend in which environmental threats are shifting to developing 
countries.
3 China and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
3.1 Actively promote the development of green economy and 
emphasise a package solution
China emphasises that the green economy is an important way to realise 
sustainable development. However, although it is of positive significance 
for poverty eradication and economic structural adjustment, it also brings 
with it risks and challenges. Developing a green economy is a complex, 
long-term process, especially for the developing countries. They are usually 
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constrained by limitations of capital, technology and capacity-building 
and face many practical difficulties in developing a green economy. The 
international community should therefore strengthen cooperation, avoiding 
disadvantages and addressing the concerns of developing countries. The 
primary goal of a green economy should be poverty eradication which 
is deeply related to the survival and development rights of the people in 
developing countries. China should continue to actively promote the principle 
that every country develops its own green economy model according to 
national conditions and capacities. In this vein, China advocates a green 
economy on the basis of inclusivity, diversity, innovation and fairness, but 
not with unified models, identical targets, timetables and roadmaps. China 
also concurs that green growth in developing countries is the core content of 
a future global green economy.
Moreover, the present talks discuss green economy, institutional frameworks 
and sustainable development objectives separately but the development 
of a green economy needs a comprehensive approach. The development 
objectives are essential, but the transition costs, technology transfer, 
development paths, business models, and market and policy integration 
should also be emphasised. In addition, in order to phase out backward 
industries and to encourage the use of non-fossil energy, the development 
of green industries should be promoted through a package of policy 
initiatives, particularly focused on improving energy efficiency and using 
alternative energy sources. Fossil energy subsidies should be abolished 
while protecting vulnerable groups. Along with this, it is necessary to 
implement green industrialisation globally. The development of a green 
economy is related to cross-border factors such as green investment, green 
trade, green industrialisation and globalisation. Therefore the building of 
green economies requires close cooperation between countries with the 
aim of establishing a new global economic order, reducing conflict-related 
provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and multilateral 
environmental agreements, promoting green products and services, 
opposing trade protectionism and eliminating all kinds of unreasonable 
green trade barriers.
Finally, it should be noted that China is willing to contribute more to the 
development of a green economy worldwide on the basis of fairness. 
The country hopes that developed countries will make new political 
commitments. In short, that means that China is willing to cooperate with 
other countries in seeking global prosperity.
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3.2 Reaffirm common responsibilities and fairness
It is time now for China to become a responsible power. In order to 
safeguard the world’s survival and development, China should emphasise 
the importance of reshaping its global responsibilities according to the 
principles of seeking consensus, deepening mutual trust, seeking common 
ground while reserving differences, cooperating actively and creating a 
better future. This is not to make China bear all the responsibilities, but 
rather a reinterpretation of the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ against a new background. ‘Common’ is a priority; 
‘differentiated responsibilities’ are under discussion and specific. However, 
China’s demands should be considered by the international community. 
And China would gain in moral authority and play a better role in green 
development. At the same time, in view of the profound changes in the 
international political and economic landscape over the past 20 years, we 
should look at the past consensus with new understanding.
As sustainable development involves a wide range of areas, we could weaken 
the controversial principle ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and 
stress fairness, also referring to developing a green economy and specifying 
concrete objectives. China has always argued that many developing 
countries are undergoing rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, facing the 
daunting task of poverty eradication, economic structural adjustment and 
transition to a green economy, while being constrained by limiting factors 
such as energy, natural resources and environment. The success of these 
countries in developing a green economy will make a difference to global 
sustainable development, and should be understood and supported by the 
international community. The international community should provide a 
favourable external environment for developing countries, rejecting trade 
protectionism with the excuse of promoting a green economy, or choosing a 
green economy as a condition of foreign aid. The developed countries should 
take the lead, changing their unsustainable ways of production, livelihoods 
and consumption. They should also help developing countries to develop a 
green economy in different ways, including funding, technology transfer, 
capacity-building, expanding market access, etc. The developing countries 
should formulate and implement sustainable development strategies in 
accordance with their national conditions. Every country should make a 
full employment growth plan with effective social security measures and 
make sure that basic life needs of common people, especially the vulnerable 
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populations, are catered to. The international community should help 
developing countries to develop education and vocational training courses 
in order to reduce and compensate the social costs of the green economic 
transition for developing countries.
3.3 Strengthening multifaceted international cooperation as 
well as promoting the global green transformation
It is of crucial importance to build a global partnership and an effective 
global governance framework which addresses the differences in developing 
a green economy. China should make full use of the main channel that 
the United Nations offers and other forums which promote sustainable 
development, in an attempt to establish a diverse multi-channel, multi-level 
model of international cooperation to promote global green transformation. 
In this way, China could first offer a conditional package of international 
cooperation and assistance, integrating South-South cooperation and 
traditional aid to developing countries with new commitments.
Secondly, China should announce that it will establish a long-term cooperation 
system including the Agency for International Development that is currently 
being considered, with strengthening South-South cooperation as its core. 
Thirdly, China should also issue a series of laws and regulations, regulating 
the behaviour of Chinese enterprises overseas, making them conform 
to international standards, local laws and corporate social responsibility 
requirements. Finally, China should call for the establishment of global, 
regional and bilateral cooperative partnerships to develop the concept 
of a green economy, especially with the aim of helping other developing 
countries to achieve green transformation. Through cooperation, countries 
should work together to create a sustainable and competitive future which is 
resource efficient, environmentally friendly, low carbon, fair and inclusive.
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Climate finance, post-2015 international development 
cooperation and China’s role
Yu Ye
1 Climate finance and its impact on post-2015 
international development cooperation
The UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
in June 2012 (Rio+20), called for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
in international development cooperation after 2015. The contents of the 
SDGs and their relationship with the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) are still being widely debated under the auspices of the United 
Nations (UN). However, the concept of sustainable development first 
appeared in the 1980s, and the emergence of the SDGs is not a theoretical 
innovation but a new effort aimed at taking advantage of existing theories 
for guiding new practices. Under the conditions of rising tensions between 
environmental protection and economic growth, the essence is how to find 
a new golden balance. The threat of climate change is the biggest global 
environment challenge we face today and intensifies the conflicts between 
development and the environment to an unprecedented level. This is also the 
most important reason that drives the revival of the sustainable development 
concept. The upgrading of the MDGs – that focus on poverty reduction – to 
SDGs takes a more comprehensive perspective. The issue of climate change 
is fundamentally about development: how to integrate the governance of 
the two is the key challenge for post-2015 global development cooperation.
The rising tension between the environment and development brought about 
by the climate change threat is also reflected in the financing aspect. How 
to balance and coordinate climate finance and development finance will be 
an important issue for international development cooperation after 2015. 
However, there is not yet an internationally agreed definition of climate 
finance. Broadly speaking, climate finance includes resources that catalyse 
low-carbon and climate-resilient development by covering the costs and 
risks of climate action, supporting an enabling environment and capacity 
for adaptation and mitigation, and encouraging research, development and 
deployment of new technologies (IMF et al. 2011). However, public climate 
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financing for developing countries has caught most attention in the literature 
on global climate politics, though the key for the design of any climate fund 
mechanism is to ensure that scarce public funds will be used in leveraging 
private funding (De Nevers 2011). According to the World Bank, the 
annual cost for mitigation in developing countries will average USD 140-
175 billion by 2030 so as to contain global warming to less than 2 degrees 
Celsius by the end of this century. In addition, the annual resource demand 
for adaptation is expected to be USD 30-100 billion. However, currently 
developing countries are only receiving about 10 billion USD for climate 
finance every year (World Bank 2010). The sharp increase in demand for 
climate finance is set to bring competition with traditional development 
finance.
At the same time, global climate finance architecture is becoming 
increasingly fragmented (Nakhooda / Watson / Schalatek 2013). Both 
developing countries and developed countries have incentives to set up 
vertical climate funds, separate from traditional development finance, which 
has in effect resulted in the isolation of climate and development governance 
that is harmful for both the climate and development. Firstly, developing 
countries have been seeking external climate financing that is separate from 
official development assistance (ODA). The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992 stipulated that 
developed countries are obliged to provide “new and additional” resources 
for the “full incremental costs” borne by developing countries. Developing 
countries are of the opinion that climate finance is an ‘entitlement’ that they 
deserve instead of ‘aid’ or charity (WRI 2009). In order to differentiate 
climate finance and ODA, the UNFCCC established special climate funds, 
such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Phase I and Phase IV; the 
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF); the Least Developed Countries Fund 
(LDCF); the Adaptation Fund (AF); and the newly established but not yet 
operational Green Climate Fund (GCF). These funds initiated a series of 
innovations in governance structures so as to empower developing countries 
in the allocation of resources. For example, the AF’s Executive Board 
makes decisions based on a ‘one-member-one-vote’ rule while developing 
countries hold the majority of the 16 seats.1 This is a breakthrough, compared 
to the existing multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank. 
1 UNFCCC Decision 5/CMP.2, Adaptation Fund, FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/10/Add.1, para.3; 
UNFCCC Decision 1/CMP.3, Adaptation Fund, FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1, paras. 6, 12
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Besides, the AF has created the mechanism of ‘direct access’, which means 
recipient countries can directly apply for the resources of AF and do not 
have to go to a third party, that is, implementing agencies such as the World 
Bank, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) or UNEP (United 
Nations Environment Programme), as is the case with GEF.2
Secondly, developed countries also tend to strengthen climate aid including 
setting up special climate funds so as to meet the demands from some 
environmental NGOs for more measures to combat climate change and 
showcase their fulfilment of international responsibilities in providing 
financing as well. Relevant departments can also bargain for more budgets 
for themselves by having more resources for climate. While the climate 
funds under the UNFCCC have secured power for developing countries, they 
have weakened the incentives of Western donors to contribute resources. 
Donors prefer to deliver their resources for climate purposes through 
traditional channels that they can keep control of. Countries such as Japan, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and Australia have established their 
own bilateral climate funds. They have also initiated vertical climate funds 
under multilateral development agencies, such as the Climate Investment 
Fund (CIF) under the World Bank. They can secure more influence over 
the allocation of resources under these Western-dominated multilateral 
agencies compared to those funds under the UNFCCC. In addition, donors 
also contribute to recipient countries’ national climate funds, for example, 
the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund, the Amazon Fund of Brazil, 
and the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund. Despite all these 
new funds and initiatives, OECD countries are facing sharp criticisms for 
their under-performance in climate-financing duties. On the one hand, their 
contributions on climate are still calculated as ODA, instead of ‘new and 
additional’ to their existing ODA, not to mention that the targeted 0.7% ratio 
of ODA in relation to gross national income (GNI) has never been fulfilled 
by most donors. On the other hand, too little money has been channelled 
through the UNFCCC. The four climate funds under the UNFCCC (i.e. the 
GEF Phases I and IV, SCCF, LDCF and AF) only received a little more 
than USD 2.7 billion, covering 9.1% of the total climate funds in the 
world, in which the most innovative AF only received 0.4% of the total.3 
2 UNFCCC Decision 1/CMP.3, Adaptation Fund, FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1, para.29
3 Author’s calculation based on data: http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/global-trends/
size-spending, accessed 20 Jun. 2013
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Comparatively, the size of the CIF under the World Bank reaches USD 6.2 
billion, which is larger than the total of all UNFCCC climate funds. The 
GCF, established after the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, got the support of 
developed countries. The Copenhagen Accord stated that 
...developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 
billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This 
funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, 
bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.4 
However, the sources of financing are unclear in a world of tight fiscal 
conditions.
In sum, climate financing is far from being sufficient, and the global climate 
finance architecture comes increasingly in the shape of dual and parallel 
structures (Dobson 2011). The essence is about power struggles between 
donor and recipient countries, as well as competition between climate and 
other development goals. The negative impact of the separation is clear: 
It aggravates the fragmentation of the global development architecture 
and increases the management costs of recipient countries. According to 
statistics, climate funds have become the second largest driving force after 
health with regard to vertical funds. During the 2000s, the total number 
of climate funds increased 22 % while the funds for climate and the 
environment in a broader sense increased 49 % (Castro et al. 2009). To some 
extent, the reallocation of very scarce resources to climate-sensitive areas 
and sectors will worsen the situation of the core development sectors, such 
as education and other basic areas in Africa (Brown et al. 2010). The erosion 
of traditional development finance deserves serious attention. South-South 
cooperation can fill some gaps, but emerging economies insist on their 
complementary roles.
From this perspective, the significance of SDGs as the guiding principle 
for post-2015 international development cooperation lies not only in raising 
awareness of the environmental and sustainable aspects of economic growth 
and mobilising more resources for sustainable development, but also in 
rebuilding mutual trust and coherence of environment and development 
governance, avoiding the isolation of climate governance, and ensuring 
the harmonious development of the economy, environment and society. 
Looking ahead for post-2015 international development cooperation, all 
4 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf
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stakeholders, including developed and developing countries, private sectors, 
civil societies and international organisations, need to work together for 
this. Major powers must assume special responsibilities. The expected UN 
conference on Financing for Development should address these issues.
2 China’s position and role in public climate finance
As in the general global climate negotiations, China’s official position on 
public climate finance can be summarised as ‘defensive externally and 
aggressive internally’. However, as in trade and other areas, with the rise 
of its economic power, level of energy consumption and carbon emissions, 
the resulting international pressure and the progress in pushing domestic 
economic transformation, China has been incrementally and quietly 
adjusting its position and behaviour in its climate diplomacy.
What ‘defensive externally’ means is that formally China still insists on its 
status as a developing country, the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, the core responsibility of North-South cooperation for 
post-2015 international development cooperation and the complementary 
role of South-South cooperation. However, the 2009 Copenhagen climate 
conference could be seen as a catalyst and silent turning point in Chinese 
climate diplomacy including its attitude toward climate assistance. China 
started to publicly respond to the climate issue instead of simply keeping 
silent. At Copenhagen, China announced it was giving up its claim on the 
annual USD 100 billion by 2020 promised by developed countries so as to 
support the adaptation activities of the most fragile countries. This is partly 
to address the complaint of the international society that the vast majority of 
revenues under the Clean Development Mechanism went to middle-income 
countries, with China being the largest beneficiary. China also started to 
provide funding to other countries for climate action through multilateral or 
bilateral channels. For example, China is one of the few developing countries 
donating to the GEF as well as the largest contributor of these developing 
countries (Guo 2008). At the UN Sustainable Development Conference on 
20 June 2012, the then Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao committed to 
contributing USD 6 million to the UNEP trust fund for programmes and 
activities in helping developing countries improve capacities in environment 
protection. For the first time, the new Finance Minister Lou Jiwei stated that 
China should shape its fiscal policy as a major power and take more initiatives 
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when participating in global economic governance (MOF 2013). A timely 
example was that China granted USD 0.3 billion for the 17th replenishment 
of the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank’s fund 
for the poorest, which is not a big share of the total volume of USD 48 
billion, but almost an increase of 100 % compared to that of the last round 
three years ago as well as the single largest contribution to international 
organisations in the history of China. The World Bank announced that one 
of the special purposes of IDA will be the investment related to climate 
change, which means a rising role of China in co-financing the fight against 
global climate change.
China has also been silently paying more attention to climate change in 
its bilateral and regional development cooperation. Its first White Paper on 
foreign aid published in 2011 stated that “[i]n recent years, coping with 
climate change has become a new area in China’s foreign aid” (State 
Council Information Office of the PRC 2011a). For example, at the 4th 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2009, the then Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao declared eight new measures to promote China-Africa 
cooperation, the first of which was to establish the China-Africa Partnership 
for Coping with Climate Change, through which China pledged to establish 
100 clean energy projects for Africa. This is helpful in leveraging more 
Chinese investment into clean and renewable energy development in Africa 
and would mean a shift away from the traditional focus on oil and gas. 
Furthermore, energy and climate change have become key concerns when 
China and the United States are trying to establish a new type of major 
power relationship through mechanisms like the China-US Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue. Considering that the two countries produce 40 % of the 
world’s carbon emissions, their climate cooperation is globally significant. 
In addition, China is also playing an increasing role in helping finance 
infrastructure in its neighbourhood and developing countries, including 
BRICS and Africa, which will be beneficial for increasing their adaptation 
capability.
However, China’s forward push in financing climate activities in its 
domestic economy is even more evident. Although we do not have official 
data about the exact number of Chinese investments in reducing carbon 
emissions, we can get some indication from its gross investment in dealing 
with environment pollution. Energy efficiency and emission of pollutants 
are controlled through setting binding goals in several of the recent Five 
Year Plans (FYP). During the 11th FYP period (2006-2010), energy 
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consumption per unit of GDP declined by 19.1 %, which is equivalent to 
a total reduction of 1.46 billion tons of CO2 emissions and therefore an 
important contribution to global climate protection (State Council 2011b). 
The 12th FYP (2011-2015) further mandated that CO2 emissions per unit 
of GDP and energy consumption per unit of GDP drop by 17 % and 16 % 
respectively, the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption 
reach 11.4 % and total emissions of main pollutants fall by 8 %-10 %. China 
has implemented a variety of fiscal policies in tackling climate change, 
among them green taxation, innovative resource and environment regimes, 
ecological compensation, green government procurement and a clean 
development mechanism fund (Lou 2013). The ratio of China’s investment 
in environmental protection to its GDP (gross domestic product) rose from 
1.12 % in 2000 to 1.95 % in 2010 (Bao 2013). This is not a significant level 
internationally. During the 12th FYP, the annual ratio is expected to increase 
to the international level of 2-3 %, with the total amount of over RMB 5 
trillion.5 Similar to the world trend, China is increasingly trying to use public 
policy and budget expenditures to leverage private investment in the climate 
and energy area. The share of central and local budget support in the total 
environmental investment declined from 27.4 % in 2000 to 21.7 % in 2010 
(Bao 2013). China invested nearly USD 50 billion in solar, wind and other 
clean energy and ranked No. 1 in the world in 2010 (BNEF 2011) in which 
much was provided by private investment catalysed by encouraging energy 
policies. Despite all these ambitious targets, China is still not ambitious 
enough about its environmental protection in action. Generally speaking, 
the Chinese government has been following an approach that might be 
called ‘liberal environmentalism’, as it always insists on the priority of 
securing the minimum growth for employment. Sanctions are very weak for 
violations of environment obligations. The binding targets set in its recent 
FYPs have often been achieved through administrative measures.
There is an argument that, while the prospect of global climate negotiations 
is not clear, the pragmatic approach for international climate cooperation 
is to push ‘direct actions’ of major powers domestically through global 
governance forums such as the G20 (Jorgensen 2013). Although China 
is still defensive about its official position on the financing issue in 
global climate negotiations and insists on the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities, if measured by domestic initiatives, China 
5 http://roll.sohu.com/20120503/n342286492.shtml
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has been leading the world in dealing with the environment and greenhouse 
emissions in recent years. Considering its significance as the world second 
largest economy and largest emitter, Chinese domestic engagement in 
financing climate resilience will be its largest contribution to the world’s 
sustainable development after 2015 and the most feasible approach within 
the given political context.
3 China’s role in promoting coordination of 
development and climate finance
Historically, it is mainly the DAC members that have pushed for the 
separation of climate financing from development financing. China used to 
be a recipient of climate assistance, such as through the GEF. As mentioned 
above, in recent years China has increased foreign aid for climate purposes, 
but the volume is still relatively small compared to traditional European and 
American countries. On rare occasions, it contributed to vertical climate funds 
at the World Bank or other multilateral development agencies or established 
its own. Therefore, China is not a troublemaker for the separation of public 
climate financing and development financing. As the largest greenhouse 
emitter, an emerging capital exporter and aid provider, China should put the 
emphasis on setting examples domestically by realising its own economic 
transformation and then sharing its experiences and knowledge with the 
world through various different channels.
Firstly, China should increase green and efficient investment for a successful 
economic transformation, and this could have a ‘spill-over’ effect on 
the world. China has unconsciously followed the old road of ‘pollution-
treatment’ as practised by Western countries, but has now realised this and 
taken concrete measures to save the environment. Despite this, China still 
insists on a dialectical and comprehensive approach when dealing with 
the relationship between environment and development, that is, protecting 
the environment through development and avoiding an isolated approach 
of environmental and climate protection. Meanwhile, China should also 
increase financial transfers from the resource-consuming, developed areas 
to those resource-producing, backward areas to compensate for the latter’s 
ecological damages and improve their adaptation capacity.
Secondly, China should mainstream climate change considerations into 
bilateral and regional aid and investment activities and avoid the excessive 
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proliferation of vertical climate funds. China is emerging as an important 
capital exporter in terms of official aid and investment. Estimates by Western 
sources of the annual size of Chinese foreign aid have ranged from USD 
1.5 billion to USD 25 billion (Walz / Ramachandran 2011)6, while China’s 
own data was about less than USD 3 billion (State Council Information 
Office of the PRC 2011a; Hu 2011). China became the third largest FDI 
(foreign direct investment) exporter in 2012. Infrastructure financing 
is becoming a focus of China’s foreign economic diplomacy, including 
through bilateral channels and the proposed BRICS Development Bank, 
East Asia Infrastructure Bank and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
Development Bank. These programmes should mainstream climate change 
considerations.
Thirdly, at the multilateral level, China should actively participate in the UN’s 
post-2015 process and also take advantage of the G20 forum in persuading 
major countries to enhance coordination between climate and development 
finance. As regards the UN post-2015 agenda, China clearly stated that 
poverty reduction should be the core while at the same time seeking a 
more balanced development of the economy, society and environment. The 
G20 might be able to play a unique role in enhancing communication and 
coordination of major powers in this and provide highest and collective 
leadership for the UN processes.
4 Conclusions
The rise of global climate change challenges and the resulting tensions 
between the environment and development are one of the major reasons 
why the sustainable development concept has been revived for the post-
2015 global development cooperation. The increase in demand for climate 
financing brings competition to traditional development finance, while the 
proliferation of vertical climate funds has intensified the fragmentation 
of development financing architecture and the separation of climate and 
development. China still officially insists on the principle of ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities’ in global climate negotiations while, 
with the rise of its economic power and international position, it is silently 
adjusting its position and policy and increasingly providing funding support 
6 Total non-DAC aid ranges from USD 11 to 41.7 billion.
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for developing countries dealing with climate change through bilateral or 
multilateral channels. However, fundamentally, the biggest contribution of 
China to the world in responding to climate change is to ensure a successful 
economic transformation of its own, and then to share experiences with 
others. Meanwhile, China should actively support the mainstreaming of 
climate and development through multilateral institutions, such as the G20, 
the World Bank and the United Nations, among others.
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Chinese contributions to the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs): promoting urbanisation
Jing Wang 
1 Introduction
The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are about 
to expire in 2015, and the discussions on the post-2015 international 
development agenda by the international community are becoming 
increasingly enthusiastic. Under such circumstances, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China published China’s 
position paper on the post-2015 development agenda (hereinafter referred 
to as the “Chinese position paper”) on 22 September 2013 (GoC 2013). 
The document will have a huge impact on intergovernmental negotiations 
about the United Nations post-2015 development agenda which will begin 
in September 2014. According to China’s position paper, a comprehensive 
development agenda should focus on the eradication of poverty and hunger 
while, at the same time, promoting the balanced development of the 
economy, society and the environment after 2015. Commenting on key areas 
and priorities of the post-2015 development agenda, the text enumerates the 
following points: promote inclusive economic growth”, “comprehensively 
promote social progress and improve people’s livelihoods”, “strengthen the 
construction of ecological civilisation, promote sustainable development”. 
In the economic sphere, “the government should promote economic growth 
as a priority target, increasing incomes and improving living standards”; 
in the social area, it emphasises the need “to promote social inclusion in 
development, adhere to the people-oriented principle, strive to ensure that 
all people share the fruits of development”; in the environmental field, the 
focus is on the “ecological relationship between human civilisation and the 
survival and development of a long-term plan for future generations”, and 
“respect for nature, harmony with nature, protecting the natural concept of 
ecological civilisation, and enhancing conservation awareness, ecological 
awareness, shaping the concept of sustainable consumption and lifestyle”. 
Not only that, the Chinese position paper also stressed that the 
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development agenda should focus on promoting unity and cooperation 
among countries, solidarity, responsibility sharing and jointly coping 
with challenges and threats to rid itself of poverty and hunger, achieving 
balanced and sustainable development and inclusive growth, promoting 
the common interests of mankind. 
Obviously, the promotion of economically, socially and environmentally 
balanced development, as emphasised by the Chinese side, depends on 
sustainable development and inclusive growth.
This orientation is consistent with the desire “to create an inclusive and 
sustainable future society” which has been stressed by the United Nations 
(UN) and European Union (EU) in the post-2015 development agenda. 
Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the UN, Ambassador Wang 
Min, said at the UN General Assembly meeting of the Second Committee in 
charge of economic issues on 14 October 2013 that eradication of poverty 
in developing countries to achieve sustainable development should continue 
to serve as the core of the post-2015 development agenda. China is both 
an important member of the United Nations (Security Council permanent 
member) and a member of a group of developing countries (G77 plus 
China) while at the same time it is a member of the most powerful group 
of emerging powers in recent years, the BRICS countries, and the Group of 
20 (G20). For this reason, China’s efforts to eliminate poverty and promote 
economic development will have a significant impact on the post-2015 
world economy.
China’s own national development objectives are in favour of implementing 
the MDGs and promoting international cooperation. In economic 
development, China has to meet its own ambitious goals of social 
development. As noted in the China Millennium Development Goals 
progress report of 2008, each committed country has to have its own policies 
and practices in achieving the MDGs (GoC 2008, 8–9). China’s practice 
in this regard is quite compelling: since 1980, China has been developing 
its own development goals and targets, collectively referred to as a “well-
off society”. In 2002, the Chinese government made further mention 
of building a moderately prosperous society. China’s efforts to achieve 
the MDGs have been organically integrated into the process of building 
a moderately prosperous society. Five strategic elements are relevant in 
practice: adhering to the strategic policy of expanding domestic demand; 
promoting the strategic adjustment of the economic structure; conserving 
resources and protecting the environment; adhering to the coordinated 
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development of urban and rural and regional area; and insisting on the 
appropriate implementing technology and educational strategy. The 2010 
edition of the report added a further element: “We should tackle climate 
change in the context of sustainable development” (GoC 2010, 5–6).
2 Why urbanisation?
The US economist Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winner in economics, 
once said that the US high-tech industry and China’s urbanisation were the 
two global events of the 21st century. Marx had affirmed in the Communist 
Manifesto that urbanisation was one of the great historical contributions. 
Marx praised the construction of the city as a big step forward that could 
foster productive utilisation of natural forces and other factors. After three 
decades of reform and opening up, China has created a remarkable ‘economic 
growth miracle’. Closely related to this is the fact that China’s urbanisation 
has made rapid progress. From 1978 to 2010, China’s urbanisation rate 
rapidly increased from 17.9% to 49.95%. It took China 30 years to catch up 
with the West which already had 200 years in the history of urbanisation. 
Urbanisation is both a result of economic development and an important 
driver of economic growth.
3 Urbanisation and achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals
3.1 Urbanisation can promote the transformation of China’s 
economic development. 
China’s extensive economic development is not sustainable; from the 
perspective of the world in terms of resource use it is also a plunder and 
waste. Adverse effects of disparity caused by extensive development and 
environmental pollution have stimulated reflections about how to make 
sustainable development a reality.
Urbanisation is the centre of gravity in China’s shifting economic 
development model. In order to effectively underpin the sustained and 
rapid economic and social development, China’s urbanisation needs to 
be accelerated. Sun (2012) found that it was the rapid development of 
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urbanisation in the Pearl River Delta that shaped regional development; 
in this way promoting urbanisation was an important means to solving the 
‘central collapse’. Decreasing urbanisation saturation will directly reduce 
efficiencies and economic development.
At the same time, urbanisation can promote economic growth by expanding 
domestic demand. Acceleration of urbanisation plays a significant role 
in the expansion of domestic demand and promotes economic and social 
development. With the existing rate of urbanisation and China’s population 
growth over the next five years, consumer demand will grow from RMB 16 
trillion in 2011 to RMB 30 trillion in 2016.
3.2 The impact of urbanisation on productivity
Increasing the urbanisation rate can improve the efficiency of economic 
growth and can thus promote external spillover effects to China’s economy. 
Urbanisation increases productivity through two mechanisms: one is related 
to the increase in labour costs which encourages enterprises to improve 
technology; the second is the positive effect of improving the quality of 
workers and consumer behaviour.
Urbanisation generates growth in demand for services. Services attract 
a large number of production factors, mainly labour. Due to the large 
number of labour transfers into services, the manufacturing labour supply 
is significantly reduced, resulting in labour shortages. And because 
urbanisation provides more specialised services in education, housing, 
travel, food, medical care, etc., it thereby increases the cost of living for 
workers. Therefore, urbanisation leads to rising labour costs. For a long 
time the main competitive advantage of China’s manufacturing industry 
came from cheap and abundant labour resources, while the development of 
urbanisation makes major manufacturing lose cost advantage for labour. In 
order to maintain or obtain higher profits, companies increase investments 
in research and advanced machinery instead of labour, promoting 
technological innovation and industrial upgrading, and thus improving the 
overall productivity. In other words, urbanisation acts as cost-push factor on 
production efficiency.
While the quality of workers can affect production technologies, urbanisation 
can also change the quality of workers. Urbanisation in the true sense is a 
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phenomenon whereby farmers become urban residents, thus narrowing the 
gap between urban and rural areas. After farmers become urban residents, 
they share the public services of a town on an equal footing with the original 
residents with regard to education and employment. There are two ways to 
promote the development of production technologies: on the one hand, equal 
access to education has greatly enhanced the knowledge of new residents in 
the towns, making it easier for them to learn and master the new sciences and 
technologies and rendering them capable of more complex work, rather than 
simple assembly and processing operations. On the other hand, the pressure 
to find employment will make residents engage in continuous learning 
processes, further tapping their potential and thereby promoting innovative 
production technologies and improving the added value of products.
According to the theory of consumption, changing consumer behaviour 
affects company technologies. The urbanisation of rural people can change 
consumer behaviour. Firstly, urbanisation can increase the share of labour 
income in gross domestic product (GDP) and increase the marginal 
propensity to consume. Secondly, urbanisation brings a substantial increase 
in labour productivity, making the wages of original urban residents and 
migrants rise. Third, the town’s relatively good social security system helps 
to reduce precautionary saving. If other conditions remain unchanged, this 
will increase consumer demand, such as increased investment in education, 
participation in technical training and improvement of the cultural and 
technical level; this will increase demand for high-tech products, and so on. 
These changes in consumer behaviour, on the one hand, promote the overall 
quality of workers and facilitate the use of technological improvements and 
new technologies. At the same time the production of high-tech quality 
products is enhanced. In this way, changing consumer behaviour caused by 
urbanisation promotes the efficiency of production.
The development of urbanisation can achieve inclusive growth. It is an 
indisputable fact that China’s dualistic urban-rural economic development 
deepens the rich-poor divide. The household registration system divides 
people into urban and non-urban residents, resulting in different treatment, 
such as for education, jobs, pensions, health insurance, etc., thus artificially 
exacerbating the wealth gap. Binary economic development hinders the road 
to the common prosperity of the Chinese people. Urbanisation is designed 
to transfer rural populations to an urban setting in order to eliminate the 
opportunity gap, so that farmers and urban residents can enjoy the same 
benefits in education, employment and medical care.
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4 The role of economic growth in China’s urbanisation 
in the post-2015 world economic development
On 30 May 2013, a group of eminent persons nominated by the UN 
Secretary-General submitted the report “A new global partnership: eradicate 
poverty and transform economies through sustainable development” 
(UNHLP 2013). The report set out a roadmap for international development, 
namely the eradication of extreme poverty by 2030 and the achievement of 
sustainable development commitments. The report lists five key objectives 
for the post-2015 agenda: poverty reduction to eradicate extreme poverty; 
sustainable development as the core; to achieve economic transformation 
in order to promote employment and inclusive growth; to build peace and 
efficient, open and accountable systems based on cooperation; and equality 
and human rights to create a new global partnership. On 6 June 2013, the 
Sustainable Development Solutions Network submitted to the UN Secretary-
General a report which defines ten priority areas for the post-2015 agenda: 
 • “End extreme poverty and hunger
 • Achieve development and prosperity for all without ruining the 
environment
 • Ensure learning for all children and youth
 • Achieve gender equality and reduce inequalities
 • Achieve health and wellbeing at all ages
 • Increase agricultural production in an environmentally sustainable 
manner, to achieve food security and rural prosperity
 • Make cities productive and environmentally sustainable
 • Curb human-induced climate change with sustainable energy
 • Protect ecosystems and ensure sound management of natural resources
 • Improve governance and align business behavior with all the goals” 
(SDSN 2013).
From being a desperately poor country, China has now become the world’s 
second-largest economy – but China is not Singapore: as an ultra-large 
economy, Chinese economic policies will have strong spillover effects on the 
world economy, the so-called externalities. Given China’s huge population, 
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China’s poverty elimination programme will promote poverty elimination 
within the overall situation of the world.
Urbanisation improves production efficiency which, in turn, promotes 
China’s export structure. Chinese products can gain greater access to ‘high-
end’ international markets, thus achieving higher added value, improved 
terms of trade, increasing profits, employment and incomes in the export 
sector, while giving up the ‘low-end’ markets to other developing countries 
reduces competition with them and improves their balance of payments 
situation, employment and poverty eradication. At the BRICS leaders 
meeting in March 2013 held in Durban, South Africa, the Chinese President 
Xi Jinping said: 
We should vigorously promote the construction of a global partnership for 
development, and promote the common prosperity of all countries… We 
want to participate in the international development agenda and make full 
use of human resources, productivity and material accumulation, complete 
the UN Millennium Development Goals, narrow the development gap 
between North and South, and promote more balanced global development.
5 Conclusions and recommendations
Based on the analysis of China’s policies, the following recommendations 
are made:
5.1 Continue to vigorously promote urbanisation and 
development. 
Urbanisation can promote economic growth. In shaping the urbanisation 
process attention should be paid to three issues: First, the reform of the 
household registration system should be implemented, so that farmers 
moving to the cities really do enjoy the same benefits as the original urban 
residents. Second, cultural heritage should be preserved, so as not to lose 
local specialties in the urbanisation process. Finally, the focus should be on 
the green building concept, low-carbon technologies and environmentally 
friendly methods.
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5.2 To strengthen international cooperation in the process of 
urbanisation. 
The rapid urbanisation in developing countries will inevitably lead to 
many problems. In the course of development, China should actively seek 
international cooperation, look for help from Europe and other developed 
countries, and learn the lessons of urbanisation from the developed countries. 
During the process of urbanisation, the balance must be kept between the 
development of new projects and the protection of cultural and environmental 
goods. The interests of farmers must be protected; loss of state assets must 
be prevented. To protect the cultural heritage in cities, arbitrary demolition 
should not be permitted. City dwellers should be prohibited from buying 
land in the countryside for housing (‘reverse urbanisation’).
In short, urbanisation – as an inevitable product of the market economy and 
an important driver of future economic growth – should be an important 
part of the future world economic development strategy.
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A comparative study of the official policies of  
China and India on the post-2015 development agenda  
of the United Nations
Chuankai Jiao
1 Introduction
As the cut-off date of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will 
take place in 2015, almost every country has been responding to the call of 
the UN Secretary-General for inclusive, broad-based consultations on the 
post-2015 development agenda (UN 2012). The governments of China and 
India released their respective position papers on this issue in 2013. As the 
two countries are the most important developing countries in the world, their 
policies cannot be ignored. This paper first reviews the achievements of the 
two countries with regard to the MDGs, and then studies their policies and 
positions in a comparative perspective.
2 Progress on the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) in China and India
Undoubtedly, the achievements of China and India with respect to the MDGs 
are remarkable. By 2013, China has realised seven development objectives. 
In China, the extreme poverty rate had dropped from 60 % in 1990 to 16 % in 
2005 and 12 % in 2010. Extreme poverty rates have fallen in every developing 
region, with China leading the way (UN 2013). The net enrolment rate in 
primary education reached 99.8 % in 2011; the infant mortality rate dropped 
to 10.3 per thousand, and the child mortality rate under five years dropped to 
13.2 per thousand. Finally, the maternal mortality rate dropped to 24.5 per 
ten thousand in 2012. China has also made significant progress on disease 
control and on the reduction of mortality. In 2010, the number of people 
living with HIV will be less than 1.5 million; the tuberculosis prevalence rate 
fell to 0.66 per thousand, a decrease of 61 % over 2000 (UNDP / MFA 2013).
India has also made significant progress on the MDGs. Since 2000, the 
Planning Commission of India has cooperated comprehensively with the 
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United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in eight MDG fields and 
made great achievements (Lei 2008). India has achieved, or will achieve 
in 2015, the following indicators: halving poverty; achieving universal 
primary education; eliminating gender disparity discrimination in primary 
and secondary education; reducing by two-thirds the under-five mortality 
rate; halting and reversing the spread of AIDS/HIV; halting and reversing 
the incidence of malaria and other major diseases; integrating the principle 
of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and 
reversing the loss of environmental resources; reducing the proportion of 
people without access to safe drinking water; cooperating with the private 
sector, making available the benefits of new technologies, especially 
information and communications (GoI 2013a).
China and India are large developing countries with a huge population. Their 
achievements have a very important significance to the realisation of the 
MDGs globally. For example, the global achievement of halving extreme 
poverty is mainly a result of contributions from China and India. In reducing 
the proportion of slum dwellers in their cities, a UN report says that China, 
India and Indonesia are driving this regional and global trend (UN 2013).
However, China and India have their own development problems. The 
report of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) says that the 
problems to be tackled in China are not only on the surface but also at 
the root. While the country has made tremendous progress in reducing the 
number of impoverished people, there are still many challenges. In India, 
the issue of persisting inequalities and poverty are intertwined with the poor 
quality of jobs. Many labourers are forced to work for below-subsistence 
wages (UNDG 2013). In addition, the environmental pollution and wildlife 
population decline in China are very conspicuous (UNDP / MFA 2013). The 
deaths of children under five in India and Nigeria accounted for over a third 
of the world total (UN 2013).
The eighth MDG is about developing a global partnership. China has been 
doing a lot of work on this and has made significant progress in six indicators. 
China has actively advocated and participated in international development 
cooperation, through promoting South-South cooperation, helping other 
developing countries within its own capacity (UNDP / MFA 2013). However, 
India seems to have done very little on this according to its report (GoI 
2013a). Although the official development assistance (ODA) from India has 
been increasing, its volume cannot compare with the transfers from China or 
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any of the established donors (Chanana 2010). Furthermore, India insists that 
it wishes to be independent on ODA from the influence of the Development 
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (DAC-OECD). India’s ODA is definitely different from that of 
the DAC, though there is no clear definition of ODA in India. India does 
not report any details of its own ODA to the DAC either. India’s ODA is 
characterised by the geostrategic influence that India seeks, as most of its 
ODA has been given to South Asia or India’s neighbouring countries. On 
the discussion of post-2015 development agenda, India claims that bringing 
South-South cooperation into the traditional framework of North-South 
cooperation would include the evolution of universal norms for identification, 
delivery and evaluation of all development assistance whether North-South or 
South-South, a path which the government rejects (GoI 2013b).
We can say that India focuses on how to build its influence as a regional 
big power with ODA, rather than helping other developing countries. In 
a word, there are subtle differences between China and India’s political 
commitments.
3 China and India have similar positions on the 
principles and major issues of the post-2015 agenda
In a comparative perspective, this current paper comes to the conclusion that 
China and India have similar positions on the principles and major issues of 
the post-2015 agenda, as reflected in their respective position papers (GoI 
2013b; GoC 2013).
3.1 China and India both highly value the United Nations 
Millennium Development Declaration and the MDGs, 
and have actively participated in the consultations on the 
agenda
China says: 
The MDGs, formulated on the basis of the Millennium Declaration adopted 
in 2000, are the most comprehensive, authoritative and explicit set of 
goals of the international community in the field of development. They are 
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important indicators for measuring the level of development and guiding 
international development cooperation (UNDP / MFA 2013, Part I). 
India says that the 
government of India attaches great importance to the international 
deliberations on a Post-2015 Development Agenda as this will not only 
define the key international development priorities but the overall template 
for global cooperation in the coming decade and more (GoI 2013b, 27).
3.2 China and India both argue that the post-2015 agenda 
should be based on the MDGs
According to China’s paper, one of the guiding principles is continuity; those 
unaccomplished goals of the MDGs should be included in the development 
goals beyond 2015. With regard to key areas and priorities, the first goal 
should still be eradicating poverty and hunger, which was the first goal of 
the MDGs too.
India proposes that the post-2015 development agenda must remain rooted 
at its core on poverty eradication, which was identified at Rio+20 as the 
greatest global challenge. India argues that the post-2015 development 
agenda should retain the core development priorities embodied in the 
MDGs, without supporting further sub-dividing of the MDG into sub-goals 
and without adding new indicators.
3.3 China and India insist that the post-2015 process should 
be conducted under the UN framework
China insists that the process of exploring the post-2015 framework should 
seek consensus through consultation, and relevant consultations should take 
place under the UN framework. It should be a process led by member states 
in a just, democratic and transparent manner, giving full play to the United 
Nations in leading the organisation and coordination of the development 
agenda. In short, China emphasises the role of the United Nations.
India mentions that the MDGs were not ratified by the United Nations 
General Assembly; member states did not even have the opportunity to 
participate in the discussion of the goals, and therefore there are flaws in 
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the legality and legitimacy of MDGs. “Unlike the MDGs, the post-2015 
development agenda must be arrived at through an inclusive and transparent 
inter-governmental process under the United Nations” (GoI 2013b, 28).
3.4 China and India are of the opinion that the post-2015 
agenda should preserve simplicity
China argues that an overloaded agenda may deviate from the theme of 
development. All goals should be simple, clear and practical (UNDP / MFA 
2013). Similarly, India maintains that the post-2015 development agenda 
must preserve the simplicity of the narrative. It should focus on the key 
development challenges, limited in number. It is important not to overburden 
the agenda with a ‘laundry list’ of world problems. “The ‘development’ 
agenda must remain ‘growth-focused’ aiming to spur and support robust 
economic growth in developing countries, and must remain rooted at its 
core on poverty eradication” (GoI 2013b, 28) .
3.5 China and India share similar views on key areas and 
priorities
China is of the opinion that, besides eradicating poverty and hunger, the 
key areas and priorities should include aging populations; education; basic 
health care systems; women; children; demographic growth; social security 
systems; vulnerable groups; and inclusive economic growth; employment 
of better quality; a just and open environment for trade; liberalisation and 
the facilitation of trade and investment.
India also argues that the important subjects, besides eradicating poverty and 
economic growth, should include non-communicable diseases, lifestyles, 
mental health and gender equity. Notably, neither China nor India considers 
subjects such as ‘security’, ‘conflict’, ‘human rights’ and ‘governance’ to be 
goals of the post-2015 agenda.
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3.6 China and India concur on the need for reforming 
international economic governance systems
China argues that the problems facing developing countries, such as 
insufficient funding, lack of technical means and weak capacities, have not 
been adequately addressed. Development capacity in developing countries 
is limited; the international community should provide active assistance to 
them. China maintains that the development agenda should increase the 
representation and voice of developing countries in the global governance 
system. India believes that emerging economies are increasingly becoming 
an important force in the international community, but the current global 
governance structure does not adequately reflect this reality; whenever a 
crisis arises, the developed countries transfer risks to developing countries. 
India argues that, if there is a discussion of governance issues, the first subject 
should be the structure of global governance. The UN Security Council 
should increase the representation of developing countries; the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and other institutions should 
increase the shares of emerging economies (GoI 2013b).
In addition, China and India also have proposed strengthening the 
‘multilateral trading system’, and oppose all forms of protectionism. The 
two countries have highlighted the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ (CBDR), however, they both do not provide any details on 
the implementation of this principle.
Unfortunately, both China and India say almost nothing about their own 
domestic transformation, although the post-2015 agenda is universal and 
calls for the transformation of all economies and societies. Nor have they 
addressed their roles as new donors as the international society would expect. 
India almost says nothing in this regard, while China seems to be ready to 
explain its activities in South-South cooperation to the outside world.
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4 There are differences in style and certain policy 
details between China and India
4.1 China and India differ in their views on global 
partnerships, especially in regard to North-South  
cooperation and South-South cooperation
China stresses the compatible nature of South-South and North-South 
cooperation while, in contrast, India emphasises the differences and 
antagonisms between them. India claims that former colonial countries and 
other industrialised/high-income countries which have prospered, at least 
in part, by monopolising global public goods and resources should be held 
responsible for the poverty of developing countries. Such countries therefore 
have the obligation to help developing countries to overcome poverty and 
barriers to growth. When the suggestion that South-South cooperation should 
be integrated into North-South cooperation was put forward, India voiced 
its suspicion that the developed countries wanted to shirk the responsibility 
of providing development assistance. India highlights the different nature of 
South-South cooperation and North-South cooperation with the following 
views: the provision of South-South cooperation is completely voluntary, 
whereas North-South cooperation is the cut-clear obligation of developed 
countries (GoI 2013b).
China is also opposed to distorting the nature of South-South relations or 
integrating them into the framework of North-South relations. Contrary to 
the Indian position, China does not emphasise the different nature of South-
South and North-South cooperation but instead argues that North-South 
cooperation remains at the core of the global partnership, with South-South 
cooperation a useful supplement to North-South cooperation. Both South-
South cooperation and North-South cooperation should be enhanced. China 
has provided assistance to other developing countries within the framework 
of South-South cooperation and helped other developing countries in 
meeting the MDGs and achieving common development (UNDP / MFA 
2013). China’s position is similar to the United Nations System Task Team 
on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, whose report says that the global 
partnership should include North-South cooperation and South-South 
cooperation and triangular cooperation (UN Task Team 2012).
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4.2 China and India are not entirely consistent on the 
international obligations of developed countries
Both countries have highlighted the obligation of developed countries to 
assist developing countries and expressed disappointment when ODA from 
the North continued to decrease. However, China urged the developed 
countries to fulfil commitments in a moderate tone while India forcefully 
argued that the post-2015 agenda must have clear-cut commitments on ODA, 
public finance, technology transfer, and capacity building (GoI 2013b). 
India has highlighted the historic obligation of the developed countries to 
provide development assistance. The difference between China and India 
on this topic is whether the post-2015 agenda should establish a binding 
mechanism on developed countries’ obligations.
Furthermore, with a claim to create a more equitable set of responsibilities 
and obligations, India argues that the post-2015 agenda should apply to 
both developed and developing countries. India insists that the patterns of 
consumption in the developed countries are unsustainable and iniquitous 
and wants this addressed meaningfully in the post-2015 development 
agenda (GoI 2013b). India’s opinion on this topic has found approval in 
certain sectors of the international community, such as High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons on the post-2015 development agenda, which formulated 
that developed countries have a special role to play in reducing unsustainable 
consumption (UNHLP 2013). China says nothing on developed countries 
except referring to their ODA obligation.
4.3 On the goals of the post-2015 framework, China mainly 
proposes general principles with the purpose of avoiding 
conflict, while India challenges the international 
community
Many targets such as human rights, democratic governance at national and 
sub-national levels, political empowerment, government accountability and 
governance reform have been proposed by the international community and 
especially by Western countries. Most of them are very sensitive and even 
unacceptable to the developing countries. 
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China does not directly reject these targets, but stresses the importance 
of respecting the independence of all countries in determining their 
development strategies and goals and choosing their own development 
models and paths in accordance with national conditions (UNDP / MFA 
2013).
India’s view reflects a diametrically different position towards the 
international community. India argues that while issues such as human 
rights and governance are relevant to the global development narrative, they 
cannot be made the focus of the development agenda and should not be 
considered as goals. India opposes international baselines and international 
accounting and monitoring. The Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals also points out in its report that human rights, rights-
based approaches, governance, rule of law and wider participation in 
decision-making may be difficult to enumerate as goals (OWG 2013).
5 Conclusions and comments
Based on the comparative analysis of China’s and India’s policies on the 
post-2015 development agenda, this paper comes to two conclusions: Firstly, 
the two countries’ positions are basically the same with regard to main 
principles and key goals. Secondly, there are still significant differences in 
diplomatic style and some policy details. This leads to the following policy 
recommendations:
5.1 The two countries should strengthen cooperation, as 
their interests towards the post-2015 framework are 
fundamentally the same
Although China and India are not entirely consistent in regard to policy 
details and political style, they have basically the same interests on almost 
all major issues. They should strengthen solidarity in order to strengthen the 
voices of developing countries in the international community.
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5.2 Their different diplomatic styles and policy details may 
lead to different outcomes
China is relatively moderate and detached, trying to avoid conflict on 
any subjects which are not connected with its fundamental interests. In 
contrast, India is building up a relatively strong position by challenging 
developed countries and the international community on a number of issues. 
India is sticking very much to its views and interests and its position is 
determined to strengthen the voices of the developing countries. However, 
its confrontational style may impact negatively on the formulation of the 
development agenda.
5.3 India’s diplomatic style and performance are linked to its 
imagination of a big power, which may impact negatively 
on China-Indian relationship 
India has been pursuing the status of a big power since its independence in 
1947. Obviously, India regards the process of formulating the United Nations 
post-2015 development agenda as an opportunity to improve its status 
within the international community. That is why India has been so active. 
India’s concept of being a big power is potentially competing with China, as 
China also wants to be a big power. How to avoid the potential conflicts will 
undoubtedly become an important issue for diplomatic practitioners of the 
two countries, even if there is no clear-cut conflict between the two countries 
on the post-2015 development agenda.
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Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and beyond: 
BRICS perspectives – the cases of Brazil and China
Haibin Niu
1 Introduction
With 2015 approaching, international cooperation on development enters 
a key phase. Most debates regarding the post-2015 development agenda 
have been focused on the attitudes of OECD-DAC countries (countries in 
the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) and BRICS members (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, South Africa), respectively. In the post-2015 development agenda, 
the DAC emphasises the dominant position of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) while the BRICS group emphasises the importance of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). To understand these attitudes 
better and to find a common base for building the post-2015 agenda, this 
paper will analyse Brazil’s experience in participating in international 
development cooperation and propose some policy options for BRICS 
countries, based on the examples of Brazil and China.
2 Brazil’s major experiences in international 
development cooperation
Brazil is a major emerging force in promoting development cooperation 
under the MDG framework. It has improved domestic resource allocation 
and social justice impressively by introducing a series of public policies 
aimed at reducing hunger, improving education and promoting social 
inclusiveness. Achievements on the domestic front create new resources for 
Brazil to transform itself from aid receiver to aid provider. International 
development cooperation has been integrated into Brazil’s broader 
diplomatic agenda. The country has developed a model for international 
development cooperation characterised by multi-players, demand-driven 
by partners and based on Brazil’s special advantages. It has played an 
impressive role in hosting two important conferences on the environment 
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and development, in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and 2012, respectively. The 
conferences have shown the support of developing countries to sustainable 
development. To make Brazil’s efforts more transparent to the outside world, 
the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) and the Institute of Applied 
Economic Research (IPEA) made the first survey on Brazil’s international 
development cooperation in the period 2005-2009 (Cintra 2011). According 
to this survey, the major experiences of Brazilian international cooperation 
can be summarised as follows:
Firstly, in light of the low budget available, Brazil puts priority on 
technological cooperation based on Brazil’s experience and institutions while 
the role of state and public institutions in development cooperation have 
been stressed. Though the Brazilian budget for development cooperation 
increased 129 % during the period 2005-2009, the amount only accounted 
for 0.02 % of Brazilian gross domestic profit (GDP) which is lower than 
the committed 0.7 % of the developed countries. One interesting point is 
that the percentage of technological cooperation increased from 7.22 % to 
13.49 % during the period (Burges 2011). With the budget increase, ABC’s 
main function was transferred from receiving aid to coordinating and 
providing development aid, especially technological, to the external world. 
Furthermore, Brazil views technological cooperation as a way to enhance 
the state’s institutional capacity. At the conference of Rio+20 in 2012, the 
Brazilian Ministry of Finance underlined the decisive role of the state rather 
than the market in transforming the economy to a sustainable growth path 
(BFM 2012); states should guide and regulate market behaviour.
Different from the focus of OECD countries on capital aid and external 
consulting institutions, Brazil gives emphasis to the role of domestic public 
institutions and development experiences. These institutions have become 
stronger in solving the domestic development issues of Brazil, which has 
encouraged other developing countries to learn from them. Public companies 
such as the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) and 
the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources 
(IBAMA) are leading institutions in Brazilian international development 
cooperation. Some good practices and public policies, such as the breast 
milk bank and conditional cash transfer programmes (Bolsa Família), have 
been extended to the developing world. Any woman who produces more 
milk than her baby needs can donate the excess to Brazil’s national network 
of breast milk banks. Brazil is becoming an international reference on the 
matter and exports low cost technology to set up breast milk banks to 23 
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countries, as an effective tool to combat infant mortality (Ortiz 2012). Bolsa 
Família attempts to both reduce short-term poverty by direct cash transfers 
and fight long-term poverty by increasing human capital among the poor 
through conditional cash transfers. Another difference from DAC practice is 
that ABC only plays a coordinating role and not one of direct management, 
which reduces the transaction costs since the DAC countries have to pay for 
the consulting companies and hire more staff to manage the project.
Secondly, Brazilian international development cooperation serves the multi-
dimensional goals of struggling for higher international status, broadening 
diplomatic scope and promoting the ‘go-out’ strategy of domestic 
enterprises. Closely related to its diplomatic geography, most of Brazil’s 
development partners on the receiving side are located in Portuguese-
speaking African countries, South America, Central America and the 
Caribbean. Financial support to the UN’s refugee agency and regional 
development banks is expected to enhance Brazil’s international influence. 
Institutional arrangements, such as the positioning of ABC as part of the 
foreign ministry, make it clear that international development cooperation 
also serves Brazil’s diplomacy. Support to its quest for a permanent 
membership of United Nations Security Council from both Latin America 
and Africa is highly valued by Brazil. 
Though Brazil claims that its international development cooperation has 
no commercial objectives, it is obvious that such cooperation can provide 
help to Brazilian enterprises. The trade volume between Brazil and Africa 
has increased from USD 4.3 billion in 2002 to USD 27.6 billion in 2011, 
while Africa accounts for 55 % of ABC’s budget. The powerful Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES) does not give loans to foreign companies 
and governments but provides financial support to Brazilian companies and 
institutions to explore overseas markets, which, in fact, provides additional 
financial resources to developing countries. Helping African countries 
to develop ethanol fuel activates the world market for this competitive 
Brazilian product.
Thirdly, Brazil accentuates the nature of South-South cooperation of its 
development cooperation, namely equal partnership. Brazil does not use 
terms like ‘aid’ or ‘donation’ to describe its development cooperation but 
stresses solidarity, partnership and similarity. One interesting aspect is that, 
although Brazil emphasises the South-South character of its development 
cooperation, it actively pursues trilateral development cooperation with 
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developed countries and international organisations in providing support to 
fellow developing countries. Based on the wish to enhance relationships with 
Brazil and to understand or influence Brazil’s international development 
cooperation, developed countries intend to cooperate with Brazil. The main 
cooperation areas, such as social programmes, sanitation and agriculture, 
are also attractive to developed countries. Generally speaking, such a kind 
of trilateral cooperation is successful by integrating financial resources and 
management experiences into the Brazilian model.
3 Policy options for Brazil and China in the post-2015 
agenda
As the most influential emerging economies, both Brazil and China made 
great achievements in both domestic development and external development 
cooperation. A number of policy options for both countries exist based on 
the analysis of their identities, norms and interests.
Firstly, with their rapid economic growth and active global diplomacy, 
Brazil and China have transformed themselves from receivers of aid to 
providers, and have made great contributions to the realisation of the MDGs 
in their own countries. The rising influence of emerging economies in trade 
with low-income countries and finance for development have caused some 
developed economies such as the European Union and Japan to discontinue 
official development aid to China. Though Brazil and China have realised 
these changes, they do not want to be treated as donors defined by DAC 
countries, and do not fully agree with the norms and ideas of the DAC 
regarding aid. Instead, they prefer to work through the framework of South-
South cooperation, where they can demonstrate their special profile and 
importance in participating in international development cooperation. Brazil 
underlines its identity as a Southern and middle-income country, even if it 
has strong Western cultural linkages. Both China and Brazil still insist on 
their identity both as developing countries and emerging economies.
Obviously, Brazil and China will continue to promote the post-2015 
agenda from a developing countries’ perspective, namely to shape their 
behaviour according to the South-South cooperation framework and to 
underscore the dominant status of North-South cooperation together with 
the supporting role of South-South cooperation regarding the distribution 
of responsibilities. However, the evolution of South-South cooperation 
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brings with it the challenge of coordinating multiple players in development 
cooperation. The fragmentation of international development cooperation 
will reduce overall effectiveness. While Brazil and China put priority on 
infrastructure-financing based on their successful domestic experiences, 
developed countries focus on governance improvements based on DAC 
principles. How to coordinate these two approaches regarding development 
cooperation will be a key challenge of the post-2015 agenda.
Considering the low probability of Brazil and China joining the DAC in 
the near future, the international community should coordinate closely 
to build a more universal norm for post-2015 development cooperation. 
Brazil has made some adjustments to its level of bilateral relationships with 
the European Union (EU). At the Brazil-EU summit in 2013, both sides 
emphasised the importance of the Rio+20 outcome document placing 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at the centre of the post-2015 
agenda. Both sides thought that poverty reduction, changing unsustainable 
consumption and production models, and safeguarding and managing 
natural resources should be the fundamental requirements for sustainable 
development (GoB / EU 2013). The declaration shows that there are many 
similarities between the South and the North when diverging views on 
politics, good governance and security are avoided.
Secondly, while Brazil and China will probably insist on traditional norms 
such as non-interference in internal affairs and ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’, Brazil shows more support for the SDGs than China in 
the post-2015 agenda. Both countries refuse to accept conditionality in 
international development cooperation and emphasise solidarity based 
on mutual respect, sharing development experiences and training human 
resources. Based on their domestic development experiences and international 
cooperation practices, both countries highlight the importance of diversity 
in development models, and respect for the ownership of development 
partners. In contrast to the Washington Consensus, both countries value 
the role of the state in promoting economic and social development. This 
preference makes both countries favour a closer relationship with partners’ 
governments and public institutions rather than the private sector or NGOs. 
However, this does not mean that both countries would not cooperate with 
the private sector and NGOs in the long run since the latters’ roles are 
increasing in their domestic societies. Brazil is developing a multi-stake-
holder-approach to include companies and NGOs in forging its position 
towards the international negotiation process on SDGs.
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Both countries insist on the norm of ‘common but different responsibilities’ 
in dealing with almost all important global issues including climate change 
and international development. They maintain that developed countries 
should shoulder major capital and technological support to developing 
countries. China’s foreign aid maintained a rapid increase of 29.4 % 
annually during 2004-2009 (CNAOSC 2011). Brazil paid more attention 
to capacity-building and technological aid rather than financial support. 
Despite the rapidly increasing volume of their foreign aid, both countries are 
nonetheless trying to avoid specific commitments with regard to the future.
It is noteworthy that Brazil is playing a leading role in promoting SDGs 
in the post-2015 agenda, which is highly different from China’s middle 
position between MDGs and SDGs. Brazil highlights the important role of 
poverty reduction, climate change, social protection, biodiversity, prevention 
of violence against women, equal access to education, improving energy 
efficiency, sustainable infrastructure, public safety, sustainable lifestyles, 
rule of law, and freedom of expression (OWG 2014). As a champion of 
sustainable development since 1992, Brazil has a major stake in promoting 
a liberal and universal SDGs agenda.
Lastly, both countries’ international development cooperation is closely 
related to their overseas interests and rising international prestige. Both 
countries treat South-South cooperation as a channel through which to 
provide international public goods, which is an import dimension to 
understand if one wishes to grasp why both countries are actively involved 
in the post-2015 process. MDGs have given both countries an opportunity, 
not only for their own domestic development but also for developing their 
capacity to help others develop. Even though both countries have not yet 
achieved their domestic MDGs and SDGs, they have more capacity than 
ever before to help other developing countries to achieve the same goals. 
With their rising influence in international development cooperation, both 
countries are confronted with the legitimacy issue of their engagement.
There are two dimensions to the legitimacy of their international 
development cooperation. One dimension relates to development partners, 
the other to the attitude of DAC countries. To deal with such a legitimacy 
challenge, both countries have enhanced their cooperation with multilateral 
institutions and third parties. China has been a donating country towards 
the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank. China 
has also developed institutional interaction with the African Union and 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and beyond
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 109
cooperation partner countries under the framework of the Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). China also issued its White Paper on China’s 
Foreign Aid to increase transparency (CNAOSC 2011). By increasing 
transparency, trilateral cooperation and communication with partners, the 
legitimacy of their international development cooperation is expected to be 
improved. The international community in general is eager to get a realistic 
assessment of their role in Africa’s development.
It should be noted that, even as developing countries, both face huge domestic 
development tasks: Brazil and China have increasingly recognised the 
importance of sustainable development, especially considering the current 
transformation to more sustainable growth in their domestic economies. 
Based on this current transition in their domestic development, it can be 
predicted that the importance of sustainable development to both countries 
will influence their attitudes towards international development cooperation. 
In sum, both countries stress the priority of poverty reduction, the major 
responsibilities of developed countries for financial and technology support, 
and the increasing importance of the SDGs in a post-2015 development 
agenda.
4 Conclusions: a possible BRICS position in 
negotiations for a post-2015 agenda?
Considering their different economic sizes, competitive advantages and 
development stages, it is hard to define a common position of BRICS to the 
post-2015 agenda on the basis of only Brazil and China. However, as the 
most influential member countries of the BRICS, economically speaking, the 
experiences of Brazil and China can give us some clues to possible common 
positions within the BRICS group. Similarly to Brazil and China, all BRICS 
countries share certain common characteristics in regard to huge domestic 
sustainable development tasks, a new identity of providing development 
assistance, and being supporters of non-conditional assistance. To explore a 
possible common position of the BRICS countries to the post-2015 agenda, 
we need to undertake a text analysis of BRICS summit declaration.
Based on the experiences of Brazil and China, the importance of BRICS 
countries as development aid providers will increase in post-2015 
development cooperation though it cannot replace the leadership of DAC 
countries in international development cooperation in the short term. 
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Increasing capital resources, active global diplomacy and growing ‘big-
power’ identity will help to build a strong foundation for BRICS’s influence 
in future development cooperation. Brazil’s international cooperation 
reflects its wishes to promote its international influence and prestige since 
countries receiving help usually like to learn from the countries that provide 
help. BRICS countries have some special advantages in international 
development cooperation. These advantages include the applicability 
of BRICS’ development experiences, traditional friendship, and non-
interference in internal affairs. For example, Brazil mainly uses its domestic 
achievements and knowledge to support its international image as a leading 
development model. Brazil focuses on technological and public cooperation 
without introducing political topics into its development cooperation. Africa 
became a main topic for the 2013 BRICS summit in South Africa, and the 
promotion of development partnership with Africa became a priority for 
the summit. The major achievement of the summit – agreeing to establish a 
new development bank – partially served this partnership. The bank will be 
the first achievement collectively initiated by major developing countries to 
mainly serve the development cause of the developing world. Coordinating 
their positions towards the post-2015 development agenda will, most likely, 
be on the agenda of the 2014 BRICS summit in Brazil. 
Nonetheless, there are several reasons why BRICS will not replace the 
leading position of the DAC. Firstly, Brazil and China show that BRICS 
countries lack an independent and strong agency in charge of international 
development cooperation. Dependence on the Foreign Ministry or the 
Ministry of Commerce suggests that the cooperation has a strong shadow of 
diplomatic and commercial interests. This kind of institutional arrangement 
makes it hard for BRICS countries to develop an independent and sustainable 
international cooperation policy. Secondly, there is no special institution 
within BRICS like DAC to coordinate and regulate their development 
cooperation practices. This shows that it is necessary for BRICS countries 
to exchange their views on development approaches and to integrate their 
international development cooperation. To some extent, however, there are 
differences in development models followed by individual BRICS countries 
which would need to be addressed. Thirdly, norms such as ‘common 
but different responsibilities’ indicate that BRICS will play a secondary, 
supportive role in international cooperation. Fourthly, BRICS countries 
need to invest most of their resources in their own domestic development. 
World Bank data shows that most of the 1.2 billion people living under USD 
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1.25 daily are from emerging economies rather than the poorest countries. 
The emerging middle classes in BRICS countries are demanding that 
more financial resources are provided to support sanitation, infrastructure, 
education, and so on.
The fifth summit of BRICS provides some useful clues to understanding 
the BRICS perspective on the post-2015 agenda. Firstly, BRICS emphasises 
the importance of multilateral cooperation but with different priorities. 
The G20’s development agenda and the critical importance of the United 
Nations as a multilateral platform for sustainable development were also 
underlined by the BRICS summit declaration. BRICS gave a positive review 
of the outcome document of Rio+20 and agreed to participate in the future 
MDGs. They argued that the negotiation of the post-2015 agenda should 
be an inclusive and transparent intergovernmental process. However, Brazil 
has shown more interest in the SDGs based on its Rio+20 declaration and 
domestic achievements on social inclusiveness. South Africa, similar to its 
neighbours in Africa, is also giving a high profile to supporting the SDGs 
since there will be external assistance available. Nonetheless, there is still no 
consensus regarding the role of SDGs in post-2015 agenda within BRICS.
Secondly, BRICS puts emphasis on the comprehensive nature of the 
development concept, which requires finance, trade, climate change and 
security to be taken into account when promoting development cooperation. 
These external factors regarding development require related negotiations 
to consider the development rights of developing countries. The BRICS 
development bank initiative demonstrates that BRICS countries are trying 
to expand development finance. Whether OECD countries maintain stable 
macro-economic policies and safeguard world peace and, even more so, 
fair trade policies are also of concern to the BRICS countries when they 
consider development issues.
Thirdly, BRICS values the importance of the MDGs in the post-2015 
agenda. When thinking about the difficulties in realising the MDGs, BRICS 
points to those low-income countries that cannot achieve the MDGs by 
themselves, but rather need help through the international development 
partnership. The post-2015 agenda should build upon the MDGs, continue 
to keep poverty reduction and human development as a core concern, and 
consider the influence of emerging challenges and individual situations. 
The key to a successful post-2015 agenda is to ensure that more resources 
are available to assist developing countries. Even though China has made 
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some aid commitment at bilateral level, it is hard for it to make a specific 
commitment at the UN level because of the principle of ‘common but 
different responsibilities’.
Although BRICS countries have made great development achievements not 
necessarily based on Western experiences, this does not mean that they should 
overlook the successful experiences of Western countries in international 
development cooperation. Both the domestic development experiences and 
external development cooperation of developed countries have provided 
valuable experiences for BRICS countries. Domestic development policies 
in Brazil and China have been treated as tools to enhance national integration. 
Furthermore, BRICS countries are experiencing transformation of their 
own development models which will pay more attention to sustainable 
development and the modernisation of governance structures. Along with 
this, the increasing overseas interests demand a more stable environment in 
partner countries. Brazil’s practices of public policy training can improve 
the capacity of partners’ governance though this might not be achieved 
by applying preconditions to the cooperation. Though BRICS countries 
do not explicitly mention conditionality for development cooperation, 
the importance of a stable domestic environment and good governance in 
development partners has been given more weight by the BRICS group.
On account of their rising influence in international development 
cooperation, the BRICS countries should develop a common approach. The 
DAC, on the other hand, also aims to influence the way BRICS engages 
in cooperation. As far as financing development is concerned, there are 
currently three differences between BRICS and the DAC, namely: the ‘win-
win’ model; lack of policy conditions for financing; and focusing more 
on an individual project’s debt than on long-term debt sustainability and 
macro-economic factors (Babb 2013). What is lacking is an independent 
policy focus of the BRICS on development cooperation proper as opposed 
to diplomatic and commercial perspectives. With the deepening of BRICS 
development cooperation, these countries will have to concern themselves 
with the overall sustainability of the economy and the participation of 
NGOs and independent development consultants. BRICS countries also 
need to develop their own review standards and regulatory mechanisms to 
evaluate their performance regarding development cooperation since the 
DAC standards may not be suitable. In the long run, the biggest challenge 
for BRICS is to find a sustainable way to achieve development.
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and beyond
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 113
Bibliography
Babb, S. (2013): The Washington consensus as transnational policy paradigm : its 
origins, trajectory and likely successor, in: Review of International Political 
Economy 20 (2), 268–297
BFM (Brazilian Financial Ministry) (2012): Green and sustainable economy : the 
Finance Minister’s perspective, Brasilia; online: http://www.uncsd2012.org/
index.php?page=view&type=1000&nr=524&menu=126#sthash.rfgiqH8Y.dpuf 
(accessed 1 Mar. 2014)
Burges, S. W. (2011): Brazilian international development cooperation : budgets, 
procedures and issues with engagement, in: Global Studies Review 7 (3); online: 
http://www.globality-gmu.net/archives/2726 (accessed 1 Jul. 2014)
CNAOSC (Chinese News Affairs Office of State Council) (2011): China’s foreign aid; 
online: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-04/21/content_1849712.htm (accessed 1 
Jan. 2014)
Cintra, M. (2011): Brazilian cooperation for international development : 2005-2009, 
Brasilia/Brazil: Ipea/ABC
GoB (Government of Brazil) / EU (2013): Joint statement of the 6th Brazil-EU 
summit, 24 Jan., Brasilia; online: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135015.pdf (accessed 6 Feb. 2014)
Ortiz, F. (2012): Breast milk banks : from Brazil to the world, in: Inter Press Service 
IPS, 27 Sep.; online: http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/09/breast-milk-banks-from-
brazil-to-the-world/ (accessed 2 Feb. 2014)
OWG (Open Working Group of the United Nations General Assembly) (2014): 
Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals working 
document, New York; online: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/
documents/3686WorkingDoc_0205_additionalsupporters.pdf (accessed 20 May 
2014)





The evolution and dynamics of South Africa’s official post-2015 position
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 117
Contents
1 Introduction 119
2  Post-2015 between Pretoria and Addis Ababa:  
pursuing South African interests through the  
African Agenda  120
3 Convergence and divergence: the post-2015 official  
positions of South Africa and China 125
3.1 The vital role of the United Nations 126
3.2  The perceptions of South Africans towards China  
in the field of SDGs: teacher and student 126




Table 1:  List of Presidents of South Africa since 1994 121
Figure
Figure 1:  From which of the following countries could we learn  
most about alleviating poverty and unemployment? 127

The evolution and dynamics of South Africa’s official post-2015 position
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 119




With the birth of post-Apartheid South Africa in 1994 led by Nelson 
Mandela, the country has made remarkable progress in reducing poverty 
and promoting economic growth. South Africa has provided wide-ranging 
social benefits to poor people, within its capabilities. For instance, in 2012 
4.4 million households received free water supplies of which 2.5 million 
were indigent. And 1.8 million indigent households received free basic 
electricity, representing 51% of households in this category (GoSA 2013, 
23). That is why some Chinese scholars even call South Africa ‘Africa’s 
Sweden’ due to its relatively high level of national welfare (Qin 2013).
But, along with the progress, there are also significant challenges. Many 
poor people have to walk one or two hours to get to work since they 
cannot afford to buy private cars and the public transportation system is 
not developed well enough. To those South Africans, the post-Apartheid 
era after 1994 is not the end of a “Long walk to freedom” like the title of 
Nelson Mandela’s biography, but “Freedom for a long walk” (Lee 2013). 
Samir Amin, a well-known Egyptian Marxist economist, once pointed out 
that South Africa as a nation has four ‘worlds’ similar to the world system: 
There is the small segment of the white population whose living standards 
could be categorised as first world. The economic policy of South Africa 
during Apartheid made itself de facto a part of the ‘second world’. And a 
part of the urban African population seems to be living in the third world 
while the rural African people are living in the ‘fourth world’ (Amin 2003).
According to the 2006 State of the Environment Report (SOER), South 
Africa needs to respond to declining groundwater reserves, water quality and 
the integrity of the country’s ecosystems (DEAT 2006). About 34% of the 
country’s terrestrial ecosystems, 82% of its main river ecosystems and 65% 
of its marine bio-zones are threatened, whereas 50% of the wetlands have 
already been destroyed and living marine resources are either maximally 
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used or overexploited. Water demand is expected to rise by 52 % over the 
next 30 years, while the supply of water is likely to decline, if current 
trends – leakage from old and poorly maintained municipal infrastructure 
and the loss of wetlands – persist. Climate change is considered to be 
among the most serious, if not the single most serious, threat to humanity 
and sustainable development, with adverse impacts expected on food and 
water security, economic activity, human health, physical infrastructure and 
natural resources.
Spatial planning and spatial development decisions are still fragmented 
and there is still a need to address competing land-uses and to ensure that 
industry and infrastructural development programmes support the long-term 
sustainability of natural systems and the environment. Unaddressed, these 
issues could undermine South Africa’s ability to achieve its economic growth 
and poverty reduction goals on a trajectory of sustainable development 
(DPME 2012, 35). Besides the environmental challenges, social issues are 
also very tough. That is why South Africa is still labelled as a nation in the 
state of ‘fragile stability’ by some scholars (Besada 2007).
2  Post-2015 between Pretoria and Addis Ababa: 
pursuing South African interests through the  
African Agenda 
South Africa, the ‘rainbow’ country, was once a pariah state due to the 
Apartheid regime (Conway 2004, 96). Since 1994, South Africa has become 
a respected and constructive member of the international community. To 
analyse South Africa’s post-2015 position, we first need to look at the 
country’s foreign policy.
As some South African scholars have pointed out, South Africa’s foreign 
policy decision-making process is mostly driven by the president.1 Since 
1994, the New South Africa has had four Presidents. Kgalema Motlanthe, 
who had maintained a low public profile, was elected to the presidency by 
the South African National Assembly following the resignation of Thabo 
Mbeki in September 2008. He was widely considered to be acting as a 
‘caretaker president’ on behalf of Jacob Zuma who succeeded Motlanthe in 
1 Interview with a South African scholar in Johannesburg on August 2013.
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May 2009 following the general election which had been won by the ruling 
party, the African National Congress (ANC). Due to Motlanthe’s relatively 
short term, his impact on South African foreign policy can be neglected.
Table 1: List of Presidents of South Africa since 1994
Name Term length
Nelson Mandela 10 May 1994 – 16 June 1999
Thabo Mbeki 16 June 1999 – 24 September 2008
Kgalema Motlanthe 25 September 2008 – 9 May 2009
Jacob Zuma 9 May 2009 –
Source: Author’s compilation
Nelson Mandela, New South Africa’s first president, put a high premium 
on African solidarity and development, but cared more about the Southern 
African region. He once stated that South Africa was an inseparable part 
of the region, which enjoyed a privileged position in the country’s foreign 
policy. During Mandela’s term, South Africa did not pay enough attention to 
all of Africa and showed no willingness to become a leader of the continent 
(Pan 2007, 114). The style of Mbeki’s foreign policy was much more pro-
active compared to Mandela’s.2 During his term, South Africa, together 
with other African countries, transformed the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). Mbeki and Nigeria’s president 
Olusegun Obasanjo jointly served as leaders to drive the agenda of NEPAD 
(New Partnership for Africa’s Development) (Adebajo / Whiteman 2012, 
113).
The African position during international negotiations has always been 
controversial, since very often African countries have failed to speak with 
one voice on issues of sustainable development. This divergence comes 
from the sometimes heterogeneous African interests. For example, countries 
with high natural resource endowments have different interests from those 
with a weak potential. Moreover, the institutional, political and economic 
2 But Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe’s policy was not active enough in many 
people’s eyes.
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nomenclatures of African nations are also heterogeneous. In addition, 
the continent has lacked a clear and defined programme that could bind 
African countries together around common interests. This shortcoming has 
nevertheless been overcome since 2001 by the creation of NEPAD. However, 
although NEPAD has helped African countries to identify sustainable 
development priorities, a common position only started to emerge in 
2009, when the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) clearly declared their 
commitment to defend African interests during international negotiations. 
The position of the African negotiators was to challenge developed nations 
to reduce their emission levels, as such nations have a high responsibility in 
terms of climate change and environmental damage (Thiam 2012, 3).
Many observers wonder whether and to what extent South Africa could play 
a leadership role for Africa and speak for the whole continent. South Africa 
has enjoyed unique advantages since 1994 and can serve as a bridge to other 
African countries. South Africa’s reintegration into the global community 
has seen its diplomatic, political and economic relations expand rapidly to 
include countries with which it previously had no relations. By 2012, the 
number of foreign diplomatic missions, consulates-general, consulates and 
international organisations in South Africa had increased to 315. This is the 
second-largest number of diplomatic offices accredited to any country after 
the United States. South Africa’s missions abroad increased from 36 in 1994 
to 125 in 2012 (The Presidency 2014, 148).
South Africa is the sole African representative in the G20 and the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa); the chairperson of the African 
Union Commission (AUC), Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, had served under 
Presidents Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma. Indeed, South Africa’s membership 
in these various multilateral groupings does afford it multiple channels of 
influence. However, these multiple foreign policy orientations also mean 
that it has to perform a tough balancing act in order to promote its core 
values while at the same time achieving its interests and maintaining the 
many strategic relationships it is publicly committed to. That is why, under 
President Zuma, South Africa has rarely sought to project its influence on 
the African continent, wary of accusations that it is a meddling ‘big brother’ 
(Attree / Suri 2013).
In August 2010, on the basis of views expressed at the summit on climate 
change, held on 22 September 2009, and inspired by the report “Closing the 
gaps”, prepared by the Commission on Climate Change and Development, 
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Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, set up a High-level 
Panel on Global Sustainability, co-chaired by Tarja Halonen, President of 
Finland, and Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa (UN 2012). It included 
20 more eminent persons from around the world, not representing their 
countries of origin or organisations, but serving in an expert capacity. 
Through the co-chair position, South Africa has successfully introduced 
its development concept into the report. The South African Government 
considers the outcome of the UN Conference on Sustainable Development 
(Rio+20), which took place in Brazil in June 2012, to be critical in terms of 
the post-2015 agenda for sustainable development and its implementation. 
South Africa played an active role in the formulation of the position of 
Africa and the G77 and China, as reflected in the outcome document “The 
future we want” (DIRCO 2013, 34).
Since mid-2012, South Africa has been playing a prominent role in 
the preparations for the intergovernmental process that will shape the 
UN development agenda beyond 2015, which is the target date for the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In addressing 
issues related to the UN post-2015 agenda, South Africa thinks it is critically 
important to build on the unfinished business of the MDGs and address 
existing ‘gaps’ that may have arisen. More momentum and commitment 
should therefore be generated towards the achievement of the MDGs up to 
2015 and beyond. Any development agenda beyond 2015, according to the 
official South African position, should also address the three dimensions 
of sustainable development (social, economic and environmental) in an 
inclusive, balanced and integrated manner (DIRCO 2014).
South Africa commenced its three-year term on the UN Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) on 1 January 2013. The country joins the UN 
body at a strategic juncture, when the world is focused on the run-up to 
the 2015 target date for the achievement of the MDGs, with the post-2015 
development agenda discourse being the dominant topic in the global 
arena. Given the key role that ECOSOC plays in co-ordinating global 
efforts towards shaping the post-2015 framework, South Africa intends 
to use this platform to ensure that the options considered are compatible 
with South Africa’s own development agenda, African Union aspirations 
and the development agenda of the South. DIRCO is co-ordinating inter-
departmental consultations to define South Africa’s position on this matter, 
guided by the recently adopted National Development Plan “Vision 
2030” and other relevant government policies. Furthermore, the ongoing 
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discussions on the reform of ECOSOC, as mandated by Resolution 61/16 
on “The strengthening of the Economic and Social Council”, are also an 
issue of cardinal importance to South Africa as this will enhance the role 
and relevance of the Council, making it a truly meaningful body in fostering 
the global development agenda (Ebrahim 2013a).
South African officials have stressed that ‘Post-2015’ has not yet been part 
of their lexicon, although suggestions about what should be included in 
the framework have been plentiful (Attree / Suri 2013). Unlike China and 
other emerging powers that have issued their own official position paper on 
post-2015, Pretoria has yet not done so. But this does not mean that South 
Africa is remaining passive in the national, regional and global post-2015 
processes. There is reason to believe that the present South Africa has shown 
a relatively low profile in African affairs compared to the Mbeki era precisely 
because of the lessons learned from that time. In fact, the leadership role of 
South Africa is not widely accepted in Africa. There is one good example 
from the early 2000s to demonstrate this. At that time, the then President 
Mbeki bid for the 2004 Summer Olympics Games and South Africa played 
the ‘Africa card’ to win support from its African brothers. But many African 
countries did not even vote for South Africa during the first round of the 
final vote (Pan 2007, 116). In contrast to Mbeki’s approach, Zuma’s style is 
relatively conservative. He appears to prefer to be led by the African agenda, 
instead of drafting his own African agenda and calling on other countries to 
follow him as Mbeki once did.3
Under President Zuma, South Africa has rarely sought to project its 
influence on the African continent, wary of accusations that it is a meddling 
‘big brother’. One notable exception was Dlamini-Zuma’s election to 
become Chair of the AU Commission, which made other continental powers 
like Nigeria uneasy. What seems clear, as discussions around a post-2015 
framework gather momentum, is that South Africa will pay close attention 
to the views of other African member states before defining its own position. 
At the same time, its core values and its triumph over Apartheid mean that 
it has huge potential to promote progressive values that can address Africa’s 
biggest challenges in this global debate (Attree / Suri 2013). Maybe the fact 
that the AU issued its “Communiqué of N’Djamena” listing the six pillars 
3 My judgment on Zuma’s foreign policy received support from South African scholars 
during a conference in Shanghai on 18 March 2014.
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of the AU’s position on Post-2015 on 25 February 2014 (AU 2014) is the 
reason why Pretoria has not issued its own position paper.
But this does not imply that South Africa has not put enough effort into the 
African post-2015 consultations. In fact, Pretoria has quite a lot of diplomatic 
tools or platforms available to promote its own, as well as African interests. 
The country hosted and presided over a successful United Nations Climate 
Change Conference (COP17) in 2012 which delivered the landmark Durban 
Platform thereby rescuing the Kyoto Protocol (Nkoana-Mashabane 2013, 
6–7). South Africa returned to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
twice as a non-permanent member. South Africa joined the powerful and 
influential group of emerging economies, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa), and hosted the fifth BRICS summit in Durban in 
March 2013. The economic benefits of this membership for South Africa 
are massive.
3 Convergence and divergence: the post-2015 official 
positions of South Africa and China
Along with most of its BRICS partners, South Africa positions itself 
squarely in the global South. In doing so, it identifies with the global 
marginalisation of the African continent, but has also taken an active role in 
addressing this, advocating for and on behalf of African concerns. Utilising 
the African National Congress (ANC)’s rhetoric against apartheid, South 
Africa has taken up the fight against what it regards as ‘global apartheid’ – 
the unequal playing field that prevents Africa from fully participating as an 
equal in the global community (Grobbelaar / Chen 2014). Both as members 
of the global South and the BRICS group, Pretoria and Beijing have already 
exchanged and cooperated quite well on African, regional and global affairs. 
With regard to MDGs and the post-2015 agenda the two countries share 
common positions.
The leaders of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the 
Republic of India, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of South 
Africa, met in Durban, South Africa, on 27 March 2013 at the fifth BRICS 
summit. The “eThekwini Declaration” (Durban Declaration) adopted at the 
summit states that:
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We reiterate our commitment to work together for accelerated progress in 
attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by the target date 
of 2015, and we call upon other members of the international community 
to work towards the same objective … It is important to ensure that any 
discussion on the UN development agenda, including the ‘Post 2015 
Development Agenda’ is an inclusive and transparent inter-governmental 
process under a UN-wide process which is universal and broad based. 
We welcome the establishment of the Open Working Group on the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in line with the Rio+20 Outcome 
Document which reaffirmed the Rio Principles of Sustainable Development 
as the basis for addressing new and emerging challenges. We are fully 
committed to a coordinated inter-governmental process for the elaboration 
of the UN development agenda (BRICS 2013).
Besides the broad consensus written into the “eThekwini Declaration”, 
there are also some similarities between the two countries.
3.1 The vital role of the United Nations
China, as one of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, 
is committed to supporting the United Nation’s vital role for the post-2015 
framework. During the Apartheid era, the ANC gained moral support from 
the United Nations, which has generated a strong South African bond with 
the United Nations. DIRCO’s Deputy Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim made the 
following point on 19 March 2014: 
The centrality of the United Nations to South Africa’s foreign engagement 
is in part based on a strong belief in collective and equitable global 
governance, but also because of the organization’s role in the fight against 
apartheid… Former South African President Mandela once put it in 2002: 
‘No country, however powerful it may be, is entitled to act outside the 
United Nations … Any country that acts outside the United Nations is 
making a serious mistake’ (Ebrahim 2014).
3.2  The perceptions of South Africans towards China in the 
field of SDGs: teacher and student
Funded by the South African Foreign Policy Initiative of the Open Society 
Foundation of South Africa, IPSOS/Markinor conducted a public opinion 
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survey. Face-to-face computer-assisted personal interviews were conducted 
with a representative sample of 3,500 South Africans during October and 
November 2012. One question asked from which countries South Africa can 
learn from most about reducing poverty and unemployment. China emerged 
as the number one choice amongst most respondents (26%), followed 
by Brazil and Botswana (both at 20%). These patterns became apparent 
regardless of significant demographic variations, although people under 
25 were more likely to identify Brazil and those over 45 Botswana as the 
countries they could learn most from (Van der Westhuizen / Smith 2013, 
1–11).
Figure 1:  From which of the following countries could we learn most about 
alleviating poverty and unemployment?















Source: Ipsos Public Affairs, October and November 2012
Some South Africans also believe that, besides learning from China, China 
could also learn something from South Africa. For instance, since the 
fall of Apartheid, South Africa is very experienced in social dialogue for 
the promotion of harmonious relations between different groups within a 
country. China is now also facing the challenges of social issues for which 
South Africa could lend a hand by transferring its own experience.4 In fact, 
Pretoria has already begun to advertise its social reconciliation experience – 
as a recent case shows: The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
4 Interview with Busani Ngcaweni (Deputy Director General in the Office of the Deputy 
President of South Africa) on 14 August 2013 in Pretoria.
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(CHOGM) took place in Colombo, Sri Lanka from 15 to 17 November 2013 
on the theme “Growth with equity: inclusive development”. On the last day 
of the meeting, President Zuma offered South Africa’s experience with the 
truth and reconciliation process to assist with the challenges of post-conflict 
accountability in Sri Lanka.
3.3  South Africa as the messenger of African concerns to 
China
The leaderships of China and South Africa have also been quite satisfied with 
their good working relations and relevant progress since formal diplomat 
relations were established. To China, South Africa is one of the most 
important partners not only in African affairs but also in global cooperation. 
One former Chinese Ambassador to South Africa once said that the 
diplomacy of South Africa is quite different from other African countries. 
While other African leaders meet with Chinese counterparts, they always 
focus on bilateral topics, but South Africa leaders think the bilateral topics 
are too small to talk about and prefer to talk with China about global issues.5 
On 22 May 2014, President Xi Jinping sent a message of congratulations to 
Jacob Zuma on his reelection as President of the Republic of South Africa. 
Xi Jinping stressed that, as important developing countries, China and 
South Africa share extensive common interests in international and regional 
affairs. President Xi also mentioned China-South Africa relations as “the 
strategic pivot point and the priority in our own foreign policies, so as to 
elevate the China-South Africa comprehensive strategic partnership to new 
highs” (Xinhua News Agency 2014).
But to the outside world, the key role of South Africa is still to be the 
voice of Africa. For example, the invitation to South Africa to become a 
formal member of the BRICS group and to attend the Sanya Summit in 
2011 signalled that the country was regarded as a significant emerging 
power, worthy of attention in global decision-making. South Africa ensured 
that infrastructural development and industrialisation in Africa was on 
the agenda at the BRICS summit in Sanya, China. The summit expressed 
support for such development in the context of the NEPAD framework (The 
Presidency 2014, 153).
5 Interview with Ambassador Liu Guijin in Jinhua City, China on 20 Apr. 2014.
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Comparably speaking, when we read “China’s position paper on the 
development agenda beyond 2015” (GoC 2013), we see that terms ‘NEPAD’ 
or ‘African countries’ are not mentioned but this, of course, this does not 
mean that Beijing pays little attention to the post-2015 issue in cooperation 
with African countries. In March 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met 
with visiting Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa in Beijing, and vowed 
continued support for Africa’s peace and development cause. Kutesa, who is 
to be elected president of the 69th session of the UN General Assembly for 
2014-2015, said African countries including Uganda hoped to cement ‘win-
win’ cooperation with China and strengthen coordination in multilateral 
organisations such as the United Nations. Li told Kutesa that China firmly 
backed the United Nations and the UN General Assembly in playing greater 
roles, nailing down development plans for the period after 2015, and making 
more efforts to help developing countries (Tan 2014). That is to say, possibly 
due to the presence of South Africa within BRICS or other international 
mechanisms of which China is also a member, Beijing’s promises towards 
the developing world in the field of development are more clearly targeted 
instead of being just vague statements. In other words, South Africa has 
served as the messenger of African concerns to China to some extent.
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Emerging economies in the post-2015 negotiations:  
how their positioning will shape the new agenda
Christine Hackenesch / Heiner Janus
Summary
The rise of emerging economies has fundamentally changed the context in 
which negotiations on a post-2015 agreement take place. The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) were an agenda driven by traditional donors 
and North-South relations – a model of global relations that is outdated 
today. When the MDGs were negotiated at the end of the 1990s, they set a 
new basis for cooperation among industrialised and developing countries. 
By focusing on human development and orienting development aid to the 
poorest people, the MDGs allowed policy-makers and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to mobilise support among the broader public for 
increasing aid flows.
Almost 15 years later, countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (BRICS) play a major role on the global stage. A second group 
of emerging countries, such as Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Turkey, are 
rapidly gaining importance as economic and political players, especially 
in their respective regions. The rise of these countries shapes the nature 
of global development challenges and the instruments used to address 
them. While poverty remains a key concern, a new agenda has to take into 
account that the poverty landscape has changed considerably, as most of the 
world’s poor today live in middle-income countries. Issues of environmental 
sustainability and social inequality have become even more pressing today 
compared to the end of the 1990s. The role of development assistance as 
an instrument to engage with emerging economies is in a fundamental 
transition period. 
The post-2015 debate holds the potential to generate momentum for a 
“new bargain” among developing countries, emerging economies and 
industrialised countries. An international agreement, integrating the MDGs 
and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) could pave the way for a 
comprehensive agenda on sustainable human development. If a new agenda 
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were to also set goals for industrialised countries and emerging economies, 
it would become a truly universal development agenda. Securing the means 
for implementing the new agenda, including finance, trade, technology 
transfer, capacity building, will be as important as the goals themselves. 
Negotiations at the United Nations (UN) on the SDGs, however, already 
show diverging opinions on this issue, especially between the Group of 77 
and China and industrialised countries. The new bargain will therefore also 
require an agreement between all countries on who will pay for what.
Supporting such a comprehensive international development framework 
that goes beyond poverty reduction and includes social, environmental 
and economic sustainability entails challenges for both industrialised and 
emerging economies. Dynamics in South-South cooperation currently 
provide limited incentives for emerging economies to actively support 
a new agenda. Development policy communities in emerging economies 
with an interest in pushing active contributions to a post-2015 agenda are 
weak. Moreover, institutions for cooperation among emerging economies 
that would be crucial in identifying common positions are still in their 
infancy. On the other hand, policy-makers in emerging economies may 
seize the opportunity to use a post-2015 agenda to address joint interests 
such as tackling inequalities and achieving environmentally sustainable 
development. Negotiations may provide an opportunity for China and others 
to strengthen their international “soft power”. For Europe, implementing a 
universal agenda will be equally ambitious, not least when thinking about 
goals for reducing social inequality or environmental footprints.
Whether emerging economies decide to engage or not, they will 
fundamentally shape the relevance and scope of any global framework. Only 
if they actively support a universal agenda, a new bargain among developing 
countries, emerging economies and industrialised countries can be struck. 
This gives important responsibilities to European countries, which need to 
make ambitious commitments and conduct negotiations towards increasing 
the attractiveness of a new agenda for emerging economies.
1 Emerging economies and the post-2015 agenda
For most emerging economies, the MDGs have neither played a central 
role for their domestic policies nor for their relations with other developing 
countries. The goal of halving world poverty (MDG-1) has been met, largely 
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because of robust economic growth in China and India. Yet, in China or 
India, few people at the government level or in the general public knew about 
the MDGs before the debates and negotiations on a post-2015 framework 
started. Scholars in China therefore question the function of new global 
goals if a causal link between the MDGs and progress in achieving them 
is so difficult to make. In some countries of the “second tier” of emerging 
economies, however, the MDGs figured more prominently as guidance 
for policy-making. The Indonesian government, for example, developed a 
strong institutional structure to ensure the implementation of the MDGs and 
align incoming foreign aid with the domestic development agenda.
The MDGs have also not served as an explicit framework for South-South 
cooperation. Emerging economies have contributed towards the progress in 
achieving the MDGs by providing growing levels of technical assistance, 
trade and loans to Least Developed Countries. Moreover, the MDGs are 
mentioned in key policy documents, for instance the action plans of the 
Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). But in the context of 
partnerships like the FOCAC meetings, for instance, China and African 
countries have mainly called on traditional donors to increase support for 
African developing countries.
Looking ahead, the post-2015 negotiations hold the potential to address these 
shortcomings of the MDGs and to develop a truly universal development 
agenda. Three scenarios with different degrees of engagement of emerging 
economies in the post-2015 agenda can be envisioned (see figure). 
Depending on how emerging economies position themselves towards a new 
agreement, the scope of the goals and instruments of the agenda and the 
overall relevance of a new agreement will differ considerably.
1) Major emerging economies may decide to not embrace the post-2015 
agenda. The international community would then settle for a reformed 
“traditional MDG-type agenda”. This agenda would remain confined to 
traditional North-South relations. Poverty reduction would remain the key 
goal. The agenda would continue to be underpinned by the understanding 
that official development assistance (ODA) constitutes the key instrument to 
support poverty reduction. Against the backdrop of decreasing importance 
of ODA – as compared to other flows such as trade, direct investments and 
loans, and in light of reduced aid budgets in European countries in times 
of economic crisis – the relevance of such a traditional MDG-type agenda 
would be limited.
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2) Emerging economies will embrace the post-2015 agenda, but only in 
a limited fashion that covers South-South cooperation and not domestic 
policy-making in emerging economies. In addition, emerging economies 
would not see a new agenda as being relevant for their domestic policy-
making or as an instrument for global governance. In this scenario, which 
we call the “global agenda” poverty reduction could still be the key goal. 
Still, the instruments used to support the renewed goals could go beyond 
Figure 1: Emerging economies and the post-2015 agenda
 
Source: Authors’ own representation
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aid commitments and become more comprehensive by linking trade and 
investments more coherently towards achieving development objectives. 
Yet, cooperation would be selective in addressing poverty in the poorest 
countries. This agenda would be more comprehensive and inclusive than the 
current MDG framework, but it would remain an agenda for poor countries. 
3) A new bargain among developing countries, emerging economies and 
industrialised countries is struck. If emerging economies consider a post-
2015 agenda to be relevant also for their domestic policy-making and as a 
framework for global governance, a “universal agenda” could be reached. 
This agreement would integrate the MDGs and SDGs, paving the way for 
a comprehensive agenda on sustainable human development and the means 
for achieving it. This would also require including sustainable development 
and social inequality targets in European countries. Cooperation would 
no longer be limited to poverty reduction and aid, but address the broader 
context of common and collective global challenges. A post-2015 agenda 
that would define objectives for all countries could thus provide a window 
of opportunity for enhancing international cooperation. 
Ongoing discussions for instance in the Open Working Group or statements 
at the 2013 UN General Assembly suggest that emerging economies, 
developing countries and industrialized countries agree that the new agenda 
should be universal, which could lead to a global agenda or a universal 
agenda (scenario 2 or 3). Yet, the actual intergovernmental negotiations 
will only start in September 2014 and the outcome of the negotiations will 
also depend to an important extent on how the negotiations are going to be 
conducted.
2 Challenges and opportunities for emerging economies 
to engage in post-2015 debate
A number of factors make it difficult for emerging economies to actively 
support a global agenda, much less a universal one. Yet, other factors such as 
common development challenges and the opportunity to use the post-2015 
negotiations to strengthen their soft power may also allow these countries to 
actively contribute to a new agenda.
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South-South cooperation
The future of South-South cooperation is a key factor for the engagement 
of emerging economies in the post-2015 debate. South-South cooperation 
currently is not facing pressure to redefine itself. The situation of South-
South cooperation therefore differs substantially from the challenges faced 
by providers of ODA at the end of the 1990s. Driven by rapid and sustained 
economic growth in emerging economies, trade, direct investments, 
loans and development aid to developing countries continue to increase 
(Chaturvedi / Fues / Sidiropoulos 2012). According to one estimate by the 
UN, South-South cooperation was between USD 16.1 billion and USD 19 
billion in 2011, representing a share of 10 percent of total development 
cooperation compared to 6.7 percent in 2006 (United Nations 2014).
Intensifying relations among emerging economies and other developing 
countries have been accompanied by critical debates, mostly held in Europe 
and the United States, and particularly regarding China’s engagement in 
Africa. The public in China and India may also question the provision of 
more assistance to other developing countries, but rather in light of persisting 
poverty at home. On the other hand, many actors in developing countries view 
opportunities arising from South-South cooperation positively. Public opinion 
polls conducted by Pew and Afro-barometer show that emerging economies’ 
contributions to development in partner countries are well received.
Yet, as South-South cooperation intensifies, the incentives to integrate it into 
a post-2015 agreement also grow. Policy-makers in developing countries 
increasingly question the sustainability and transparency of South-South 
flows. For instance, African government officials used the 2012 FOCAC 
meeting and the visit of the new Chinese President in Africa in early 2013 
to raise concerns about the medium and long-term sustainability of the 
relationship. Further, South-South relations often present challenges that 
are not too different from those in North-South relations. Environmental, 
social and economic sustainability, for instance, have become pressing 
concerns also for emerging economies’ relations with developing countries. 
Most importantly, developing countries have not (yet) asked emerging 
economies to join a new agreement. So far, the African Union common 
position on post-2015 (African Union 2014) has only mentioned South-
South cooperation in very general terms in the context of mutually beneficial 
partnerships. The common position only very loosely refers to the need to 
mobilise external, non-traditional sources of financing from “emerging 
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partners”. If, for instance, the African Union or the Least Developed Country 
group in the UN were to articulate more clearly formulated expectations 
towards emerging economies, this could be a powerful incentive to join a new 
agreement. These factors would eventually increase emerging economies’ 
interests to include South-South cooperation more visibly in a new agenda. 
Weak development policy communities
Weak development policy communities in emerging economies may 
make it more difficult for these countries to actively shape the post-2015 
negotiations. Within industrialised countries, the MDGs have reinforced the 
separation between development and other policy areas and strengthened the 
development policy communities. These communities have a vested interest 
in pushing the post-2015 negotiations. Emerging economies in contrast do 
not (yet) have strong development policy communities that could take up 
the debate. In contrast to countries from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), there are very few development 
NGOs in emerging economies that would seek to influence government 
positions in the post-2015 negotiations. Only a few countries such as South 
Africa, India, Brazil and Mexico have established development agencies. 
In addition (similar to European countries), policy communities working 
on environmental sustainability are not familiar with the MDGs and do not 
immediately see the value added of promoting an agenda that closely links 
the MDGs and SDGs. 
Still, weak development policy communities may eventually turn out to be 
an advantage for emerging economies. The absence of development policy 
communities could make it easier for emerging economies to advocate an 
agenda that links the MDG and SDG frameworks and includes goals relevant 
for domestic policies in emerging economies as well as their relations with 
other developing and industrialised countries.
Cooperation among emerging economies 
Limited cooperation among emerging economies on development policy 
and weak institutions for cooperation may hinder these countries in feeding 
common positions into the post-2015 negotiations. Weak cooperation 
among emerging economies may thus make it difficult for these countries to 
actively support a global or even universal agenda.
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During past decades, countries organised in the OECD have developed 
extensive mechanisms for exchanging ideas, knowledge and information. 
Policy-makers in China, India and Brazil, in contrast, know comparatively 
little about other emerging economies’ policies towards developing 
countries, making it more difficult to develop joint positions in supporting 
a global agenda. For instance, research in India on China’s cooperation with 
African countries, or vice versa, is only slowly becoming more important. 
In addition, low transparency of South-South cooperation impedes access 
to information. Emerging economies do not report their flows according to 
a common standard; most do not provide information that is disaggregated 
on a country and yearly basis.
Policy-makers in emerging economies often view global forums such as 
the G20, World Trade Organization and Bretton Woods Institutions as 
strongly dominated by industrialised countries. Within the United Nations, 
rising powers still position themselves as developing countries. Institutions 
for cooperation such as the BRICS and the IBSA forum are still relatively 
young. Cooperation among emerging economies in the context of UN 
Development Cooperation Forum is still very recent. The plan to set up a 
BRICS development bank is the most prominent example that demonstrates 
the interest of emerging countries to create global forums that serve their 
collective interests. Translating these innovations to the international stage, 
however, will require building bridges with ongoing international processes 
such as the post-2015 negotiations.
Common development challenges
Emerging economies are struggling with a set of common challenges that 
could prompt their interest in supporting a universal agenda. For example, 
emerging economies are among those countries most affected by climate 
change. Sustainable use of natural resources has become a policy priority 
for most of these countries. Even in the absence of internationally binding 
agreements, Brazil, India and China committed themselves to ambitious 
targets for reducing emissions per unit of gross domestic product. 
Similarly, most emerging economies face rising levels of inequality. Since 
the 1990s, income inequality has rapidly increased in all BRICS countries, 
except for Brazil. High levels of inequality reduce the impact of economic 
growth on poverty reduction. In addition, all emerging economies have 
to cope with the challenges of urbanisation, rising middle classes, large 
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numbers of young people entering the labour market and the volatility of 
commodity prices.
These challenges have profound influences on domestic policy-making in 
emerging economies, but at the same time they include a global dimension. 
Climate change cannot be tackled within national confines. Rising inequality 
catalyses social and political instability. Making these common challenges 
central issues of a new international agreement may offer the advantage 
to emerging economies of addressing their primary concerns – at national 
and global levels. By taking the lead in putting these issues on the agenda, 
emerging countries would be in a position to shape global policy strategies 
actively rather than merely reacting to imminent domestic social, economic 
and environmental challenges. 
Soft power and alternative narratives
Engaging in the post-2015 negotiations offers an opportunity for emerging 
economies to strengthen their international soft power. The amount of 
discursive strength a country holds on the global stage depends strongly on 
its reputation. The upcoming negotiations provide an opportunity to shape 
international cooperation for the coming decades. Through a constructive 
engagement in the post-2015 debate, rising powers could accumulate more 
influence in the international community.
For countries such as China (and to a lesser extent India), the MDG debate 
could be an opportunity to project a narrative about its rise internationally. 
From the perspective of the Chinese government, international 
acknowledgements of China’s success in reducing poverty have often taken 
a backseat against concerns regarding economic competition and criticism 
of China’s autocratic political system. Similar to other emerging economies, 
China (for various reasons), until now, has not projected a “vision” for 
international development. For China and India, negotiations on a post-2015 
agreement could provide an important opportunity to shape a narrative on 
international development based on their own development experiences and 
that reflects their domestic concerns and priorities.
Countries from the second tier of emerging economies such as Indonesia 
and Columbia could use the negotiations to complement their growing 
economic weight with soft power. International negotiations such as the post-
2015 agenda allow for strengthening their international influence beyond 
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their economic weight, which is often still confined to their immediate 
neighbourhood. As a co-chair of the High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 
Development Agenda as well as the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation, Indonesia has already seized the opportunity.
3 The way forward: which role for Europe?
As there are a number of factors making it difficult for emerging economies 
to actively support the post-2015 agenda, European countries play a key role 
in facilitating the engagement of these countries. 
First, European countries can facilitate the active engagement of emerging 
economies by building credibility. Similar to emerging economies, 
European countries will be reluctant to subscribe to a universal agenda 
that defines targets for their domestic policy-making. Making international 
commitments to address inequality, poverty and environmental sustainability 
is politically sensitive for all countries. However, only by making ambitious 
commitments for their own domestic policies can European countries 
credibly ask emerging economies to subscribe to a universal agenda.
Second, the relevance of a post-2015 agreement will be determined by 
the negotiation process. UN thematic- and country consultations on the 
new agenda suggest that the preferences of different actors regarding the 
goals may converge around a few priorities such as poverty reduction, 
environmental sustainability and socio-economic inequality. Still, emerging 
economies will only actively engage in the process if they perceive the 
process as being inclusive and open to their positions. Debates about the 
post-2015 agenda are still taking part to an important extent within and 
among European countries. European actors should reach out to emerging 
economies proactively in the negotiation process.
Lastly, an important factor for the success of the negotiations and 
development of a universal agenda will be to define the responsibilities 
of different actors. Revisiting the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” (CBDR) could be a starting point for the negotiations 
(Pauw et al. 2014). The CBDR phrase originates from the Rio Declaration 
produced at the UN Earth Summit in 1992. Traditionally, the phrase has 
been used by developing countries to argue for “fair burden-sharing” in 
protecting the global climate. Re-conceptualising CBDR for the post-2015 
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debate may provide a valuable basis to integrate contributions from different 
groups of countries.
In the negotiations on the SDGs, the Group of 77 and China proposed in its 
position on the means of implementation to “Enhance global partnership 
based on MDG-8 in accordance with the principle of CBDR with North-
South Cooperation at its core and South-South and Triangular Cooperation 
as a useful supplement, consistent with the Financing for Development 
process” (G77 and China 2014). The Group of 77 and China has started an 
important and useful debate on the implementation of the new agenda by 
proposing detailed means of implementation for each proposed SDG and 
insisting to convene the third conference on Financing for Development, 
which will take place from 13-16 July 2015 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
The willingness to discuss South-South and triangular cooperation as 
“supplements” to ODA is a positive steps towards presenting these efforts 
in the framework of an international agenda. This might also contribute to 
further improving the quality and availability of information on the scale 
and impact of South-South and triangular cooperation. At the same time, 
maintaining the language of North-South cooperation in regard to CBDR 
might overemphasize a dichotomy that has become increasingly outdated. 
Instead, a more flexible implementation of CBDR is needed to take into 
account the differentiated global landscape of countries and the rise of 
emerging economies. A flexible CBDR regime would include differentiation 
of state groups beyond the North-South dichotomy, with graduation and 
exclusion mechanisms that are based on a set of transparent, measurable and 
verifiable indicators (Pauw et al. 2014). 
The political challenge of agreeing on goals as well as on the means of 
implementation still has to be resolved. The positioning of emerging 
economies will be a key factor in this process. European countries also 
need to invest more in upholding existing commitments and expanding 
international cooperation. In the end, all countries will have to take 
responsibility to make a post-2015 framework relevant. The challenges that 
the world is facing can only be tackled if every country contributes.
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The post-2015 global agenda for sustainable development is based on a 
new concept of development and cooperation: what the United Nations will 
adopt in 2015 will be a convergence of i) the ‘unfinished business’ of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with a strong focus on poverty, 
hunger, education, health and gender, and ii) the Sustainable Development 
Goals discussed at the 2012 UN Summit on Sustainable Development 
which add challenges such as food, water, biodiversity, climate, and oceans 
as goals in their own right and with targets that explicitly mention the social, 
economic and environmental dimensions of food or water security for all 
countries, not just developing countries, at national and global levels. The 
new goals will be universal, and they will emerge from a long list of thematic 
focus areas currently being negotiated by the intergovernmental Open 
Working Group in New York. These negotiations illustrate the difficulties of 
establishing joint priorities among very different countries, and they show 
that a new approach to cooperation will be needed if the agenda is to be 
implemented.
Different German actors involved in the post-2015 agenda hold different 
positions which I will try to explain by answering four questions: First, why 
do we need a new global agenda after the MDGs? Second, what do the 
concepts of universal goals and common but differentiated responsibilities 
mean for the new agenda? Third, who is engaged in the post-2015 agenda 
process in Germany? And fourth, how can we link the new agenda to 
domestic policies in Germany?
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2  Why do we need a new global agenda after the MDGs?
The Millennium Development Goals had emerged from the UN Millennium 
Declaration as an agenda of traditional North-South cooperation, with goals 
focused mainly on social conditions in developing countries. Cooperation 
was defined by the existing roles of donors (from the North) and receivers 
of aid (from the South). It should be remembered, though, that the Monterey 
Conference on development finance in 2002 had already highlighted the 
important and increasing role of domestic financial resources, and that 
development aid would tend to play a complementary role.
The new post-2015 agenda could have been a continuation of the MDGs, 
with poverty reduction as its main focus, extending the timeline for 
the goals which had not been achieved, and including new topics which 
are missing, such as goals on social safety nets or employment. Today, 
however, this approach is not possible anymore for two reasons. Firstly, 
the MDGs were already much more narrowly defined than the Millennium 
Declaration which covered many more policy fields relevant for long-lasting 
improvements in human wellbeing. Environmental sustainability objectives 
were concentrated in MDG 7 (ensure environmental sustainability) and only 
poorly translated into quantified targets. More fundamentally, the MDGs 
reduced the implementation of the Millennium Declaration to an agenda 
of development cooperation, and therefore MDG 8 (develop a global 
partnership for development) could not contribute strongly to fostering 
international cooperation beyond aid. This ambition gap cannot be ignored 
anymore as these uncovered problem areas threaten to undermine progress 
in poverty reduction. Therefore, in OECD countries, the post-2015 agenda 
needs to go beyond development cooperation and mobilise the interests, 
policymaking and implementing capacities of other ministries too.
Renewed international cooperation is in the interest of many policy fields. 
The essential challenges for global and domestic sustainable development 
are closely related to the main characteristics of a globalised world economy 
and interdependent societies which changed the conditions for policymaking 
(Messner 2014):1 i) the rapid globalisation process of the world economy 
created both manifold opportunities for growth and vulnerabilities and 
1 The following paragraph paraphrases the analysis contained in Dirk Messner’s recent 
contribution to the Review Process of German foreign policy launched in 2014 by the 
Foreign Minister, Frank Steinmeier. 
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risks at local levels; ii) tectonic power shifts towards the rising economies, 
especially China, India and Brazil, changed international relations and 
the distribution of power, which are characterised today by a reduced 
dominance of the West, polycentric power constellations and blockades; 
iii) irreversible global environmental change caused by the accumulated 
impact of human activity (the ‘anthropocene’) will be a dominant feature 
of the coming decades, if the world economy remains on its established 
high-carbon and resource-intensive growth path; the impacts of earthsystem 
change on human welfare are hard to estimate and plan for; and iv) the 
global diffusion of communication technology and infrastructures enables 
the immediate exchange of information, knowledge, and news across all 
continents, creating something like a ‘world society’ with new virtual 
transboundary spaces for cooperation (and data control). 
The answer to the first question would then be, from a German perspective, 
that we need a post-2015 agenda for three reasons. First, the agenda is 
needed to address a new set of problems: poverty, income inequalities and 
poor economic performance continue to warrant international cooperation, 
but climate change, protection of biodiversity, freshwater resources, soils, 
and oceans have to be added to the list as these problems threaten to 
undermine and reverse any progress made on the social and the economic 
front. In its latest policy paper, the WBGU (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 
der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen/Scientific Advisory 
Council to the German Government on Global Change) recommends 
orienting the new catalogue of goals towards the key message of the 1992 
Earth Summit: that development and environmental protection must be 
considered together and do not contradict each other. The SDGs should 
not be reduced to poverty eradication, but must address all dimensions 
of sustainable development. In particular, global environmental change 
must be incorporated, otherwise even poverty eradication will become 
impossible (WBGU 2014, 3) 2.
Second, the agenda is needed to encourage global cooperation towards 
global public goods, with the intention of improving human wellbeing in 
the future, by avoiding irreversible change and incalculable risks. Third, the 
agenda is needed to help national governments better manage or avoid the 
2 More specifically, the WBGU recommends using the concept of planetary guard rails 
or planetary boundaries for incorporating global environmental problems in the SDG 
catalogue and operationalising them through corresponding targets.
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negative global consequences of domestic policies while actively pursuing 
those with positive effects.
Currently, the governance systems of rich and poor countries are not geared 
sufficiently towards managing policy interdependence, neither between 
sectors nor between countries and regions. Many rich countries, including 
Germany, do not yet fully realise how dependent their own wellbeing is on 
improving global cooperation. Addressing common and collective problems 
can help to establish a community of practice in global cooperation, to give 
it the necessary push and to make clear that modern problem-solving needs 
to be based on carefully linked domestic and foreign policies (as Inge Kaul 
argues with her concept of ‘smart sovereignty’, Kaul 2013).
Horst Köhler, a former president of Germany who also participated in the 
High-Level Panel on the post-2015 global agenda, states that 
we … need a new leitmotiv for international politics which really takes into 
consideration the strong interdependence on our planet… I believe that 
we have to develop a new spirit of global partnership. Domestic policies 
have to be shaped taking into consideration global wellbeing. But national 
governments have to go beyond that and find new multilateral solutions 
for the many problems that they face locally but that can only be solved by 
international action (Köhler 2014, 11).
In congruence with these thoughts, the German position paper on the post-
2015 agenda (GoG 2014), which was issued in February 2014, emphasises 
the need for a new global partnership as an “overarching framework” for the 
future agenda and defines it as follows: 
The purpose of the Global Partnership is to induce a paradigm shift, 
breaking with traditional views such as the classic North-South or donor-
recipient thought patterns and defining joint goals for reducing poverty, 
creating economic, political and social opportunities, and transforming 
economies worldwide, making them more sustainable. The existing 
economic, ecological and social interdependencies in and between 
all countries require all states and all stakeholders to assume joint 
responsibility for the global common good (GoG 2014, 2).
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3 What do the concepts of universal goals and common 
but differentiated responsibility mean for the new 
global agenda?
The High-Level Panel Report on the post-2015 agenda issued in May 
2013 stated that several ‘transformative shifts’ were needed in order to 
improve human wellbeing within the boundaries of the Earth’s ecosystems. 
According to the panel, these shifts are a universal requirement for which 
policy changes need to happen in North and South.
If the goals of the new post-2015 agenda are to be universal, they will have 
to satisfy several criteria. First of all, the goals need to speak to both poor 
and rich countries. Relevance to the lives of people in all countries requires 
a careful selection of priorities, and a careful combination of global and 
national targets. A poverty goal, for example, which combines the abolition 
of extreme poverty with the reduction of the number of persons living under 
the relative poverty line of each country, is one example (see SDSN 2013). 
Second, the goals need to include targets that are ambitious (and reachable) 
for all signatories. This means that the level of ambition should not only be 
defined by improving the lives of the poorest and most vulnerable today in 
absolute terms, as in the MDGs, but also those of people who are poor in 
relative terms (thus including inequality challenges in rich countries and 
rising powers). Quantification of targets needs to allow for flexibility, as 
conditions in UN member states are very heterogeneous, on the one hand 
and on the other, quantification needs to refer to a common global metric 
where it makes sense (as in numbers of extreme poor or in greenhouse gas 
emissions). Third, goals and targets need to address policy interdependence 
and create incentives for reducing the negative transboundary impacts of 
domestic economic action or policies. They need to make clear that a global 
agenda requires all states to contribute to implementation by designing 
adequate domestic policies and by developing and implementing improved 
international laws and regulations.
Such a radically new agenda for global cooperation requires trust, which 
is a scarce good at multilateral level today. Building trust requires that 
stronger players, such as OECD countries and rising powers, make clear 
offers early in the process: i) offers in terms of domestic policy changes 
which contribute to poverty alleviation and global public goods; ii) offers in 
terms of supporting a list of priorities which caters for the more immediate 
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social and economic needs of poor countries and combines them with 
the most important issues of global environmental change and global 
economic governance; and iii) offers in terms of financial contributions to 
poor countries in order to advance their domestic agendas and help them 
contribute to global public goods. The post-2015 agenda will be a non-
binding document; its relevance will depend on the wisdom, strength and 
willingness of national governments to accept its guidance.
The position paper by the German Federal government does not feature such 
details yet. It states that one key characteristic of the global partnership it 
advocates for are “universally applicable goals” which build on 
mutual respect and shared values, i.e. all countries are responsible for 
both the goals and for achieving them (developing countries, industrialised 
countries and emerging economies) and for all policy areas, while ensuring 
that national realities, capacities and levels of development are taken into 
account and national policies and priorities are respected (GoG 2014, 2).
How does this concept of universal goals play out in the four strategic issue 
areas and exemplary goals which are listed in the German position paper? 
The four strategic issue areas comprise:
1. “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, secure a life in dignity,
2. preserve the natural resource base and ensure its sustainable use,
3. achieve the creation of decent jobs and adequate income through 
ecologically sound growth,
4. strengthen good governance, anchor gender equality, protect and foster 
human rights, secure peace” (GoG 2014, 2).
These general focus areas are well chosen for elaborating a list of globally 
relevant goals, and there are several examples of goals which would have 
beneficial transboundary effects if they were translated into ambitious 
domestic action. A general weakness of the German position paper is that 
it does not explicitly show the implications of the goals and targets for 
domestic action. But one can draw one’s own conclusions. One example 
is the exemplary goal on hunger. It reads “end hunger and ensure food 
security and good nutrition” and includes targets on achieving a “land and 
soil degradation neutral world” and on reducing “by 50 % worldwide post-
harvest loss and food waste” by 2030 (GoG 2014, 3-4). For Germany, these 
goals and targets could be relevant in two ways: first, that Germany supports 
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policies and measures in developing countries which pursue these goals, and 
second, that Germany takes measures for reducing land and soil degradation 
at home (i.e. by supporting a European directive on soil conservation) and 
for reducing food waste in retail trade and households. A 50 %-target would 
be ambitious for Germany, and gathering political support for a European 
soil conservation from the agricultural ministry and the farmers’ lobby 
would require considerable political effort.
But there is also room for improvement: In some areas, the goals are 
formulated in such a way that they remain irrelevant for Germany. The 
exemplary goal on poverty reduction reads “leaving no one behind – end 
extreme poverty” and includes targets such as “by 2030, end extreme income 
poverty (1.25$ PPP/day)” and “establish and maintain national floors of 
social protection comprising basic social security guarantees according to 
ILO recommendation No. 202” (GoG 2014, 3). But no reference is made 
to poverty in Germany. According to a report of German welfare NGOs, 
12 to 16 million people in Germany are living under the national poverty 
line. Including them in the universal goal with a reference to national 
poverty lines (as is done in the Sustainable Development Solutions Network 
(SDSN) Action Agenda and Indicator Report) would be a clear sign of 
strong political will towards meaningful universal goals. 
A thorough exercise that would give the numbers for all areas of action 
for Germany is still missing; the Center for American Progress recently 
published a paper which gives those numbers for the United States with 
regard to the illustrative goals listed by the High-Level Panel report (Norris 
/ Elgin-Cossart / Dunning 2014). This paper shows that poverty and hunger 
are problems in the United States, too, with 15 percent of the population 
living under the national poverty line. It does not, however, cover the global 
impacts of current and renewed domestic policies in the United States.
Universal goals, if defined clearly enough and with high levels of ambition, 
could make the post-2015 global agenda politically more attractive for those 
groups and political forces interested in fostering international cooperation 
for sustainable development. But at the same time, this departure from 
conventional forms of North-South cooperation can lead to mistrust. 
How can the poor countries be assured that enhanced engagement for the 
preservation of global public goods will not be to the detriment of poverty 
reduction in their territories? The G77 has reacted to this risk by emphasising 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
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capabilities (CBDR-RC), which is part of the Rio Declaration 1992 and also 
of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
The German position paper does not mention CBDR-RC. It makes reference 
to 
shared responsibility for global wellbeing through the protection of global 
public goods and the creation of structural framework conditions that are 
conducive to development” and to the “Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the Millennium Declaration and the outcome document of the UN 
Conference on Sustainable Development (GoG 2014, 2).
Behind this statement is the claim that the principle of CBDR-RC only 
applies to burden-sharing for the provision of global environmental goods, 
but not to the whole agenda of international cooperation. However, the 
argument for combining social, economic and environmental issues in 
one agenda is exactly grounded on the interdependence between them. To 
separate the issues again when it comes to funding is therefore not very 
convincing. Germany as well as the European Union should revise their 
positions and come to a more comprehensive proposal.
The main problem, however, is that public financial transfers from rich to 
poor countries are a very limited source: Domestic financial resources grew 
much more in the last two decades than official development assistance 
(ODA); and public budgets in many OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) countries, especially in Europe, are faced 
with heavy constraints as they are still suffering under the impacts of the 
combined crisis of financial markets and the euro, and economic stagnation 
or low growth rates associated with very high unemployment rates. Under 
such conditions, it is difficult to maintain, let alone increase budget lines for 
development cooperation.
The United Kingdom constitutes a rare exception as it has managed to 
achieve the 0.7 % target for its ODA budget. Unfortunately, a similarly 
strong political will to achieve this aim is not visible in Germany or other 
European countries. It has to be seen, however, that with regard to the post-
2015 agenda, the United Kingdom defends a rather conservative position: 
it wants to maintain the focus of the agenda basically within the MDG 
framework, without new departures towards global collective problems and 
renewed action.
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The common challenge for rich countries, rising powers and the upper 
middle-income countries is to promote global sustainable development by 
changing patterns and flows of investment, production and consumption. 
This is an area where cooperation towards joint learning processes in order 
to accelerate change is very much needed and likely to bring about rapid 
progress. Such cooperation, however, requires mutual interest and joint 
funding beyond what we have now in the aid sector.
The German position paper states that the German government 
is willing to take on the responsibility associated with (the Global) 
Partnership, but expects all other members of the UN to do the same. 
Emerging economies, in particular, must assume new responsibility as part 
of the post-2015 agenda (GoG 2014, 2).
From my view, making one’s own offer of taking on more responsibility 
dependent on the willingness of others to do the same would weaken the 
German position. Emerging economies are already offering increased 
South-South cooperation as a complementary instrument for international 
cooperation. At least in the field of climate and energy policy, emerging 
economies have also adopted laws and programmes which set targets for 
emission reductions. These are signs for their taking on more responsibility. 
The answer to the second question is that universal goals should unite all 
countries around common priorities in order to achieve transformational 
change towards inclusive and sustainable development for present and 
future generations. How responsibility will be shared is not yet clear.
4 Who is engaged in the post-2015 agenda process in 
Germany?
In its position paper, the German government makes a caveat: “Germany’s 
contribution to achieving the goals of the post-2015 will depend to a great 
extent on a coherent concept pursued by all Ministries” (GoG 2014, 2).
In congruence with the definition of universal goals applying to all countries 
and all policy areas, this means that the German government knows that 
global sustainable development cannot be promoted through the Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation and Development alone. Universal goals are there 
to guide domestic and European policies, too. In an interdependent world, 
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the line between domestic and foreign policies is blurred, and securing 
wellbeing within national borders requires international cooperation.
This new concept affects those actors with strong stakes in international 
cooperation. The ministries responsible for the post-2015 process in Germany 
are the Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and 
Nuclear Safety (BMUB) and the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ); the position paper quoted in this article has been 
co-authored by both ministries. This shared leadership has existed since the 
preparation for the UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992 
in Rio de Janeiro, and has helped both ministries to coordinate action with 
regard to implementing the UNFCCC, the UN Convention on Biodiversity 
and the UN Convention on Desertification. The BMUB is keen to strengthen 
its international environmental cooperation through the new post-2015 
agenda, and it knows that, to do this, it needs the BMZ for that as BMZ 
has the larger budget. The BMZ itself covers a broader agenda than the 
BMUB: in its bilateral programmes and the support it gives to multilateral 
action, the BMZ is active in all traditional areas covered by the MDGs 
(poverty reduction, social security, education, health), as well as in peace 
and promotion of rule of law, conflict resolution and democracy, in private 
sector development and infrastructure, in environmental issues, natural 
resource management, climate change, biodiversity and desertification. 
From the backdrop of this broad agenda, it is understandable that it is not 
easy for the BMZ to set priorities for the post-2015 agenda, especially as 
one of the learning experiences from the MDGs was that focused action in a 
few narrowly circumscribed areas led to measurable progress.
There is an ongoing debate within BMZ on the ‘overarching goal’ of 
development cooperation: whether it is poverty reduction or sustainable 
development; whether strategically development cooperation should follow 
a rather narrow focus on the least-developed countries (LDCs); or whether it 
is a question of a broader perspective which links poverty with global public 
goods. However, although this debate is important, it deviates attention for 
the real issue: the need to better manage the global spillovers of domestic 
policies across departments and to do this with a view to global wellbeing, 
as Horst Köhler formulated it (see above). Unfortunately other ministries 
beyond the BMZ, the BMUB and the Foreign Office have taken a rather 
limited interest in the post-2015 process so far, and as long as that does 
not change, the auspices for a post-2015 global agenda which is fit for the 
purpose are not good.
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Civil society, especially NGOs (non-governmental organisations) engaged 
in development and environment issues, are also participating actively in the 
debate on the post-2015 agenda. Yet they often replicate the internal BMZ 
debate or the BMUB position instead of focusing on the larger picture. 
The environmental NGOs have a very critical approach to the conventional 
concept of development, and maintain that societies and economies need to 
transform themselves more fundamentally in order to improve wellbeing 
for the majority of the present generation and to secure wellbeing for future 
generations. They hence see sustainable development as a task for both 
domestic policy reforms and international cooperation, but their engagement 
comes across as mainly motivated by avoiding irreversible environmental 
change and not by improving human welfare. Development NGOs have a 
stronger focus on action abroad, and often share the concern that poverty 
reduction might suffer from a stronger focus on global public goods.
Recently, development NGOs and environmental NGOs published a joint 
declaration on the post-2015 process which refers to joint challenges faced 
by countries of the global North and the global South, and which 
includes increasing social injustice, ingoing and growing environmental 
destruction, increasing resource use, the consequences of financial, 
economic and hunger crises as well as climate change (VENRO et al. 
2014, 3, author’s translation).
Universal goals are interpreted as requiring ambitious action both at home 
and internationally. The declaration also calls for the German government, 
civil society and other actors to work towards broad support for the new 
post-2015 agenda.
The answer to the third question is that there is a clear risk that the societal 
debate remains within the realms of the small environment and development 
community and does not reach out to the larger public concerned with 
other issues such as the reduction of poverty and inequality in Germany, or 
changing global economic governance (i.e. reducing illicit financial flows or 
improving regulation of financial markets) for which the post-2015 agenda 
could also offer political opportunities, as illustrated in the Section 2 above. 
For these constituencies, which do not see themselves automatically as part 
of the post-2015 process, the point is not to mobilise international funding: 
domestic policies for reducing poverty and inequality should be funded with 
domestic resources; this is not about reducing poverty in Germany with 
external funds. But a broader domestic coalition for the post-2015 agenda 
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could increase political pressure for these issues in Germany and in Europe 
and facilitate joint political action, i.e. in the European Union or in the 
G20, for the improvement of global frameworks in trade, investment, and 
financial markets. 
5 Conclusions: how can we link the new post-2015 
agenda to domestic policies in Germany?
Since 1998, Germany has had a domestic strategy for sustainable development 
which has been elaborated by all ministries and has a focus on domestic 
action. Germany also has a Council for Sustainable Development (Rat für 
Nachhaltige Entwicklung) which gives advice to Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and consists of representatives from academia, environmental NGOs, the 
trade unions, and the private sector.3 Since 1998, the German parliament 
also has its own Parliamentarian Council on sustainable development; but 
this does not have the same status and rights as the standing committees 
have (which reflect the structure of the Ministries). At the level of the 
executive government, there is a Committee of Secretaries of State which 
meets regularly to consult on cross-departmental issues of sustainable 
development.
This institutional setting provides many opportunities for linking the post-
2015 agenda with ambitious domestic policies and initiatives.
The German strategy for sustainable development (Deutsche 
Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie – DNS) is to be updated by 2016. So far, it has 
mainly been concerned with improving sustainable development for those 
living in Germany, and its international dimension is rather weak as it only 
refers to the 0.7% target for ODA and for opening German markets to imports 
from developing countries. A more fundamental review and adaptation of 
the DNS to the areas of work of the post-2015 agenda could be very fruitful 
and strengthen efforts towards more effective cross-departmental policy 
approaches.
Currently, the DNS is structured around four main chapters:
i) justice between generations (which includes targets for improving resource 
efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, increasing the share 
3 I was appointed a member of this Council in July 2013 (the author).
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of renewable energies, reducing land conversion, protecting biodiversity, 
reducing public debt, increasing investment in economic infrastructure, 
investing in research and innovation and increasing the share of young 
adults with a vocational degree);
ii)  quality of life (which includes targets for economic growth, mobility, a 
reduced environmental burden of agriculture, air quality, health and life 
expectancy, and reduced crime rates);
iii)  social inclusion (which includes targets for employment, work-life 
balance, gender equality, and the integration of migrants); and
iv)  international responsibility (which includes the 0.7 % target for ODA, 
and increasing imports from developing countries) (GoG 2012, 29–31).
This structure is not congruent with what is likely to result from the post-
2015 process, and it is also not congruent with the key elements presented 
in the German position paper for the post-2015 agenda. For this reason, 
the review process of the DNS should take these documents into account 
and include ambitious elements for domestic action and more explicit 
international commitments. This would be a first, but crucial, step towards 
strengthening Germany’s credibility in the post-2015 process.
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1 Not the beginning of the end, but perhaps the end  
of the beginning 
Discussions about the post-2015 global development framework provide 
an opportunity to reconsider the European Union’s potential role as a 
development actor for the coming decades. The EU and several of its Member 
States are heavily involved in ongoing negotiations on new development 
goals to succeed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) when they 
expire in 2015. The EU position on the post-2015 agenda is outlined in 
the June 2013 Council Conclusions and the June 2014 Commission 
Communication ‘a decent life for all’ (EC 2014). The documents put forward 
three guiding principles: universality, with differentiation based on national 
circumstances; a transformative agenda that can address new challenges, 
and accountability with regard to commitments. The Communication goes 
on to list 16 priorities, which are universal and comprehensive, if somewhat 
unstructured in terms of their prioritisation. The EU also promises its 
commitment to a new global partnership to succeed MDG 8. The EU should 
aspire to fulfil a post-2015 role that is only partly based on traditional 
support to developing countries, and that would build on current efforts 
and explore new ways of supporting global development. Central to this 
are efforts to reform and create international regimes which are inherently 
“developmental”.
The EU is, of course, just one of a multitude of actors and organisations 
putting forward its vision for the post-2015 world. The United Nations is 
tasked with leading international debates on devising a new set of objectives 
to succeed the MDGs as benchmarks for progress towards a world free of 
poverty, deprivation, hunger and environmental degradation. Thus far, the 
goal-setting process has been participatory and inclusive, which bodes well 
for its legitimacy, especially if a comprehensive and yet clear set of goals 
emerges. Any agreement on new development goals will emerge from the 
usual international horse-trading process, probably conducted in the early 
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hours of the New York morning. The goals may turn out to be ambitious, 
measurable and comprehensive, or they may be framed in vague terms 
leaving plenty of room for political manoeuvre and obfuscation.
The real test, of course, will be in achieving goals, especially as these are 
likely to be much broader and more ambitious than the MDGs. The UN 
and its Member States are, with the support of the EU, aiming for a global 
agenda that will also include Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
Moreover, although the goals will be framed as ‘development’ objectives, 
their achievement will be contingent on the mobilisation of a wide range 
of political and economic tools and actors. Indeed, development ministries 
and agencies are not in total charge either of goal setting or goal achieving, 
because the post-2015 global development agenda will go beyond traditional 
development policy topics. The new agenda will impact on many other 
policy areas and their international and domestic constituencies, some of 
which have far more power in national and international policy discussions 
than development agencies have. Accordingly, the goals themselves will 
be important, but not as important as the broader context in which global 
development proceeds. This will continue to evolve regardless of what the 
post-2015 negotiators can agree on.
The European institutions have been tasked with supporting developing 
countries since the Treaty of Rome. Building on this tradition, the EU and 
its Member States have become the world’s largest providers of official 
development assistance (ODA), thereby playing a part in helping to achieve 
the MDGs. Against this backdrop, the EU must continue increasing the 
effectiveness of its aid and advancing Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD). Furthermore, as development really only begins when poverty has 
been eradicated, the EU needs to broaden its focus beyond poverty. Amid 
the rise of the ‘new global middle classes’, the inequality phenomenon 
will be an important cornerstone of a transformative global agenda after 
2015. The EU could make important contributions to reversing global and 
country-level trends towards widening socioeconomic inequality.
In addition, the EU needs to invest more in order to promote development 
and remove barriers to development progress at global level. While the 
reasons for countries achieving or failing to achieve the MDGs are primarily 
domestic in nature, experience with the MDGs has shown that progress 
is also heavily influenced by the framework conditions for development: 
the economic, political, geographical and environmental context in which 
The EU can contribute more than aid to the global development agenda
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 175
societies and states develop. It is here that Europe’s greatest potential to 
promote better global development outcomes lies.
2 Finishing overdue homework
Poverty reduction will remain a top priority for any new global agreement, 
although the perspective is changing rapidly. According to estimates by 
the World Bank, half a billion people escaped USD 1.25 per day poverty 
between 2005 and 2010. At the same time, socio-economic inequality 
and other forms of marginalisation, and environmental degradation are 
becoming more problematic. Traditional distinctions between developed 
and developing countries, North and South, and donors and recipients have 
become increasingly obsolete. The changing geography of poverty means 
that poor people are increasingly likely to be living in middle-income 
countries, reducing the need for donors to provide resources for national 
poverty reduction programmes.
Figure 1: EU Official Development Assistance
Sources: OECD aid statistics; European Report on Development 2013
One of the key steps to be taken next is the reduction of fragmentation through 
successful implementation of recent joint programming exercises (Furness / 
Vollmer 2013). Joint programming is the latest effort to improve the 
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coordination of EU and Member State development policy at headquarters 
level, and to better streamline aid delivery at the country level. Further gains 
could be made by translating the lessons of the aid effectiveness agenda to 
other forms of development finance, especially in the area of climate change 
adaptation and mitigation. Several Member States remain interested in 
strengthening national aid programmes, even if this runs counter to efforts 
to improve division of labour at the EU level.
Secondly, PCD remains crucial. PCD means that other policy initiatives, 
such as those addressing security and trade, do not undermine the poverty 
reduction objectives of aid programmes and partner country development 
policies. Where possible, non-aid policies that affect developing countries 
should contribute positively to the MDGs and other development objectives. 
The impact of the EU’s efforts to improve PCD has so far been quite limited, 
even where there is an obvious negative impact on development. The EU has 
long-standing difficulties in reconciling domestic interests, for example its 
agricultural and fisheries policies, with the interests of developing countries. 
Europeans need to get better at dealing with these legitimate but politically 
sensitive trade-offs.
The focus of the PCD agenda will need to shift as well, from a “do no 
harm” approach to a more holistic concept where trade, security and other 
issues are reframed as global public policies that actively support global 
development goals (Severino / Ray 2009; 2010). Therefore, a new global 
development agenda needs to be truly transformative, that means supporting 
economic and social transformations through employment, socioeconomic 
equality and environmental sustainability in all countries, including 
European countries. Whether PCD language will feature explicitly in the 
new framework or not, progress at achieving greater coherence of globally 
connected multi-sectoral policies will determine the effectiveness of a new 
development agenda (Knoll 2014).
3 Leading by example: tackling inequality  
in a post-2015 context
The European social model is one of Europe’s greatest successes: although 
European Gini coefficients have been rising since the 1980s, the EU still 
has the lowest levels of inequality in the world (see figure 2). The EU could 
set an example by pushing harder for specific inequality targets in the post-
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2015 agenda. It could, for example, lead the way by implementing promises 
made in August 2012, when the Commission released the excellent 
Communication on social protection in EU development cooperation (EC 
2012). 
Inequality is primarily a domestic issue, and the EU cannot force other 
countries to tackle it, but it can offer support to partners that want to 
address their own inequality issues. This could include building political 
will by placing social protection at the centre of policy dialogue, supporting 
domestic initiatives to reform tax systems – including by closing European 
tax havens – and providing technical expertise for building welfare delivery 
systems.
Unfortunately, there are many reasons to doubt that Europe will be able 
to make this ambition a reality. First, inequality is not a priority for EU 
development policy. Although the Commission earmarks 20% of its aid for 
social programmes, most is actually spent on promoting economic growth 
Figure 2: Changes in regional Gini coefficients 1990–2008
Sources: Ortiz / Cummins (2011); EuroStat data
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and tackling governance issues like police and judicial reform. Though 
these are helpful, they do not directly address inequality. The EU missed 
a chance to make a strong statement on inequality in the better life for all 
Communication, which argued that “lower income groups [should] benefit 
equally from growth in national income in comparison with the higher 
income groups (EC 2014, 5). The poor need to benefit proportionally 
more, or inequality rises. There is no escaping the need for redistribution 
of wealth through progressive taxes on income and property, a social safety 
net providing minimum income, industrial policies that enable collective 
bargaining in the workplace, public ownership and provision of key strategic 
utilities, and healthcare and education that are free at point of use.
Second, the EU is disengaging from country-level development cooperation 
with middle income countries (MICs). Poverty remains a massive problem 
for many MICs, and even though their national wealth is increasing, there 
are major obstacles to ensuring that ordinary people benefit. Addressing 
inequality could therefore become a central topic for cooperation with 
interested MICs.
Third, the EU can set an example. Developing country elites will not take 
the EU seriously while inequality is rising in Europe. As Europe wrestles 
with its future and its place in the world, this is a good time to reflect on 
what the European project has been about: assuring the long-term peace and 
prosperity of the citizens of its member states. Social cohesion, achieved 
by ensuring that as many people as possible have a decent standard of 
living, is a core element of the EU strategy. Therefore, putting the issue of 
inequality on the negotiation table for a new global agenda could still hold 
important benefits for the EU, including improving credibility of the EU as 
a responsible global actor who can lead by example.
4 New homework to do: development friendly 
international regimes
If the post-2015 development agenda is to actually deliver a world free of 
poverty and hunger, it will need to use global public policies for addressing 
the provision of global public goods (Kaul 2013). These include aspects of 
foreign and security policy – the traditional high politics of international 
relations. Economic and trade policy, finance and investment policy, 
environmental and climate change policy, fisheries, agriculture, technology 
The EU can contribute more than aid to the global development agenda
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 179
transfer, migration, and aspects of domestic policies – such as public health, 
consumer protection policy and food standards, which affect producers, 
markets and citizens in developing countries – are all components of a global 
development policy package. The issue is not only how policies in these areas 
impact on poverty reduction, but how they can be utilized at the global level 
to address complex challenges, consolidate successes and make progress in 
hitherto difficult areas of globalisation that require better management. 
Global public policies shape a web of international regimes that support 
public goods provision and help address cross-border challenges. 
International regimes typically provide rules, standards and structures for 
a given policy area, such as trade, global financial flows, carbon emissions 
or fisheries management (see Figure 3). Policies in these areas are crucial 
to development progress everywhere, whether in developing countries, 
emerging economies or the OECD world.





























Source: Authors' own compilation
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Although national actors hold the key to progress, action is needed at global 
level to complement national efforts. In a “beyond aid” post-2015 context, 
international cooperation will need to bring together a broad range of actors 
and policies, only some of which will be primarily development-oriented 
(Janus / Klingebiel / Paulo 2014). While creation of a new development 
agenda may provide an opportunity to set norms for global cooperation that 
are conducive to development, there are significant obstacles to gearing 
different global actors and policies towards the achievement of common 
development objectives.
The track record of international negotiations on trade (the stalled Doha 
Round) and, more recently, sustainable development (the toothless Rio+20 
summit) demonstrates the difficulty of achieving strong multilateral 
agreements. These troubled processes indicate that it will be very hard to 
reach the sort of global deal that will be required to establish a global public 
policies agenda, with formal processes and clear commitments.
There are three main challenges for joint international action: weak 
coordination among actors, incoherence in policies and a lack of visionary 
leadership. Coordination requires international actors to follow jointly 
agreed rules on policies with external impacts, and to resist the temptation 
to free ride on the efforts of others. Coherence demands that national and 
international level policies are in tune with globally agreed goals. This is 
difficult when long-term global objectives conflict with more immediate 
national preferences or strong domestic interest groups, such as farmers or 
the financial sector. Overcoming such challenges is hard at the best of times, 
and more so when leadership is lacking. Right now, no-one stands ready to 
promote a convincing, comprehensive vision for global development, and 
more importantly to lead others by example.
5 Not just an impossible dream
Over the last 20 years, an increasing share of ODA has been used to finance 
global public goods, both directly and indirectly. This trend is partly due 
to links between the global commons and the MDGs. For instance, efforts 
to achieve MDG 6 on combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major 
diseases are providing a global public good. The clearly defined MDG 
health objectives have also served as a reference point for rallying global 
multi-stakeholder support, including from private actors such as the Bill and 
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Melinda Gates Foundation. The EU has supported health-related MDGs by 
providing assistance to the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunisation 
and the Global Fund to fight against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. 
In terms of preserving environmental sustainability there have been globally 
successful initiatives such as the Brundtland Commission and the Earth 
Summit or the Montreal Protocol on Substances that deplete the Ozone 
Layer for preserving the global commons. More recently the UN Secretary-
General’s Sustainable Energy for All Initiative is gathering international 
support for sustainable development. The initiative on Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) is aligning international 
efforts in the forestry sector and has been mainly financed by ODA 
contributions.
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is another example 
of an international compact aimed at providing a public good on a global 
scale. The EU and some of its members have been slow to support the EITI, 
an initiative which demonstrates the potential of engaging with private 
sector companies in order to achieve greater transparency in the oil and 
mining industries across the world. Nevertheless, the EITI process indicates 
that internationally coordinated action for providing global public goods is 
within reach and the EU has an important role to play.
6 Why the EU?
Of course, the EU is not the only actor involved in designing and establishing 
international regimes. The World Bank, for example, is starting to explore 
options for providing greater support to global public goods provision. There 
are, nevertheless, several steps the EU can take without waiting for anyone 
else. One starting point would be a development-oriented review of the EU’s 
role in negotiating and maintaining relevant international regimes. The EU 
should also find ways to increase interaction with emerging economies and 
play a more active role in convincing these countries to join deliberations 
on a future framework. EU policies in areas such as agriculture, fisheries, 
trade and investment, taxation, migration, and international security have an 
enormous impact on development outcomes, and more careful consideration 
will need to be given to the global implications of these policy areas as they 
evolve.
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The current debate about a global development agenda provides an 
opportunity to think about the kind of world we want to live in, and what is 
needed to get us there. The EU as a unified actor is a sleeping giant in this 
process, largely because of persistent divisions between Member States that 
can no longer drive global issues on their own, but are nevertheless reluctant 
to sacrifice sovereign autonomy for the sake of unity. 
European politics are currently transfixed by the dramas of the Euro crisis 
and domestic austerity programmes in several countries, and ambitious 
international cooperation agendas have taken a back seat in public discourse. 
However, there is a bigger picture and EU member states and the European 
institutions have global responsibilities in these turbulent times. The EU 
remains crucial to this bigger picture because of what it is: a major global 
development actor, and a visionary project that has ensured the peace, 
stability and prosperity of a previously war-torn continent for nearly 70 
years. 
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Post 2015: what can the European Union learn from past 
international negotiations? 
Niels Keijzer / Adam Moe Fejerskov
1 Introduction: negotiating as a European Union
The world community is preparing for negotiating a post-2015 framework 
on global development that might refresh, revise or replace the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). Negotiations will take place in a context that 
observers consider much less favourable compared to when the MDGs were 
negotiated.
There is a shared conviction among the Member States of the EU that when 
they operate as a “bloc” in international negotiations, they can exceed 
the sum of their individual nation-state parts. However that conviction is 
not always easily adhered to in practice in the presence of strong national 
interests, including the need felt by EU Member States to be visible and 
achieve influence on their own. 
Effective European action in international negotiations covering more 
than one policy area is challenged by a high degree of “sectoralisation” 
in EU policy-making as well as by differing degrees of Europeanisation 
in the policy areas concerned. Preparing for international negotiations 
therefore presents coordination challenges involving multiple Directorates-
General, Council configurations and Standing Committees of the European 
Parliament (ERD 2012). 
The two main policy areas in the post-2015 discussions – development and 
environment – have two things in common: both are self-standing policy 
areas with shared competences between the EU and its Member States, 
and both seek to make other policies more “coherent” towards their overall 
objectives, as stated in EU treaties. Moreover, negotiations in both areas are 
sensitive, as they include both the actions of EU governments and citizens 
“at home” as being part of the EU’s external support to third countries. 
The European Commission recognises the challenge posed by the upcoming 
negotiations, but has committed itself in its 2013 Legislative Work 
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Programme to “put forward coherent EU positions bringing together the 
Millennium Development Goals, the post-2015 development agenda and 
Rio+20.” The priority given indicates that the process is considered an 
important test case for EU joint action, which, as Table 1 shows, is much 
more “exposed” when compared to the past – both by new technologies and 
more inclusive meetings.
Table 1: Estimated number of participants in selected international meetings
Event Paris 2005 Accra 2008 Busan 2011 Rio 2012
Number of 
participants
150 1,500 3,000 45,381
Source: Authors’ own compilation
The following sections analyse the EU’s engagement in three selected 
negotiation processes:
 • The 2008 Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
 • The 2011 Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
 • The 2012 Rio Conference on Sustainable Development
The first two meetings allowed for learning from situations in which the 
EU had a relatively strong influence as the leading provider of official 
development assistance, whereas Rio+20 represents a United Nations 
negotiation process in which the EU’s success depended much more on its 
ability to form broad-based alliances. Positive (+) or negative (-) findings 
are highlighted at the end of each description as the basis for the five lessons 
identified in the summary. 
2 Aid effectiveness, Accra 20081
On 26 and 27 May 2008, the General Affairs and External Relations Council 
(i.e. EU ministers responsible for development cooperation) adopted four 
key priorities and ten key ingredients for a meeting to discuss progress made 
1 The information and analysis on the High Level Forum in Accra that is presented in this 
chapter has been adapted from Keijzer 2011.
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in implementing the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. These 
priorities formed the basis for a 22-page document detailing the EU position 
that was adopted on 22 July 2008.
The meeting subsequently took place from 2–4 September 2008. EU 
ministers arriving in Accra the night before the last day of the forum found 
that negotiations, as led by their technical staff, had reached a deadlock 
manifested in a text reflecting a lack of ambition. The EU at that time spread 
the rumour that they would issue a separate statement after the meeting to 
commit their willingness to go beyond a weak outcome document.
Following EU interventions, it was agreed just before the ministerial dinner 
that negotiations would be re-opened, with negotiators subsequently staying 
at the table until 3.00 a.m. and meeting again early in the morning to work 
on the text. Civil society observers then subsequently heard the European 
Commissioner for Development, Louis Michel, pronouncing that “With this 
Accra Agenda for Action, we have an operational framework that will allow 
us to turn our promises into concrete actions.” The resulting final text was 
widely considered to be more ambitious than earlier drafts. 
Box 1: Key findings from Accra
+ early preparation and adoption of a position; endorsement at high 
political level; EU ability to adapt negotiation on the spot.
Europe’s strong engagement in Accra was part of a longer process, wherein 
the EU assertively promoted a high level of ambition in discussions on aid 
effectiveness and pushed others to do so – thus, to a large extent, it followed 
a “first mover” approach in the area of aid effectiveness.
The start of the economic and financial crisis later in 2008 gave some 
observers the impression that the EU had perhaps been too ambitious in its 
negotiations, as would be shown by its own limited progress in advancing 
the commitments that had been agreed to.
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3 Aid effectiveness, Busan 2011
Compared to its preparations for Accra, the EU was rather late in 2011 
with preparations for the successor forum in Busan, Korea. By summer 
2011 no formal discussions had yet taken place in the Council, whereas 
some Member States had by that time already submitted contributions to 
the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) with their own views on the zero 
draft (including Germany and the Nordic group).
The slow progress in Europe in moving towards a joint position on Busan 
has been linked to disagreements between Member States on what the 
focus should have been in Busan. Some were in favour of the Busan 
forum concentrating on the essence of the Paris Declaration – i.e. the 
“aid effectiveness agenda” – whereas other Member States wanted to 
fundamentally “open up” this agenda by bringing in new actors, interests, 
funding and/or policies.
The Commission published a formal Communication with proposed 
elements for an EU position – a change from preparations for Accra, where 
the Council had been more proactive. The 13-page document detailing the 
position was eventually adopted on 14 November 2011, leaving only two 
weeks until the start of the Busan forum.
After the opening plenary meeting in Busan, the co-chairs of the forum met 
with the secretariat and agreed that a Sherpa group would take responsibility 
for negotiating the final outcome document. Following a first proposal for 
the OECD to delegate three Sherpas, it was later increased to five (out 
of eighteen). Three of these five were European members: France, the 
European Commission as well as the United Kingdom, which was expected 
to represent the “Nordic+” group and thus also promote the interests of 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia. EU Member States thus were not 
convinced of the added value of negotiating as a European Union. 
2 The information and analysis on the High Level Forum in Busan that is presented in this 
chapter has been adapted from Keijzer (2011) as far as the European Union’s preparations 
is concerned, while the analysis of the EU’s engagement in the negotiations has been 
adapted from Atwood (2012).
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Box 2: Key findings from Busan
- late finalisation of a position; Member States presenting unilateral 
positions in advance; EU unable to choose one representative to advance 
EU position during the forum.
During the forum the EU did not aggressively promote its position and 
especially did not want to be forceful in its negotiations towards the emerging 
economies; it was definitely much less assertive than during the Accra forum. 
Following the adoption of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation, the main message promoted by EU Member States was that 
they managed to “enlarge the tent” of development cooperation.
4 Sustainable development, Rio 2012
The Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development was held two 
decades after the milestone conference that led to the adoption of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development. In February 2011, the 
European Commission launched a public consultation to gather inputs for a 
proposal that was to create a basis for a joint EU position. On 20 June 2011, 
the European Commission published a Communication meant to prepare 
the grounds for the EU’s position at the Rio+20 conference. 
As the common position was taking shape in the spring of 2012, the Danish 
EU presidency recognised that ambitions of EU countries were beginning to 
wane. By May 2, the original 19-page draft of the EU position had grown to 
just under 200 pages. After the final talks, however, the EU and its Member 
States submitted a detailed 31-page document to the conference bureau. 
A broad view on sustainable development through the concept of a green 
economy roadmap became the central element of the EU’s position – a 
roadmap that it sought to promote with specific goals, objectives and actions 
at the international level. However, the breadth of the sustainable development 
agenda itself implied a great challenge for the EU in negotiations, as it 
remained difficult to control and coordinate the interests of Member States. 
3 The information and analysis on Rio+20 that is presented in this chapter has been adapted 
from Fejerskov / Keijzer (2013). 
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Box 3: Key findings from Rio
+ strong internal coordination approach; public consultation to seek 
broad-based support for the position; EU successful in reaching a broad 
position covering different policy areas.
- low performance in forming coalitions around key aspects of position; 
dense and detailed position inhibited flexibility and adaptation.
Negotiations of the outcome document started in New York in the spring of 
2012. The increasingly complex negotiations led to the creation of an EU 
core group consisting of the Commission, the European External Action 
Service, the EU mission to the UN and representatives from the Danish 
Presidency. Negotiation responsibilities were split among these four actors.
In practice the lead EU negotiators were supplemented by representatives 
from all parts of the core group and by Member States during the negotiations, 
with representatives providing inputs in the form of “diplomatic whispering”.
In the run-up to Rio, the EU adopted a joint political statement with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States to work constructively 
during Rio to secure an ambitious outcome, but the EU was unable to form 
broad-based alliances around its position in the same way that had allowed it 
to be successful one year earlier in Durban in relation to climate change. One 
reason was a clear gap between the level of ambition of its position and the 
EU’s own practice and performance in promoting sustainable development.
Following the New York negotiations, the conference in Rio itself did not 
start until Wednesday, June 19, but the Brazilian hosts had gavelled through 
an outcome document before then. When the preparatory committee’s last 
official meeting had come to an end the week before – with still more than 
half of the text disputed – no one had expected this pace, as the Brazilian 
government was asked to lead in the remaining informal pre-negotiations. 
Eager to secure agreement, Brazil weakened more sensitive parts of the 
draft outcome document, resulting in a document reflecting only the lowest 
common denominator.
EU visibility at Rio was secured by a high-level delegation comprising the 
leaders of the EU institutions. The EU also tried to push for negotiations 
to continue among ministers, with a view to producing a more substantial 
agreement, but there was insufficient support for this.
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The final 53-page document was endorsed by all, pleased no one and was 
essentially the same as that announced before the ministers had arrived. The 
initial response was one of disappointment, with Connie Hedegaard, EU 
Climate Commissioner, tweeting that “Nobody in that room adopting the 
text was happy. That’s how weak it is.”
Nonetheless, a significant result of the negotiations for the EU remains 
the ability of the EU negotiators to have “green economy” recognised as 
important in the final agreement, though it did not include the more far-
reaching ambitions of a detailed roadmap. The commitment to develop and 
adopt SDGs by 2015 was also considered important.
5 How could the EU engage pre-2015?
The analysis shows that the influence of the EU is significantly reduced 
when individual Member States distance themselves from previously agreed 
joint EU positions. This is not to say that the EU can push things on its own, 
but rather that unity in the EU’s positions and negotiation strategies – i.e. 
28 states, each with their own wide-ranging views and interests – is key to 
convincing others that it would be worthwhile for them to align themselves 
with the EU’s views and ideas.
International negotiations have at least as many differences as they have 
similarities, so the three cases studied here can only modestly inform a 
broader reflection on what the EU can learn from its past engagement in 
relation to the upcoming post-2015 negotiations. The analysis presented 
here confirms that doing so is nonetheless important, and the findings 
indicate that there is definitely a learning curve ahead for the EU.
Five lessons are identified that could inform the EU’s preparation and 
negotiation actions:
1. Prepare well and complete on time: the approach to preparing EU 
positions has become heavier and more time-consuming, increasing 
the risk that a joint position could be adopted at a time when the draft 
outcome document is already at an advanced stage.
2. Keep things flexible: a too detailed position can hamper the EU’s 
flexibility (or reduce the usefulness of the position) in the case of 
unforeseen circumstances or strong shifts in the negotiation positions of 
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other countries. The need for coordination between negotiations on the 
post-2015 development agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) – and their full integration, as desired by the EU – definitely 
calls for such flexibility.
3. Seek broad-based alliances: the EU needs to strongly invest in seeking 
support from other United Nations (UN) members around key elements 
of its joint position if it is to negotiate successfully during the coming 
months.
4. Promote a broad agenda: compared to environmental policy negotiations, 
development cooperation negotiations show stronger tendencies of EU 
Member States operating on their own or in like-minded coalitions. The 
potential inclusion of Sustainable Development Goals into the post-
2015 framework may reduce that risk. EU coordination during Rio+20 
presented some ideas on how the EU could organise itself.
5. Convince with action, not with words: in negotiations the EU has 
developed a reputation of “do what I say and not what I do”. Given 
the possible greater focus of a post-2015 development agenda on areas 
and actions beyond development assistance, the importance of results in 
making policy areas such as trade and environment more development-
friendly only increases.
On the 25th of June 2013, the EU’s General Affairs Council adopted its 
position towards negotiations of an overarching post-2015 agenda (EU 
2013). This short, 4.5 page position shows that the EU is seeking to apply 
these and other lessons by means of adapting a brief, flexible yet broad 
position to guide its engagement, and by adopting it reasonably early in 
the process. The EU institutions have moreover engaged into dialogue with 
many non-EU nation states parallel to the discussions of this proposal. The 
analysis in this chapter shows that whereas these preparations help to make 
sure that the EU is well-placed to have an impact on the outcome of the 
negotiations, much will depend on the Union’s dexterity and coordination 
capacity to effectively negotiate as a Union of states in the upcoming 
demanding and erratic negotiations of a post-2015 agenda. 
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Markus Loewe
1 Introduction
For the last 20 years, the international development debate has been 
dominated by two trends that seem at first to be heading in a similar direction. 
However, under closer scrutiny they differ with respect to their focus and 
underlying philosophies. These are on the one hand the agenda of reducing 
poverty in developing countries in its various dimensions (lack of income, 
education, water, political participation etc.) that found their expression in 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). On the other hand, there is the 
idea of sustainability that became popular at the Earth Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 and that at the Rio+20 summit in 2012 generated a parallel 
concept to the MDGs: the so called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
As a result, two separate processes started within the United Nations (UN) 
system: one of them to discuss whether there should be a new global 
development agenda after the term of the MDGs ends in 2015, and what 
such an agenda should entail; and the other to compile a list of possible 
SDGs. For more than a year, there was a very real possibility that these two 
processes could result in two separate sets of goals guiding international 
development policy after 2015.
However, UN member states, which met in September 2013 in order to design 
a process for the negotiations on a post-MDG agenda, were luckily very aware 
of this risk. In response, they adopted a very short, almost vacuous declaration, 
which contained mainly two messages: first, that future development goals 
should be truly universal targets, and second, that there should be only one 
“single framework and set of Goals” – i.e. no separate MDGs and SDGs.
The challenge is now to design a post-2015 agenda that fulfils the aspirations 
of both, the proponents of a second set of MDGs as well as the proponents 
of SDGs. The latter see poverty as merely one of a number of global issues 
to be addressed, which again makes those in favour of the MDGs afraid that 
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poverty reduction will become secondary in an SDG agenda as just one 
item among many others. On the other hand, the pro-SDG side criticises 
the MDGs for having a too narrow concept of development and giving 
immediate results preference over socially, economically and ecologically 
sustainable ones. Both are valid concerns, and thus it is important to find a 
solution that takes them both into account, while still satisfying the interests 
of countries around the world.
This article discusses what a solution could be. It argues that a future post-
2015 agenda should be made up of two separate but mutually referring sets 
of goals – one concentrating on human development, the other on global 
public goods – because this distinction would address the most serious 
concerns of the proponents of either pure MDGs or pure SDGs
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 looks back into the past in order 
to recall how the MDGs emerged. Section 3 identifies their main strengths, 
Section 4 their weaknesses. Section 5 explains why and how the competing 
idea of SDGs came up. Section 6 discusses which criteria a post-2015 agenda 
would ideally fulfil. Section 7 discusses the key question which goals that 
agenda should contain. Section 8 suggests that the post-2015 agenda should 
have two separate but inter-related lists of goals. And Section 9 examines 
the scope of a post-2015 agenda.
2 Emergence of the MDGs
The MDGs are the outcome of a development that entailed an at least partial 
departure from the so-called Washington Consensus, which dominated the 
international debate during the 1980s. It found expression above all in the 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank that provided for consolidation of the 
current accounts and budgets of indebted developing countries, continuous 
and non-interventionist monetary and fiscal policies and structural market 
reforms (market opening, deregulation and privatisation). Poverty reduction 
was largely equated with higher economic growth, the assumption being 
that such growth would, sooner or later, benefit the poor through trickle-
down effects.
In the early 1990s, however, it gradually became apparent that this 
assumption was, at least in its then current form, not tenable. Indeed, in 
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many developing countries – above all in Africa, but also in Latin America 
– poverty had even worsened under the SAPs (Betz 2003, 456). As early as 
the mid-1980s UNICEF, the UN Children’s Fund, voiced criticism of the 
high costs exacted by the SAPs and called for “adjustment programs with 
a human countenance.” This demand was underpinned programmatically 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which, in 1990, 
released its first Human Development Report (HDR), a counter piece to the 
World Bank’s World Development Report. The HDR argued that economic 
growth did by no means automatically come along with social development 
(e.g. on education and health indicators) (UNDP 2000). The report further 
noted critically that the development debate was largely dominated by a 
one-dimensional, purely economic understanding of poverty. Based on 
the capabilities approach pioneered mainly by Amartya Sen (Sen 1981), 
poverty was now defined as multiple deprivation of capabilities, i.e. as a 
lack of means that are needed to carry out the activities one cherishes and 
to live a life of self-determination (Lipton / Ravallion 1995). Five groups of 
capabilities can be distinguished:
 • economic capabilities (on the basis of income and assets),
 • human capabilities (health, education and access to food, water and 
habitation),
 • political capabilities (freedom, voice, influence, power),
 • socio-cultural capabilities (status, dignity, belongingness, cultural 
identity) and
 • protective capabilities (protection against risks).
The disappointing balance of development in the 1980s also led to the 
calling, in the early 1990s, of a number of international conferences in 
the UN framework that dealt with various aspects of social and ecological 
development. The first of these conferences was the 1990 Summit on Education 
for All in Jomtien (Thailand), which was organised by UNESCO; at it the 
international community defined a number of educational goals, including an 
important one calling for access, for all children – girls and boys alike – by 
the year 2000, to a complete course of primary education. It was followed 
by the World Summit for Children in 1990 in New York. One conference of 
particular importance for what was to come was the 1995 Copenhagen World 
Summit for Social Development. And each conference adopted long lists of 
goals in its respective topic (education, food, child development...).
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In 1996, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) 
released a report on “Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of 
Development Co-operation”, which took up the central goals defined by 
the main world conferences and proposed a global development partnership 
geared to achieving these “ambitious but realisable goals” (OECD/DAC 
1996, 2) by the year 2015. These so-called International Development 
Goals were to be pursued and implemented by each country on its own. The 
key consideration here was to make donor aid more effective and poverty-
oriented. In addition, the OECD/DAC started taking poverty as a multi-
dimensional phenomenon rather than simply a lack of income.
Almost all of the International Development Goals were taken up by 
Chapter 3 of the Millennium Declaration, which was adopted by the United 
Nations (UN) at its Millennium Summit in 2000. Other main chapters of 
the Millennium Declaration are about Peace, security and disarmament 
(Chapter 2), Protecting our common environment (Chapter 4) and Human 
rights, democracy and good governance (Chapter 5). 
And one year later again, a commission was constituted with representatives 
from the UN, the World Bank, the OECD and other international 
organisations to bring the goals of Chapter 3 into a new form and specify 
them by 16 targets and 48 indicators: The MDGs were born, which were 
subsequently extended to 21 targets and 60 indicators today.
The time had come, eleven years after the end of the cold war and before the 
emergence of possible new international conflicts, and so it was possible to 
define clear value targets and a target year to a number of the goals in the 
Millennium Declaration and present them to the UN General Assembly as 
the MDGs in 2001 (see Box 1).
Box 1:  The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality 
5. Improve maternal health
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6. Combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development
3 Strengths of the MDGs
The MDGs have four major strengths:
 • The MDGs are highly relevant in both, objective and subjective terms. 
On the one hand, they measure key aspects of human well-being and 
human development. On the other hand, they are plausible, acceptable 
and easy to agree on by everybody because they are close to the 
imaginative capacities of everybody – if rich or poor.
 • The MDGs constitute a short (!) list of simple goals. Hence, they are 
easy to understand, easy to remember and easy to communicate.
 • The MDGs are goals for people. They are final end goals of development 
(i.e. what people want to achieve) rather than instruments (what people 
need only to achieve their aims). Or put differently: The MDGs measure 
outcomes rather than inputs.
 • And the MDGs are SMART goals: Specific, Measurable, Agreed upon, 
Realistic and Time-bound. Hence, they are suitable for measuring 
progress and comparing the efficiency of countries, inputs or strategies.
These strengths provide the MDGs with considerable opportunities:
 • Create synergies: The fact that the MDGs are a compact list of relevant 
goals that all relevant actors have agreed upon (at least all actors 
who were relevant at the time when the MDGs were issued) bore the 
opportunity to foster co-operation. The MDGs provided, for the first time 
ever, a common goal system for all actors that were active in development 
policy at that time, one that had been agreed on by developing countries, 
traditional donor countries and international organisations and was thus 
well suited as the basis of a global partnership for development. All actors 
involved were from that day on able to key their efforts and contributions 
to this goal system and in this way to improve (i) donor alignment, (ii) the 
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harmonisation of bi- and multilateral donors and (iii) coherence of donor 
policies. This not only made it possible to concentrate forces, it also set 
the stage for greater continuity in international development policy.
 • Strengthen outcome orientation: Furthermore, the MDGs provided an 
opportunity for a more pronounced outcome orientation. Their very 
existence called for concrete achievements at a fixed point in time and, 
hence, for (i) timely, impact-oriented inputs, (ii) aid efficiency, (iii) 
continuous monitoring and (iv) early readjustments. What individual 
donors contributed individually did not matter anymore; the crucial 
factor was what impacts they had achieved by working together.
At the same time, there is no navigator for the MDGs: They contain just 
targets, no strategy of how to achieve these targets. Some people see this 
lack as a considerable flaw of the MDGs and therefore called repeatedly 
for an implementation plan. However, the lack is also a chance because 
it allows each developing country to pursue its favourite development 
path towards the MDGs. In fact, one of the core aims of creating the 
MDG agenda was to strengthen their ownership in development policy 
making: i.e. let them sit on the driver’s seat rather than to teach them 
once again what they should do like in the 1980s. And probably, a one-
size-fits-all-strategy for the achievement of the MDGs does not even 
exist – until today.
 • Make all involved parties accountable: The existence of the MDGs 
invited the public both in developing and developed countries to ask 
governments what they were doing to achieve the MDGs, to compare 
the results of government policies with a benchmark and to make 
governments responsible for failures in the achievement of the MDGs.
 • Mobilise energies and resources: The fact that the MDGs are easy to 
accept, understand, remember and communicate makes them a perfect 
publicity instrument. They were very good after 2000 for redirecting 
public attention in the global North to the problems of the global South, 
for mobilising civil societies in all countries and for making them 
request their governments to double their efforts and contributions for 
international development.
This made it possible to re-kindle the interest in development issues in the 
countries of the North and strengthen willingness to put more resources into 
aid. Further, the MDGs have increased the accountability of actors in both 
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the North and the South, which contributed to greater results orientation 
and effectiveness of development policy and conventional development 
co-operation.
Proponents of the MDGs argue that, to be as successful, a new international 
agenda beyond 2015 should also be straightforward and realistic.
4 Weaknesses of the MDGs
Meanwhile, the critics of the MDGs point out that these have a number of 
weaknesses as well:
First, the MDGs constitute an incomplete agenda. They originated in the 
Millennium Declaration (see above), but only cover Chapter 3 (Development 
and poverty eradication) in addition to parts of Chapter 4 (Protecting our 
common environment), completely leaving out Chapter 2 (Peace, security 
and disarmament) as well as Chapter 5 (Human rights, democracy and good 
governance). 
Equally, they cover only some dimensions of multi-dimensional poverty. 
MDG1 measures economic capabilities, while MDGs 2–7 cover human 
capabilities. But none of the MDGs appraises changes in socio-cultural or 
political capabilities (freedom, voice, access to justice, transparency), and 
protective capabilities are considered only at the margin.
And the MDGs leave out many of the goals that the world community had 
already agreed upon at the global conferences that have taken place during 
the 1990s. Box 2 shows that the MDGs echo, for example, only a few small 
segments of the six goals for education for all that the United Nations 
have adopted with the Dakar Framework for Action adopted at the World 
Education Forum in Dakar in April 2000.
Box 2: The Dakar Framework for Action (2000)
We hereby collectively commit ourselves to the attainment of the 
following goals: 
(i)  expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and 
education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged 
children;
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(ii)  ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in 
difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have 
access to and complete, free and compulsory primary education of 
good quality;
(iii)  ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are 
met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life-skills 
programmes;
(iv)  achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy 
by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and 
continuing education for all adults;
(v)  eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education 
by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a 
focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in 
basic education of good quality;
(vi)  improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring 
excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning 
outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and 
essential life skills.
Note: Only the segments printed bold are also included in the MDG agenda.
Source: UNESCO (2000)
Second, the MDGs neglect distributive issues. Inequality is a severe 
obstacle for many aspects of development. Nevertheless, the MDG agenda 
contains only one indicator (under the head of MDG1) capturing one aspect 
of distribution: the share of the poorest quintile in consumption. In addition, 
MDG1 focuses at least on the most deprived individuals in society. In 
contrast, MDGs 4 and 5 for example call for improvements in mean values 
of mortality rates thereby ignoring who benefits from such progress. As 
a consequence, many governments may be tempted to reduce child and 
maternal mortality rates for social groups that enjoy already below-average 
rates (such as e.g. the urban middle class). Progress for these groups may be 
cheaper and easier to achieve than for the most deprived groups who live in 
squatter and rural settlements and are thus more difficult to reach by health 
care services.
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Third, some MDGs measure outputs or inputs rather than outcomes or 
impacts of development. MDG2, for example measures only the intake of 
education, regardless of its quality or relevance for economic, social and 
political life. Its existence has led to a significant acceleration in the rise of 
school enrolment rates – but in many countries at the expense of the quality 
of education: more children went to school but the number of teachers and 
the space in school buildings did not increase correspondingly.
Fourth, some MDGs cannot even be measured – either because no 
indicators or targets were set, or because for certain indicators no data is 
available. There are, for example, no reliable data for maternal mortality 
for the majority of developing countries for the base year 1990 that would 
be needed for tracking progress since then and benchmarking it against the 
goal to reduce maternal mortality by three quarters between 1990 and 2015. 
No indicators exist at all for MDG1b (productive employment and decent 
work for all) and MDG 7a (environmental sustainability) as well as for most 
targets of MDG8 (global partnership of development), which was initially 
meant to quantify the contribution of donor countries.
Fifth, the MDGs cannot easily be transformed into national objectives. They 
were originally formulated as global goals, but, without modification they 
were increasingly seen as national objectives in order to create national 
accountability. 
This interpretation constitutes a particular challenge to the least developed 
countries, which tend to have started out in the baseline year 1990 with 
much poorer performance than other countries with regards to most MDG 
indicators. Therefore, it has been especially hard for them, for instance, to 
achieve MDG1c, which calls for a reduction in the share of malnourished 
people by half between 1990 and 2015. Countries that start from a higher 
share of people with malnutrition have more difficulties in achieving the 
goal than other countries, because the goal implies a much greater reduction 
for them in the absolute number of people with hunger. It would therefore 
be good to create a fairer formula for allocating the responsibilities or 
contributions to implementing the common global goals to each country. 
At the same time, the seeming failure of many developing countries – most 
of them particularly poor and hence receiving especially large amounts of 
aid – was a strong factor for undermining the acceptability of development 
co-operation in the donor countries. We observe that on average countries 
with high initial levels of deprivation (high mortality rates, high non-
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enrolment rates) have made much more progress in absolute terms (e.g. 
reduction in child mortality in percentage points) than more advanced 
countries but that they have achieved less progress in relative terms. This 
is due to the fact that the trajectory of achieving the MDGs over time tends 
to be an S-shaped curve with little initial progress, accelerated progress 
in the mid-term and again little progress on the final stretch. Formulating 
the MDGs in relative terms comes closer to what one could expect from 
individual countries than formulating them in absolute terms. The most 
realistic formulation for MDGs applied to the national level would have 
been somewhere in between.
Sixth, some goals at the global level were unrealistic right from the start (e.g. 
MDG 2, which demands total enrolment in primary education worldwide), 
while others demonstrate low ambitions, at least at the global level (e.g. 
MDG1, which asks for halving the share of people that suffer from income 
poverty and which according to the World Bank has already been achieved).
Seventh, the MDGs lacked legitimacy at least at the beginning: They were 
selected and formulated by a committee of experts from the OECD and 
international organisations with hardly any representation of countries in 
the Global South. After that, they have not even been formally adopted by 
any legitimate international body: They were presented to the UN General 
Assembly in 2001 but without any act of formal endorsement. In a way, this 
procedural error has been cured later by the fact that several international 
declarations – which have been adopted by all UN member countries – make 
ample reference to the MDGs and thereby indirectly legitimised the goals. 
This includes, among others, the Consensus on Finance for Development 
adopted in Monterrey in 2002, the Declaration of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg in 2005 and the Outcome 
Document of the Millennium+5 Summit held in New York in 2005. In 
addition, there is no doubt that the MDGs as such mirror very well some 
of the core concerns and wishes of poor and vulnerable people in low and 
middle income countries. But there is still an argument left that the MDGs 
go back to an initiative that originates predominantly within the OECD 
and which builds considerably on the traditional system of development 
co-operation between OECD donor countries and low-income partner 
countries in Africa, Asia or Latin America.
At the same time, the philosophy of the MDGs agenda is still very much 
coined by the world order of the cold war and immediate post cold war 
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periods: the existence of a large number of more or less underdeveloped 
countries with a lack of financial and technical means and a limited number 
of rich countries, which were supposed to provide some kind of aid to the 
others. The message of the MDGs was that developing countries were 
responsible themselves for reaching MDG 1-7 but that donor countries 
had to provide support to their efforts in addition to implementing MDG8. 
Of course, the world today is no longer bipolar in this way; it has many 
very different kinds of countries with different kinds of problems including 
several ones that receive and give development assistance at the same time.
Furthermore, many criticise the MDGs as well for being too focused on 
the social sectors and neglecting the production sectors and economic 
development. This judgement, however, is unfair for two reasons: First, 
the MDGs do not focus on particular sectors, but on goals of human 
development. Achieving the health goals (MDGs 4–6) may well require 
investments in healthcare, but it may also (and often even more) call for 
investments in the education or water sector. Second, economic growth, 
transport infrastructure and a functioning private sector tend to be essential 
to be preconditions for long-term poverty reduction and for the achievement 
of the MDGs. But they are no ends in themselves and should therefore not 
have a place in an MDG agenda.
5 Emergence of the SDGs
Proponents of an SDG agenda further criticise three other aspects of the 
MDGs: (i) they are not global goals and ultimately put obligations on the 
developing countries only; (ii) they are generally short to medium term 
and thus run counter to policies that are oriented towards sustainability, 
which necessarily have to be inherently longer-term; (iii) central areas of 
sustainable policies – chiefly environmental objectives – are not reflected 
sufficiently. 
These points of criticism are justified. The first one can be addressed by the 
introduction of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), which 
means that the formulation of the goals must take differences between 
countries with regards to their level of development into account. This 
means that every country should be requested to make progress towards 
all goals at the national level – depending on its individual capabilities 
and needs – but also contribute to the achievement of the goals in other 
Markus Loewe
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)216
countries, respectively on the international level – again depending on the 
each country’s individual capabilities. Such an approach would at the same 
time come up to the fact that the world is no more bipolar (consisting of 
just some donor and many recipients countries of development aid). Each 
country would be treated as being a potential donor and a potential recipient 
country at the same time.
Box 3:  Issues that the Rio+20 declaration has suggested to be 
addressed by Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
 • Poverty reduction
 • Food security and nutrition and 
sustainable agriculture
 • Water and sanitation
 • Energy
 • Sustainable tourism
 • Sustainable transport
 • Sustainable cities and human 
settlements
 • Health and population
 • Promoting full and productive 
employment, decent work for 
all and social protection
 • Oceans and seas
 • Small island developing 
countries
 • Least developed countries
 • Landlocked developing 
countries 
 • Africa
 • Regional efforts
 • Disaster risk reduction
 • Climate change
 • Forests 
 • Biodiversity
 • Desertification, land 
degradation and drought
 • Mountains
 • Chemicals and waste




 • Gender equality and the 
empowerment of women
The other two points of criticism question the MDGs much more 
fundamentally. However, current proposals for a future SDG agenda have 
not created an alternative to the second criticism. They too envision a 
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rather short-term horizon and the indicators suggested so far do not include 
aspects of sustainability as well. The proposed agenda differs from the 
MDGs mostly in that there is a wider range of goals that matter from a 
sustainability perspective. Since each of the proposals for a possible future 
SDG agenda are still in a preliminary stage and sometimes vary widely, Box 
3 lists the issues suggested by the Rio+20 summit’s final report for a future 
SDG agenda.
Of course, the MDGs are not a purely socio-political agenda and neither 
would potential SDGs be just environmental. Both approaches involve 
similar ideas. They differ mostly with respect to their underlying thinking: 
While the MDGs are mostly inspired by improving the living conditions 
of the poorest people, the SDGs main concern is shaping development 
sustainably.
6 Consequences for a new international agenda
What needs to be avoided is that MDGs and SDGs are created without 
being coordinated. Indeed, it is necessary to design an integrated agenda 
for post-2015 that takes the poverty as well as sustainability debates into 
account. The coexistence of two separate agendas would bear the risk that 
one of them would attract considerably more attention and, thus, impetus 
than the other or that different kinds of countries highlight one or the other. 
In addition, the links between both would probably be widely disregarded. 
So far, very little research has focused on these links – which are mainly 
effects of social achievements on environmental goals and vice versa. This 
relationship may benefit from synergies but also suffer from trade-offs... we 
cannot say in general (Loewe et al. 2014). Even trade-offs are no reason to 
have separate agendas. They exist anyway – no matter how we frame the 
future development agenda. On the contrary, the world community should 
even make sure that such trade-offs are taken into consideration – just like 
synergies. If there are synergies, these should be exploited. And if there 
are trade-offs, we should not close our eyes but be aware of them and try 
to find smart solutions to cope with them. That means that both, synergies 
and trade-offs would have implications on how the future goals should be 
formulated. And these are much easier to consider when all goals are part 
of the same agenda.
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And this joint agenda should have the strengths of the MDGs while avoiding 
their weaknesses, i.e. its goals should 
 • be highly relevant in both, objective and subjective terms like the MDGs,
 • have once again only a limited number of easy-to-understand goals,
 • be goals for people like the MDGs, i.e. final end goals rather than 
instruments,
 • be SMART (specific, measurable, agreed, realistic, time-limited),
 • be more comprehensive than the MDGs (include additional dimensions 
of development / well-being such as e.g. political, socio-cultural and 
protective capabilities),
 • consider distributional issues, 
 • avoid inconsistencies (all targets should focus on outcomes rather than 
inputs or outputs),
 • be truly universal i.e. defined on the global level but relevant and 
applicable nationally for all countries,
 • be still binding for all countries,
 • be ambitious but realistic and fair – globally and for every single country
 • control for the sustainability of development and
 • be negotiated from the beginning by all countries and actors (state, 
society, private sector etc.) and be formally adopted by the United 
Nations.
Without any doubt, very wide-ranging consensus exists today that any 
future international development agenda must comply with these criteria. 
However, there is considerable tension: Several of these criteria conflict 
with others:
For example, the aim to have a short, memorable list of goals conflicts with 
the aim to have a more comprehensive list of goals. 
Likewise, it is impossible to construct a comprehensive agenda covering all 
relevant aspects of development / well-being with only SMART goals. Some 
aspects of development / well-being are difficult, others are impossible to 
specify and quantify. For example, there is a reasonable explanation for the 
fact that Chapters 2 and 5 of the Millennium Declaration (Peace, security 
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and disarmament; Human rights, democracy and good governance) have 
been entirely neglected when the MDGs were extracted from the Millennium 
Declaration. It is extremely difficult to find good single proxy indicators for 
measuring and monitoring development in peace or human rights; probably 
one would need long lists of indicators (if an agreement on a canon of lists 
can ever be made).
Further, it is impossible for a future agenda to meet all of the following 
four criteria at a time: (i) to be truly universal (i.e. to be defined on the 
global level but relevant and applicable nationally for all countries), (ii) 
to be ambitious but realistic and fair – globally and nationally, (iii) to be 
binding for all countries, and (iii) to be still a short list of goals that are easy 
to understand and remember.
It is possible to fulfil two or three of these criteria but not all at a time: If 
goals are meant to be universal (applicable and intended to guide action in all 
countries) while also binding at the national level, they must be automatically 
convertible into national goals. The MDGs tend to be converted into national 
goals without adaptation to the needs and capabilities of different countries: 
all countries are expected to make the same progress in the improvement 
of MDG indicators in relative terms (e.g. to halve their respective share of 
people in absolute poverty). As we have argued, this practice is unfair to 
less developed countries because one and the same improvement in relative 
terms means much faster progress in absolute terms for countries that start 
from higher poverty levels. And it becomes even more unfair when goals are 
set for all countries: not only low and middle income but also high income 
countries.
The problem can be solved by a discrete conversion procedure, which defines 
different groups of countries (e.g. low, middle and high income) and assigns 
tasks with different levels of difficulty to each of them. It reduces only 
somewhat the initial problem because still countries with very different income 
levels must achieve the same improvement in MDG indicators as long as they 
belong to the same group of countries (e.g. middle income countries with a 
per capita annual income anywhere between 1036 and 12,615 USD in PPPs). 
In addition, the procedure creates an additional problem: discontinuities at 
the thresholds between country groupings. These imply that a country that 
moves up from an income of 12,615 to 12,616 USD per capita and year in 
PPPs has to fulfil a significantly more difficult task from one moment to the 
next. Only continuous conversion factors can solve the problem because 
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they make the difficulty of tasks rise smoothly and without any rupture with 
increasing levels of income or other parameters of development.
A continuous conversion procedure, however, is very difficult to understand 
– at least for non-experts – and may deliver entirely unexpected results. It 
would therefore offend against the fourth criterion mentioned above and 
hence cost the future development agenda one of the main strengths of 
the MDGs: that they are easy to understand, easy to memorise and easy to 
communicate.
Another challenge is to control for the sustainability of development. Of 
course, it is possible to strengthen the sustainability goal (now MDG7) to 
include additional aspects of environmental and natural resource protection. 
But the word “sustainability” has a much broader aim. It can be defined as 
the capacity to endure, which may be challenged not only by environmental 
but also by economic and social degradation. To control for sustainability 
therefore means that longer term negative effects of the achievement of 
one goal on the same or other goals are taken into account. This task calls 
for the definition of future international development goals as a dynamic 
optimisation problem, which makes these goals once again very complex 
and difficult to understand.
One way to solve the problem is to define target variables with side conditions 
such e.g. the goal to reduce income poverty as fast as possible without 
accelerating climate change. This solution, however, creates a new problem: 
Poverty reduction can be measured at the global, national or sub-national 
level while climate change can only be measured globally. This is due to the 
fact that poverty reduction is a final end goal of human development – a goal 
for people – while climate stability is a goal for the planet. Humanity might 
not have to bother about it if climate change was not expected to fire back on 
human development after one or more decades. In this way, climate stability 
can be seen as a control variable for the sustainability of achievements made 
towards human development or as an instrumental variable for long-term 
progress towards most different aspects of human development.
It is thus most important to include climate change as a goal in the future 
global development agenda! But it is also problematic to add it as just 
another goal next to final end goals of human development such as income 
poverty reduction, nutrition, education and health. To limit climate change 
is perhaps much more urgent than to take more action towards the existing 
MDGs but the goal is distinct from most of the MDGs in terms of the level 
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of aggregation (global versus individual or national), time-horizon (long-
term versus short-term) and function (instrumental versus final goal).
One could argue in a similar way for several other, highly important goals 
such as (i) the stability of financial markets, (ii) the existence of an open, 
rules-based and fair world trade system, (iii) the containment of infectious 
diseases, (iv) the joint global management of oceans, the atmosphere, space, 
polar regions, fresh water resources or (v) the curbing of international 
terrorism. All of these are highly important global goals but mainly as 
instruments to control for (‘enablers of’) sustainable, long-term human 
development.
Finally, there is also, of course a tension between the claim that the future 
should be evenly agreed upon by all countries and different actors of 
development (states, the private sector, societal initiatives and international 
organisations) and the need to have ambitious goals covering all relevant 
fields of human development. The interests of countries and actors 
of development are much more diverse today than at the time when the 
MDGs were established so that some compromises have to be made by all 
parties involved. Nobody should aspire to get a perfect agenda after 2015. 
Nevertheless, there is some hope for the possibility of smart compromises 
because in many areas, conflicts are not really due to contradictory interests 
in development outcomes as such. Rather, they can be attributed mainly to 
the fact that different countries and actors of development have different 
opinions on the question what a fair sharing of the costs of achieving a 
specific goal would be. In such a situation, the negotiations would have to 
focus on the distribution of financial burdens rather than the exact contents 
of a goal.
7 Selection of goals
A major issue in the negotiations on a future development agenda, which are 
going to start in early 2014, is the question which goals should be included 
in the agenda. The discussion on this issue should be guided by the selection 
criteria listed in the previous section – despite all problems discussed to 
reconcile them.
In any case, it is almost beyond any dispute that the reduction of income 
poverty, food security, education, health, family planning and gender 
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equality will show up again in one way or the other (of course the focus will 
have to be much more on outcomes than in today’s MDGs – in particular 
in education). In addition, it is a good idea, and has the agreement of most 
countries, to include a goal infrastructure, which will encompass the already 
included sub-goals water and sanitation, as well as adequate housing and 
energy supply.
Further, there will possibly be agreement on a goal resilience that will refer to 
human and social security – i.e. the protective capabilities of human beings 
against social risks, economic risks, natural and ecological risks (earth-
quakes, floods, torments, drought...), man-made ecological disasters (river 
pollution, soil degradation, deforestation, nuclear disasters...) and social and 
political risks (theft, domestic violation, violent attack, kidnapping, rioting, 
resettlement, torture, war, coup d’état...).
In spite of possible opposition from certain countries, it would also 
be desirable to introduce a framework for political and socio-cultural 
capabilities (human rights, good governance, peace, security, civil rights, 
social inclusion etc.).
It would further be desirable to take distributive issues into consideration. 
This does not mean introducing an additional goal distribution but rather 
measuring achievements towards each goal separately for different 
population groups or even better giving results different weight according 
to the segment of the population (rich and poor, women and men, urban 
and rural, disadvantaged and privileged etc.), to avoid general advances in a 
country for a given indicator either hiding strong internal differentiation, or 
in extremis overall improvements solely being the result of progress among 
those already privileged. 
Most controversial is what can be done to improve the status of environmental 
goals. The Rio+20 Declaration suggests a number of objectives for a 
prospective SDG agenda. Many are already included in the MDG agenda – 
as sub-goals or indicators (i.e. biodiversity, protection of forests, reducing 
carbon emissions), but their commitment and status could be strengthened. 
Other goals suggested by the Rio+20 agenda also involve outcomes and thus 
could easily be included in a new development agenda (such as protection 
from desertification, soil degradation or over-exploitation of fresh water 
resources), while the same could be more difficult for goals that cannot 
be measured according to indicators at the micro-level and which strictly 
speaking are not actually final goals, but instruments, i.e. ‘enablers’ of 
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development such as e.g. climate stability (see Sections 5 and 6). Without 
them, many final end goals of development cannot be achieved on the long-
term.
In the same way, it does not make much sense to add goals such as economic 
growth, access to technologies and drugs, fair global trade or the stability 
of capital markets to current MDGs. Some commentators have advocated 
integrating these into a future international development agenda – but 
they are conditions for short-term and in particular for long-term progress 
towards many of the final end goals of human well-being. Just like climate 
stability and some other aspects of environmental protection, these goals are 
crucial instruments rather than ends of development.
In addition, in contrast to most of the MDGs, these instrumental goals 
require international co-ordination. It cannot be left to the individual 
decisions of national governments whether these goals are achieved or not 
because these decisions have external effects on other countries. Free-riding 
is likely because the costs of measures taken to achieve these goals have to 
be borne individually while the benefits are shared.
8 A two-part agenda
A post-2015 agenda will therefore have to be accompanied by a second 
agenda of goals referring to the conservation / production of global public 
goods (see Box 4). This second agenda would contain many of the targets 
now included in MDG8 but also some of the instrumental goals coming 
from the Rio+20 process (known as SDGs). In any case, the goals of this 
agenda must be more ambitious, concrete, measurable and binding than 
today’s MDG8. One way to think about this is to apply the principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.
Possible issues for the second agenda are: (i) climate stability, (ii) the 
protection of oceans against overfishing, acidification and filling with 
solid waste, (iii) the joint management of scarce mineral resources, global 
energy reserves and fish reserves, (iv) the joint management of global food 
production, (v) cross-border management of water reserves, (vi) the control 
of infectious diseases, (vii) the development of an accessible, equitable and 
rule-based international trading system (already a target in MDG8), (viii) 
stability and integrity of the global financial system, (ix) the containment 
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Box 4:  Possible structure of a post-2015 international agenda  
in two parts
Agenda 1: Human development 
objectives (final goals of 
development)
5-8 goals such as, for example:
 • Reduction of income poverty
 • Food security 
 • Education
 • Health and family planning 
 • Infrastructure (energy, 
housing, water and sanitation)
 • Environment (clean air and 
water, protection of resources)
 • Resilience (human and social 
security)
 • Good governance 
(transparency, efficiency, 
political participation, human 
and civil rights)
Monitoring:  
on the local (micro) level and 
differentiated by gender, income 
and location in order to control 
for the distribution of policy 
outcomes / equity issues
Agenda 2: Essential global 
public goods (instrumental 
goals / enablers of development)
5-8 goals such as, for example:
 • Limiting climate change
 • Joint global management of 
oceans, the atmosphere, space, 
the polar regions, fresh water 
resources
 • Containing infectious diseases
 • Improving the stability of 
financial markets
 • Creating an open, rules-based 
and fair system of world trade 
 • Curbing international 
terrorism
 • Disarmament of anti-personnel 
mines and weapons of mass 
destruction
Monitoring:  
on the international level
of international terrorism, (xi) the elimination of anti-person mines and 
weapons of mass destruction etc. 
In addition, the second agenda should contain an agreement on a fair 
distribution of the costs of actions taken for the conservation / production of 
these global public goods including binding commitments on development 
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assistance for the achievement of the goals in the first agenda and on goals 
for policy coherence for development.
The two agendas would depend on each other and therefore form one unit. 
They should thus be negotiated as a package. Nevertheless, there are reasons 
for having separate lists:
First, the goals in the second list differ in conceptual and methodological 
terms from those in the first list: (i) They are instrumental rather than final 
goals of development. (ii) They focus on inputs and outputs rather than 
impacts or outcomes such as the goals in the first list. (iii) They are measured 
by macro-level indicators, i.e. they refer to regions, countries or the whole 
world, while most of the indicators in the first list are (aggregated) micro-
level variables using data on individuals. (iv) They refer to global public 
goods, which matter for everybody on Earth, while the goals in the first list 
focus on the main problems of the most deprived human beings globally 
(see Janus / Keijzer 2013).
Second, the goals in the second agenda are instrumental for those in the first 
agenda. The goals in the first list are also mutually supportive (like education 
and health) but the positive causal relation between the two agendas tends 
to go much more in one direction only: Poverty reduction can also have an 
impact on the goals of the second agenda but this effect is negative (like 
for example on climate change) or much weaker than the reverse impact (a 
reduction in the number of poor people may have a limited positive impact 
on the stability of the financial markets).
Third, the goals in both agendas are the expression of slightly different 
philosophies that are difficult to unify/bring together at equal weight in a 
single agenda. Adherents of the MDGs warn that their replacement by a 
more comprehensive SDG agenda might marginalise the issue of poverty 
eradication and development within a much broader agenda of solving 
global problems, while the protagonists of a new SDG agenda fear that 
introducing just a few selected goals from the outcome document of the 
Rio+20 summit might soak the entire sustainable development philosophy.
The separation between two lists within one package could thus also be seen 
as a compromise between two extreme positions: (i) of those who argue 
that a new international development agenda should continue to have its 
focus on global poverty rather than to cover somehow all global problems 
and (ii) of those who argue that given the interdependencies between these 
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problems the new agenda has to be much more comprehensive than the 
current MDGs and that it should be radically more global rather than to 
focus on decreasing number of aid-dependent countries.
9 Scope of the future agenda 
All goals of the post-2015 agenda should be universal in every sense of 
the word: The goals of the second part are so by definition, as they refer 
to global public goods and can thus only be measured globally. But those 
of the first part should also apply to all nations, bind all nations and be 
ambitious for all nations, rather than just developing countries, as is the case 
with the current MDGs. This will require differentiation to transform the 
global goals into national objectives, making them both achievable but also 
ambitious according to each country’s capacities. This will encourage the 
reduction of poverty, mortality and school dropout rates in the rich countries 
as well.
The goals should thus be seen as a global challenge that all countries 
can only master when they co-operate. All have immediate responsibility 
for the achievement of the goals in the first list in themselves, shared 
responsibility for the goals in the second list and intermediate responsibility 
for the achievement of the goals in the first list in other countries. The latter, 
intermediate responsibility is maintained in two ways: (i) by contributions 
made towards the achievement of the goals in the second list (referring to the 
conservation / production of global public goods, which are all essential for 
the achievement of the goals in the first list), and (ii) financial and technical 
assistance provided to the countries that are unable to achieve the goals in 
the first list on their own (especially very poor or fragile countries).
Aid will thus continue to be an important element in the implementation of 
the new development agenda, which means that aid effectiveness will still 
be relevant. However, financial aid at least will only matter for a smaller and 
smaller number of least-developed countries. At the same time, domestic 
sources of funding will gain importance for all countries world-wide.
An alternative to the notion of “aid” could be “financial contributions 
towards the achievement of the new MDGs”, which would allow a more 
comprehensive understanding of global development finance. The financial 
contributions paid by individual countries for the conservation / production 
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of global public goods would be differentiated according to their respective 
wealth and per-capita income level recognizing the issue of international 
as well as domestic inequality and thereby allowing even for negative 
contributions (i.e. net receipts) for very poor countries. 
This would entail a degree of automatism as well as fundamental international 
agreements with regard to financing mechanisms (international taxes and 
fees; agreements regarding illicit financial flows) as opposed to the post-
colonial donor-recipient “aid”-relationship with its inherent imbalance of 
power and its flawed accountability mechanisms.
Ultimately, the concept of aid effectiveness would be substituted by a concept 
of “effectiveness of financing sustainable global development” comprising 
public and private, domestic and international sources of finance.
A truly universal agenda of this kind is also much better able to generate 
real policy coherence than today’s MDGs. So far, policy coherence has been 
geared towards doing ‘no harm’ to the poverty reduction objective. The 
new global framework, in contrast, should enable development ministries 
and agencies to closely co-ordinate and align their approaches with other 
sector ministries and agencies and to agree on a coherent strategy including 
common objectives and guiding principles. What is needed is a systematic 
and coherent conceptual approach to global development followed and 
implemented by the ‘whole-of-government’. Other sector ministries in 
member states need to do more than ensuring that their policies ‘do no 
harm’ to the poverty reduction objective. They should play an active role 
in the implementation of policies that serve the identified global goals and 
should co-operate more closely when drafting strategies in order to ensure 
coherence across ministries.
Policy coherence of this kind enhances donor credibility. Policy coherence 
and donor credibility are ultimately more important than the mobilisation of 
additional aid and non-aid resources. 
Still, policy coherence is also not a purpose in itself. It is an essential 
prerequisite for development and might thus be referred to in the second 
list of goals of a new development agenda. But it is not a final end goal of 
development and should therefore not be part of the first list of goals.
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Almost 15 years’ experience with the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) has revealed many strengths and weaknesses. The lessons that 
can be learned from this experience are highly valuable for the formulation 
of any new development framework – however such a framework might 
look like in the end. This chapter provides an overview of these lessons and 
suggests different possibilities of how a future framework might build upon 
the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of the MDGs.
2 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
The UN Millennium Summit concluded with the adoption of the Millennium 
Declaration on 8 September 2000 – a global vision for the future that is 
based on a set of fundamental rights, namely freedom, equality, solidarity, 
tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility.
In the following years, a so-called “Inter-agency and Expert Group on the 
Millennium Development Goal Indicators (IAEG)” consisting of experts 
from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) developed the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) with the objective of monitoring the implementation of the 
commitments made in the Declaration – though they ultimately captured 
only a small fraction of them. With the expiration date of the MDGs fast 
approaching, the stage is being set for a post-2015 development agenda. 
Several lessons can be learned from over a decade of experience with the 
MDGs that can provide valuable guidance for this crucial task. It is the 
objective of this chapter to present the most important ones.
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3 Lessons learned from the MDGs
3.1 Lesson one: universality
The MDGs were defined by the IAEG without the contribution of national 
governments and without a great deal of relevance for developed countries. 
This fact severely undermined the acceptance of and commitment to the 
goals in most of the developing world. The MDGs were perceived as a 
mere donor agenda and the resulting lack of ownership and commitment 
on the part of developing countries is supposed to have hampered progress 
towards the MDGs (ECA 2012, 4). Thus, while the MDGs had a highly 
motivating effect on donors, their effect on developing countries was much 
less promising (Fukuda-Parr / Greenstein 2010). Against this background, 
it seems to be highly recommendable to derive any new agenda through i) a 
participatory process and to make it ii) universal, that is, to base it on a goal 
framework that is binding for all countries, both developing and developed.
So far, participation has been fairly promising. The new Agenda will be 
developed by the United Nations and a lot of efforts are being made to render 
the process as participatory as possible. For example, in the middle of 2012, 
the ‘global conversation’ was set up by the United Nations Development 
Group (UNDG) with the intent to bring the voices of individuals and civil 
society into the debate. In the course of more than a year, 88 national and 11 
thematic consultations as well as a global survey called “My World” were 
conducted. More than 1 million people from all backgrounds were reached 
and their opinions were summarised in the report “A million voices: the 
world we want”.
Regarding the universality of the post-2015 agenda, however, progress has 
been less promising. Though most of the proposals made so far agree that 
any new development agenda should be universally applicable, few studies 
exist that address the multiple challenges that such a universal development 
agenda inevitably incurs:
First, a conception of poverty needs to be provided that applies to both 
developing and developed countries in a meaningful way. Second, the 
targets of a globally applicable framework have to be formulated in a way 
that is meaningful at the national level and yet ambitious, despite the fact 
that national governments tend to seek targets that they can easily meet. 
Closely related to the second, a third challenge arises from the fact that 
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ambitious but realistic targets at the national level might be taken to imply 
that poor countries must rely on their own limited resources to deal with the 
massive poverty they face. Thus, the third challenge consists in ensuring 
the continuous commitment of developed countries within developing 
countries. Pogge and Rippin (2013) offer possible approaches of how these 
challenges might be met but substantial work remains to be done in this 
area.
3.2 Lesson two: focus
The MDGs have been criticised for not meeting the much broader vision of 
the Millennium Declaration – and even less so the sustainability paradigm 
as established in the Rio Declaration of 1992. Though the fundamental areas 
of the MDGs are still critically important topics that need to be strengthened 
in their ambition and urgency, other critically important issues have not 
been covered by the MDGs. From 20 to 22 June 2012, the member states 
met for the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro, 
known under the abbreviation Rio+20, where they adopted a resolution 
called “The future we want”. The resolution generated a concept parallel to 
the MDGs, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that combines both 
development and sustainability. The parallel nature of these two processes 
bears the risk of two – in the worst case incompatible – agendas arising for 
the period Post-2015. If this is to be avoided – as decided by the General 
Assembly at the Special Event on the MDGs on 25 September 2013 – the 
new agenda has to be much more comprehensive than the current MDGs.
However, one of the main strengths of the MDGs was their focus on a limited 
number of targets which made the framework clear and manageable. This 
strength needs to be maintained in the new agenda; otherwise it would i) 
lose its appeal to the public (as an endless list of goals and targets is neither 
communicable nor effective in galvanising public support) and ii) confront 
national governments with a virtually impossible implementation task that 
is likely to lead to a selective approach in which governments choose to 
comply with those indicators that they feel comfortable with and ignore the 
rest.
The MDGs owed their clear focus to the top-down approach in which they 
were developed. The post-2015 agenda, however, will be the result of broad 
consultation processes and intensive negotiations that run the risk of getting 
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out of hand. Nevertheless, so far hardly any suggestions for a selection 
process have been made that would ensure that the extensive processes 
ultimately lead to a limited number of goals and targets. Interesting selection 
tools could be provided by impact evaluations or statistical methods that 
build upon the correlation between possible goals and targets in order to 
identify the crucial ones. Another option could be to avoid the sectoral 
approach of the MDGs that encourages intense lobbying around specific 
sectors and priorities in an effort to secure future funding.
3.3 Lesson three: avoiding silos
International agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO)1, the 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)2, 
the European Commission3 and others, strongly criticise the sectoral or ‘silo 
structure’ of the MDGs, that is, their concentration on separate goals that in 
reality are closely related. Gore (2010, 75) warns:
Another problem is that donors are taking a sectoral approach to MDGs, 
focusing on, e.g. basic health, or primary education, or water, or even a 
favourite disease. With this approach, it is possible selectively to achieve 
targets but this does not add up to comprehensive progress.
One way to avoid the silo structure of the MDGs is to utilise a composite 
index in addition to the new goals and targets – whatever they may look like. 
A composite index has the potential to effectively capture the synergistic 
and multiplier effects which inevitably occur whenever goals and targets are 
correlated – if the respective index is ‘correlation-sensitive’.
Interestingly, the index which is usually suggested for this task – the 
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 2.0 – is actually not qualified as it 
is not correlation-sensitive. Among the most well-known indices that are 
qualified are those proposed by Tsui (2002); Bourguignon / Chakravarty 
(2003); Chakravarty / D’Ambrosio (2006); and Bossert / Chakravarty 
/ D’Ambrosio (2009). A disadvantage of these indices, however, is that 
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impossible to tell how much of the overall deprivation is due to failures 
in a specific area, for instance education, health, etc. The only index 
developed so far that is correlation-sensitive and decomposable according 
to components is the Correlation Sensitive Poverty Index (CSPI) (Rippin 
2010; Rippin 2014).
Yet, the utilisation of a composite index has several disadvantages. Apart 
from data requirements, it is likely to further fuel negotiations as not only 
individual components (e.g. health, education, living standards) have to be 
chosen but also the weight for each component as well as the marginal rates 
of substitution (Klasen 2013).
Another way to avoid the silo structure of the MDGs that would additionally 
help to ensure the focus of the new agenda would be to replace the sector-
centred approach of the MDGs by a human-centred approach (Rippin 
2013). Instead of clustering goals according to sectors, they could as well be 
clustered according to the three main transition phases of human life. These 
are the crucial times in life in which future paths are laid and deprivation has 
the strongest detrimental effect. Overcoming deprivation in the transition 
phases therefore promises the highest returns while at the same time 
ensuring cross-generational justice.
The three transition phases are: i) childhood well-being (with indicators 
such as mortality, nutrition, education, living conditions including access 
to safe drinking water and improved sanitation, birth registration, healthy 
life expectancy at birth); ii) youth transition (with indicators like healthy 
life expectancy for persons aged 14-20, higher education, vocational 
training, non-cognitive skills, access to information and communication 
technologies); and iii) retirement (with indicators like social protection, 
healthy life expectancy for persons aged 60 and over, participation in social 
life).
However, there should be one additional cluster: gender. Though gender 
should be given special attention in all three clusters, it is nonetheless a 
crucial, cross-cutting issue that – even if integrated into all three clusters 
– would not receive adequate attention: iv) gender (with indicators such 
as female employment, maternal and reproductive health, violence, voice, 
participation).
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3.4 Lesson four: fairness
The majority of MDG targets and indicators were chosen by projecting 
global progress in order to ensure that they are globally achievable – 
which does not imply that they have to be achievable at the national level 
as well. However, considering the compelling advantage of international 
comparisons, it was almost impossible to prevent their interpretation at the 
national level.
This interpretation led to serious distortions, as the global goals were highly 
disadvantageous to countries with bad starting conditions (Easterly 2009; 
Atta-Krah 2011; Vandemoortele 2011a). This is especially problematic 
as those countries that are usually the main beneficiaries of development 
assistance are in a way set up for failure. Aid-fatigue is a likely result.
Already, the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien (5–9 March 
1990) formulated global goals, while at the same time claiming in its 
Framework for Action that “countries may wish to set their own targets”.4 
By now, many proposals for a new development agenda draw on the wisdom 
of this conference and call for global goals and national targets. However, 
what is unclear so far is how such an approach of global goals and national 
targets can facilitate a meaningful comparison of country performance. 
Such comparisons are very valuable: they reveal success stories that provide 
valuable lessons learned and are powerful instruments for maintaining 
future commitment to the goals – given they are fair. But how can fair and 
meaningful country comparisons be achieved with national targets? Two 
methods have been developed in response to that question.
The first method estimates the state capacities of countries and clusters 
them accordingly, defining targets for each cluster. Some authors utilise the 
highest rate of progress achieved within a cluster as a target (Fukuda-Parr / 
Lawson-Remer / Randolph 2009; Randolph / Fukuda-Parr / Lawson-Remer 
2010) whereas others suggest using the respective average rate of progress 
(Anderson / Langford 2013). Whatever indicators are chosen in order to 
cluster countries according to state capacity, this is a viable and fairly easily 
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The second method measures the progress of countries against the progress 
that could be expected according to the S-shaped transition path, that is, 
the path that every country follows more or less strictly on its way towards 
increasing development. A direct implication of the S-shape is that the 
initial position of a country explains a lot of the progress that the respective 
country is able to achieve. This is in line with the argument that the MDGs 
were disadvantageous to countries with poor starting conditions. In a recent 
paper, Klasen and Lange (2012) use these transition paths in order to evaluate 
the fairness of different MDG targets. Figure 1 provides an illustration of 
a typical transition path using under-five mortality rates based on World 
Development Indicator 2010 data.



























) - - - - Fitted transition path 
Source: Klasen / Lange (2012, 13)
While this second method has the disadvantage that its methodology is not 
easily conveyed to the public, it has two important advantages: For once, 
it provides a sound method to determine which target would be fair and 
ambitious for every single country because it could always be evaluated 
against what could be expected from the respective country. In addition, it 
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provides a way to solve the accountability problem that automatically arises 
in the case of long-term goals, as progress towards goals can be evaluated in 
any given year in an impartial and fair manner.
3.5 Lesson five: equality 
The MDGs are strongly criticised for their exclusive focus on national 
averages that implies a complete neglect of inequality. The MDG framework 
is unable to catch whether progress had been achieved through improvements 
of the situation of the poor or of the wealthy and privileged.
Since 1990, income inequality has increased in almost every world region 
(Figure 2). According to the Global Risks 2013 report, the global risk that is 
Figure 2: Changing patterns of inequality
Notes:  Columns represent individual countries within the various regions. 
The lighter column (left) indicates data from 1990; the darker column 
(right) from 2010 or the latest data available.
Source: Rippin (2013, 45)
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“most likely to manifest over the next 10 years is severe income disparity” 
(WEF 2013, 10). The importance of addressing inequality is all the more 
urgent as rising inequality is actually an automatic by-product of economic 
growth, that is, in order to prevent rising inequality it has to be actively 
counteracted (Kanbur 2011). Vandemoortele (2008) goes as far as to suggest 
that rising inequality is the main reason why the world is unlikely to achieve 
most of the MDGs.
In order to account for inequality, however, one has to accept that inequality 
exists overall in a society along with inequality of opportunity, and both 
need to be addressed.
Inequality of opportunity is due to circumstances beyond individual 
responsibility, that is, inequality that is due to discrimination of any sort. 
It discourages individual efforts, investments and creativity, thus wasting 
human capital and hampering economic growth.
So far, only a few studies have provided estimates of inequality of opportunity. 
Brunori / Ferreira / Peragine (2013) provide an overview of those studies 
that calculate estimates for inequality of opportunity of household income 
and are thus roughly comparable.5 However, all these estimates are lower 
bound estimates, that is, they considerably underestimate the ‘true’ extent 
of inequality of opportunity. Figure 3 provides an overview of these lower 
bound estimates in relation to overall inequality.
It is easily comprehensible why almost every post-2015 proposal requests 
that the fight against inequality of opportunity takes centre stage: not only 
from a moral perspective, but also to avoid the waste of human capital and to 
boost economic growth. A suggestion of how this can be achieved was made 
by the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda (UNHLP 2013) and has been taken up in the final report of the 
Secretary-General (Ban 2013): to disaggregate targets according to 
discriminating factors (e.g. race, caste, disability, region and economic 
status) and to consider them only “‘achieved’ if they are met for all relevant 
income and social groups” (UNHLP 2013, 29).6
5 The studies are Cogneau / Mesple-Somps (2008); Pistolesi (2009); Checci / Peragine / 
Serlenga (2010); Ferreira / Gignoux (2011); Ferreira / Gignoux / Aran (2011); Belhaj-
Hassine (2012); Piraino (2012); Singh (2012); Brunori / Ferreira / Peragine (2013).
6 Please note that such an approach requires the expansion of current surveys in order to 
provide data sets that can be disaggregated according to disadvantaged people groups.
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But the obvious importance of inequality of opportunity should not obscure 
the importance of overall inequality. If inequality, no matter of which form, 
is too high, it hampers economic growth and may even create social tensions 
and conflicts (e.g. Persson / Tabellini 1994; Alesina / Perotti 1996). Thus, 
while it is not very controversial that higher investments and efforts should 
be rewarded with higher income (Sen 1992, 7-8), it is highly controversial 
how big this reward may get, that is, how much overall inequality is 
desirable? Though the response appears to differ from country to country, 
it seems to be clear that in most countries inequality has grown to an extent 
that is perceived to be highly unfair (Figure 4).
Figure 3: Total inequality and inequality of opportunity in selected countries
Notes: 
Columns represent individual countries within the various regions.
The darker areas indicate the lower bound estimate of inequality of opportunity 
on total inequality.
Source: Rippin (2013, 50)
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For this reason, a group of 90 renowned academics recently requested the 
introduction of a separate target on inequality in the Post-2015 Agenda.7 
It has to be kept in mind, though, that the current MDGs already include 
a target on inequality, namely “the share of national consumption that 
accrues to the bottom 20 per cent of the population”. This target has been 
largely ignored; in fact, most people do not even know that such a target 
exists (Vandemoortele 2011a; 2011b). The reason is that the reduction of 
inequality in a given country is liked as little as the policies related with it, 
such as the limitation of top salaries, promotion of progressive tax systems, 
7 http://post2015.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/inequality-letter-final-190313.pdf
Figure 4:  Ideal, estimated and actual wealth by quintile in the United States 
and Australia
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%10% 30% 50% 70% 90%
Ideal 22 13 112232
Estimated 59
84 11 4 0,2
20 13 5 3
Actual
Ideal 24 20 24 17 14
Estimated 40 19 19 13 9




blue: top quintile / brown: second quintile / green: middle quintile  
lilac: fourth quintile / turquoise: bottom quintile
Source: Rippin (2013, 52)
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reduction of global tax evasion and avoidance, etc. (Freeland 2012, ix–x). 
Thus it is not merely enough to include a target on inequality reduction in 
the new agenda: one must also ensure that performance with regard to this 
target is measured and communicated.
3.6 Lesson six: measurability
Several lessons can be learned from the experience with the targets and 
indicators of the current MDG framework. Some MDG indicators turned 
out to be too unspecific. For instance, the objective of a ‘significant 
improvement’ in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers is so ill-
specified that it even induced human rights violations as in the case of Viet 
Nam whose Fourth MDG Report lists slum clearance among the country’s 
efforts to achieve the MDGs (Langford 2010, 88; GoV 2005, 48).
Another weakness of the MDGs is that indicators were optionally based 
on outcomes, outputs and sometimes even inputs. Whenever possible, 
indicators should be based on outcomes as they measure directly what the 
goal and target is about. There is usually not much of a difference between 
the actual goal, target and the respective indicator. One example for such an 
outcome indicator is the under‐five mortality rate, one of the clearest and 
most unobjectionable indicators of the MDGs (e.g. Vandemoortele 2008; 
Klasen 2012).
However, what the experience with the MDGs has also taught is that, 
despite their huge advantages, there might be cases in which outcome-based 
indicators should not be the first choice. Every indicator consists of two 
basic ingredients, observations – the quality of the data that are available for 
the calculation of a specific indicator – and transformations – the number of 
calculations that have to be conducted in order to derive the final indicator 
from these observations (Vandemoortele 2011b, 14). Thus, the overall 
quality of any indicator depends on its performance in both areas. If the 
performance in any of the two areas is very low, there might be good reasons 
to reject the respective indicator even if it is outcome-based. 
The maternal mortality rate is a telling example of an outcome-based indicator 
that is derived from highly unreliable observations. As a consequence, 
almost any message can be derived from the existing data (Vandemoortele 
2011b, 13): “[T]here has been little progress in reducing maternal deaths” 
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(Ban 2010, 8) versus “[S]ubstantial, albeit varied, progress has been made 
towards MDG 5” (Hogan et al. 2010, 1). Consequently, many health experts 
would prefer the MDG indicator ‘proportion of births attended by skilled 
health personnel’ over maternal mortality rates – though the former is a 
clear input indicator.
But even reliable outcome-based indicators can be misleading if they are 
unable to precisely capture a goal or target. For instance, in an effort to measure 
health, MDG indicators concentrate on HIV/AIDs, malaria and tuberculosis. 
This approach can lead to serious distortions of national priorities in 
countries in which these diseases do not constitute the predominant health 
problem – especially if these countries are donor-dependent. A textbook 
example is provided by Rwanda: According to UNICEF8, about 170,000 
people were living with HIV in 2009, about 1.6% of the total population; 
the adult (aged 15-49) HIV prevalence rate is estimated at 2.9%. Rwanda 
spent USD 73 million of its total health expenditure of USD 307 million on 
HIV/AIDS – about 24%.
Summarising the measurement experience of the MDGs, indicators should 
i) be SMART (specific, measurable, agreed, realistic, time-limited); ii) be 
based on outcomes whenever possible; iii) be based on reliable high quality 
data; iv) be derived from a low number of transformations; and v) precisely 
capture the respective target.
4 Conclusions
This chapter presented six important lessons gained in almost fifteen years’ 
experience with the MDGs that are able to provide valuable guidance 
towards a post-2015 agenda. In particular, the post-2015 agenda should be 
universal, focused and fair; it should avoid the silo-structure of the current 
MDG framework, should take inequality into account, and should be based 
on high-quality indicators. 
8 http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda_statistics.html, accessed 12 Mar. 2013
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One of the main weaknesses of the MDGs is their sectoral approach – often 
referred to as ‘silo structure’: the MDGs consist of a list of stand-alone goals 
that disregards all synergies that undoubtedly exist between the differing 
goals. Progress towards the goals is more than likely to be accelerated if 
these synergies were accounted for, that is, if the goals (and targets) were 
addressed simultaneously rather than separately. This chapter suggests two 
different ways of how this might be achieved by the post-2015 agenda.
2 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
The UN Millennium Summit was concluded with the adoption of the 
Millennium Declaration on 8 September 2000. In the following years, a 
group of experts from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) developed the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) with the objective of monitoring the implementation of the 
commitments made in the declaration – though they ultimately captured 
only a small fraction of them (Manning 2009; Hulme 2009; Hulme 
2010; Vandemoortele 2011). With the expiration date of the MDGs fast 
approaching, the stage is being set for a post-2015 agenda.
This chapter concentrates on one of the main weaknesses of the MDGs, 
namely their sectoral approach, and discusses two different ways of how a 
future development agenda might overcome this weakness (Rippin 2013).
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3 The silo structure of the MDGs
In the course of the post-2015 debate, the sectoral structure of the MDGs 
has been severely criticised, inter alia by international agencies such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO)1, the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA)2 and the European Commission3. 
The reason is that the so-called ‘silo structure’ of the current MDG framework 
disregards the fact that close correlations exist between the different goals 
and targets. The UNDP report “What will it take to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals?” claims that the process of achieving the MDGs might 
be accelerated if they were addressed simultaneously rather than separately 
(UNDP 2010, iv):
This Assessment notes that there are important synergies among the 
MDGs – acceleration in one goal often speeds up progress in others. In 
households where women are illiterate, child mortality is higher, implying 
the links between education, the empowerment of women and the health of 
children. Given these synergistic and multiplier effects, all the goals need 
to be given equal attention and achieved simultaneously.
The silo structure of the MDGs, however, induces precisely the contrary 
effect (Gore 2010, 75):
Another problem is that donors are taking a sectoral approach to MDGs, 
focusing on, e.g. basic health, or primary education, or water, or even a 
favourite disease. With this approach, it is possible selectively to achieve 
targets but this does not add up to comprehensive progress.
In other words, the silo structure of the MDG framework encourages donors 
to take a sectoral approach to the MDGs that actually hampers the process 
of achieving them. One suggestion that has repeatedly been made is to 
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4 A composite index
There are two ways to measure multidimensional phenomena. The first is to 
measure multiple dimensions one by one. This ‘dashboard’ is used by the 
MDGs and results in the described silo structure. The second is to merge 
the multiple dimensions into one single index, that is, a composite index. 
Unlike the dashboard, a composite index provides a means to capture the 
synergistic and multiplier effects that are described in the 2010 UNDP report 
and to evaluate the impact of different policies on a number of sectors at the 
same time. Thus, it might be recommendable to utilise a composite index in 
addition to4 the future goal framework in order to make up for the described 
weaknesses of the silo structure – given that the respective composite index 
is able to capture the correlation between the different dimensions.
The latter restriction is obvious yet it excludes an index that is usually 
suggested for this task: the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). In fact, 
the simple counting approach of the MPI makes it impossible to capture any 
kind of correlation between different dimensions. But there are a couple 
of other indices which build on household data just like the MPI but are 
additionally correlation-sensitive. Among the most well-known are those 
proposed by Tsui (2002); Bourguignon / Chakravarty (2003); Chakravarty / 
D’Ambrosio (2006) and Bossert / Chakravarty / D’Ambrosio (2009).
A disadvantage of these indices, however, is that they are not decomposable 
according to dimensions. In other words, it is impossible to tell how much 
of the overall deprivation is due to failures in a specific area, for instance 
education, health, etc. The only index developed so far that is correlation-
sensitive and yet decomposable according to dimensions is the Correlation 
Sensitive Poverty Index (CSPI) (Rippin 2010; Rippin 2014). This property 
allows the index to capture the synergies between different goals and targets 
4 Please note that this is not a suggestion to replace the dashboard used by the MDGs by 
a composite index. A composite index has the clear disadvantage that, being a single 
number, it is not easily communicable to the public and obscures a lot of information. 
Please note also that this is not a suggestion to replace a single target with a composite 
index, as it has been repeatedly suggested to replace the income poverty target with a 
multidimensional poverty index. One can only strongly advise against such an approach 
for at least two reasons: First, it would disregard an important poverty dimension, i.e. 
income. Second, it would lead to double counting, as sectors such as health and education 
would be components of the multidimensional poverty index and at the same time 
additional targets of the future goal framework (Klasen 2013).
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and to identify at the same time which parts of the population are excluded 
with regard to which dimensions.
For instance, the German Correlation Sensitive Poverty Index (GCSPI) 
reveals that a higher share of the poor (i.e. those who are deprived in more 
than one third of the indicators) lives in the Eastern Bundeslaender (15 %) 
when compared to the Western Bundeslaender (11 %). It also reveals that, 
in comparison to the Eastern Bundeslaender, education contributes more 
to overall poverty in the Western Bundeslaender whereas employment 
and income are stronger contributors to overall poverty in the Eastern 
Bundeslaender (Rippin 2012; Rippin forthcoming).
In summary, a composite index such as the CSPI is able to capture synergies 
between differing sectors and is therefore able to overcome the silo structure 
of the MDGs. In addition, it provides valuable information about inequality, 
social exclusion and the main sources of deprivation in a country.
However, the utilisation of a composite index also has at least two serious 
disadvantages: Firstly, the data requirements are very high and it is at least 
questionable whether the costs for the compilation of such comprehensive 
household data are in proportion to the benefits. Secondly, the top-down 
approach that led to the MDGs – however much it should be opposed – 
ensured the focus of the goal framework. In contrast, the post-2015 agenda 
will for very good reasons be developed via a participatory process and 
have a much broader approach than the MDGs. The disadvantage of this 
more-than-welcome process, however, is that it is expected to lead to 
intense lobbying and “petty sovereignty” (Duffield 2007, 233) so that it 
will be difficult to ensure the manageability of the future goal framework 
(Vandemoortele 2011; Rippin 2013). The introduction of a composite index 
in addition to the future goal framework will not defuse negotiations but 
will rather fuel them because not only goals, targets and indicators are to 
be chosen but also the weight for each component, as well as the respective 
marginal rates of substitution (Klasen 2013). Thus, it might be worthwhile 
to think about another way to overcome the silo structure of the MDGs.
5 A human-centred approach
Another way to avoid the silo structure of the MDGs could be a human-
centred, instead of a sector-centred, approach. In other words, instead of 
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thinking about sectors, it would be more coherent to think about people, 
that is, to form clusters according to, for instance, the three main transition 
phases of human life. These are the crucial times in life in which future 
paths are laid and where deprivation has the strongest detrimental effect. 
Overcoming deprivation in the transition phases would therefore promise 
the highest returns regarding progress in human development while at the 
same time ensuring cross-generational justice that takes due care of any 
demographic structure, whatever the age-pyramid in a specific country 
might look like. For instance, while Africa in particular has to address the 
challenges of a young population – in particular the challenge of creating 
jobs for a successful youth transition – developed countries, as well as many 
countries in East Asia and the Pacific, are confronted with the challenges 
of an ageing population, linked to all the challenges related to pension 
payments, burgeoning health costs, etc. A human-centred approach would 
take due care of these differences.
Thus, it might be worth considering clustering the future goal framework in 
the following way:
Cluster 1: Childhood wellbeing. Possible indicators could be, for instance: 
mortality, nutrition, education, living conditions including access to safe 
drinking water and improved sanitation, birth registration, healthy life 
expectancy at birth.
Early childhood already predetermines a significant part of the quality of 
one’s future life. Malnutrition at an early age can cause irreparable damages 
that significantly restrict future life chances. Insufficient promotion in early 
education stages leads to failures that are extremely difficult to rectify and 
constitutes a waste of human capital. Poor living conditions are likely to keep 
children from building relationships, thereby threatening the development 
of their social skills.
Cluster 2: Youth transition. Possible indicators could be, for instance: 
healthy life expectancy for persons aged 14-20, higher education, vocational 
training, non-cognitive skills, access to information and communication 
technologies.
Young people who are insufficiently trained and educated, who are in poor 
health or lack non-cognitive skills are often forced into either inactiveness 
or precarious jobs. Their exclusion from productive employment wastes 
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human capital and provides a source for future poverty and inequality, 
burdens social protection schemes and threatens social stability.
Cluster 3: Retirement. Possible indicators could be, for instance: social 
protection, healthy life expectancy for persons aged 60 and over, participation 
in social life.
It is one of the duties of the state to take care of the elderly population. Aging 
populations, however, provide an increasing challenge to social protection 
systems. If not taken proper care of, the challenge could develop into a 
serious threat to the stability of a country.
In addition to these three clusters, there should be a fourth, a gender cluster. 
Though gender should be given special attention in all three clusters of 
transition phases, it is nonetheless a crucial, cross-cutting issue that – even 
if integrated in all three clusters – would not receive adequate attention:
Cluster 4: Gender. Possible indicators could be, for instance: female 
employment, maternal and reproductive health, violence, voice, participation.
This way to cluster future goals, targets and indicators would provide an 
effective way to overcome the silo structure of the MDGs without the 
disadvantages of a composite index. In particular, it would not cause any 
additional costs and is likely to even defuse negotiations as its non-sectoral 
approach counteracts lobbying and petty sovereignty.
6 Conclusions
One of the main weaknesses of the MDGs is their sectoral approach – often 
referred to as silo structure – as it disregards all synergies between the 
single goals. If these synergies were accounted for by addressing goals (and 
targets) simultaneously rather than separately, the process of achieving them 
might be accelerated. This chapter suggested two different ways of how a 
future development agenda might overcome this weakness.
For once, a composite index could be utilised that is composed of the 
indicators of the future goal framework – whatever they may look like. 
The only condition is that the respective index is correlation-sensitive. This 
approach, however, causes high costs and is likely to hamper the negotiations 
of the post-2015 agenda by fuelling lobbying and petty sovereignty.
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Second, future goals could be clustered according to the three main 
transition phases of human life – childhood wellbeing, youth transition, 
and retirement – as well as gender. Such a human-centred approach would 
address related goals (and targets) simultaneously without additional costs 
and is even likely to defuse negotiations as it would hamper lobbying and 
petty sovereignty.
Appendix
Figure 1: The German Correlation Sensitive Poverty Index (GCSPI)
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GSOEP (German Socio-economic 
Panel) data from 2010
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Risks and side-effects of global frameworks: what lessons 
for the post-2015 agenda?
Thomas Fues
1 Introduction
Much enthusiasm and excitement has already been generated around the 
ongoing efforts to create a post-2015 agenda for global development at the 
United Nations (UN). A wide range of actors – among them international 
organisations, national governments, civil society and think-tanks – have 
already begun to direct their attention and resources towards the multi-
level process, reaching from meetings of grassroots organisations in Africa 
to the UN General Assembly. While all this engagement is well-founded 
and important in building up transnational discourses on key issues of 
global concern, it is worthwhile to take a step back and to reflect on the 
risks and side-effects of global frameworks. I do this not from a position of 
questioning the usefulness of a yet-to-be-determined post-2015 framework 
but rather with the intent of identifying possible obstacles and pitfalls of 
getting there. Avoiding these, where possible, and otherwise managing them 
wisely will increase the likelihood of success and prevent the post-2015 
dynamic from getting “stuck in the process” (Rippin 2013, 1).
Three interrelated questions stand out as major threats for a meaningful post-
2015 agreement. The first risk relates to content and scope of the agenda. Will 
it be framed as a conventional programme of official development assistance 
(ODA) for low-income countries or will Post-2015 stand for the ambitious 
goal of promoting universal transformation? The second issue concerns the 
interplay of international commitments and domestic implementation. Will 
Post-2015 rely on a top-down definition of global targets with disputable 
impact on national priorities or will the concept rather use bottom-up efforts 
as building blocks?
The final question refers to power games and consensus-building in the 
international system. The post-2015 agenda will only come about as a result 
of intergovernmental negotiations at the United Nations. However, the 
persistence of the historical North-South divide in the world organisation 
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(the West against G77 and China) has for a long time produced nothing but 
gridlock on any matter of substance (Hale / Held / Young 2013; Mazower 
2012). Thus, the critical decision in the year 2015 will be: Can industrial 
countries, rising powers and other developing nations rise above past 
acrimony and find common ground towards a universal strategy on global 
challenges? This text tries to shed some light on such risks and formulates 
policy recommendations for a successful conclusion of the post-2015 
process.
2 ODA agenda or global transformation?
In a landmark decision, the United Nations in September 2013 decided to 
merge two parallel processes: the efforts on the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) and the search for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
by the open working group of the General Assembly, established after the 
Rio+20 conference 2012 in Brazil. All member states committed to “a 
single framework and set of Goals – universal in nature and applicable to 
all countries” (UN 2013b, 3) that will be voted on in 2015.
Despite this remarkable consensus, divergences persist about the deeper 
meaning of Post-2015. Many voices, particularly from the developing 
world, still see the framework as a continuation of the MDG agenda, thus 
embedding the conversation, at least implicitly, in an ODA context. In 
contrast, the opposing camp aims for structural transformation, applying to 
all countries.
One aim of emphasising the ‘aid narrative’ of Post-2015 is to urge traditional 
donors to provide (additional) transfers to the South. Low-income countries 
in particular would prefer to maintain the present MDG approach which 
seems to safeguard inflows of external resources. Middle-income countries 
also favour the ODA approach but are worried about being cut off by 
traditional donors. Understandably, their intent is to expand the range of 
beneficiaries in the implementation of the post-2015 agenda beyond the 
low-income category.
Rising powers like India, China and Brazil which have become important 
providers of development finance in recent years are more than happy to 
keep the pressure on the West and are inclined to avoid specific commitments 
for international transfers (Chaturvedi / Fues / Sidiropoulos 2012). As one 
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example, take the recent statement of China on post-2015: It aptly addresses a 
wide range of global challenges, from poverty eradication, inclusive growth, 
and ecological conservation to international trade and the reform of global 
economic governance (GoC 2013). The position paper also impresses with a 
candid assessment of advances and deficiencies in sustainable development 
at home but does not spell out specific contributions towards low-income 
countries and the provision of global public goods (Ye / Fues 2014).
The (implicit) ODA orientation of Post-2015 is advanced by the key role of 
the United Nations as convener. With the exception of peace and security, 
the United Nations is commonly seen as an institution concerned with 
North-South cooperation since global economic governance takes place in 
other forums, like the Bretton Woods organisations and the G20. A telling 
example of the UN-ODA nexus is the evolution of the MDG concept itself. 
While the Millennium Declaration of the year 2000, from which the goals 
were derived, addresses a wide range of global challenges, the MDG agenda 
has been broadly perceived as a framework for traditional aid (Rippin 2013).
Contrary to the narrow anti-poverty connotation, many voices, particularly 
from the global North but also from the United Nations (UN 2013a; UNHLP 
2013; SDSN 2013), see Post-2015 as a roadmap for global sustainability. The 
emphasis here lies on the universality of goals, meaning that all countries 
would need to adjust domestic policies according to global requirements. 
Proponents of this view share the urgency of poverty eradication but they 
want to embed the goal in a much more ambitious strategy of global reach 
which simultaneously addresses the environmental, social and economic 
dimensions of sustainable development.
Real action for a transformative, universal, post-2015 agenda will not come 
easily, despite broad rhetorical support. With (re-)nationalisation on the 
rise, rejection of outside advice has become more pronounced. Imagine the 
reaction of the German public if national policy space were to be restricted 
by post-2015 standards, for example in education and energy. The general 
public would not be amused about targets which require promotion of 
educational opportunities for people with a migratory history. In the energy 
field, a post-2015 agenda might advocate the expansion of nuclear energy in 
support of global climate policies, contrary to Germany’s explicit decision 
to completely switch it off by the year 2022.
The official position of Germany exemplifies the general ambivalence (not 
only in the industrial world) towards the domestic implications of structural 
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transformation. While its recent statement supports the universal framing 
of post-2015, the German government neglects to identify any concrete 
goal to be achieved at home (GoG 2014). Postulating global adjustment 
without specifying complementary policies at home can hardly generate 
trust and credibility within the international community. In a similar 
style, the European Commission proposes a comprehensive template for 
intergovernmental negotiations, albeit without naming its own priorities and 
funding possibilities (EC 2014).
Understanding Post-2015 as a script mainly relevant to developing countries 
and ODA does not do justice to the severity and urgency of global systemic 
risks. If Post-2015 is meant to strengthen the provision of global public goods 
it must be conceived as a universal programme for structural transformation 
towards sustainability. But there is not only the danger of downgrading 
Post-2015 to an aid programme which may bring about failure; similarly 
important is the need to avoid a top-down approach of global goals and 
targets without commensurate commitment for implementation at the 
national level.
3 Facing the implementation gap: top-down or  
bottom-up?
International agreements often suffer from the fact that governments adopt 
high-flying global goals without serious political will for implementation at 
home. The mismatch between global pronouncements and national action 
is a built-in feature of consensus-building at the United Nations since it is 
easy to subscribe to lofty ideals for the world with a caveat of unrestricted 
sovereignty in policy formulation at the national level. Swayed by conference 
dynamics where nobody wants to be identified as a spoiler, governments 
often accept pro-forma consensus even if they (silently) disagree. This holds 
true for legally binding conventions, for example in the field of international 
human rights law, but applies even more so to non-binding resolutions. Thus, 
global frameworks engendered by intergovernmental procedures may look 
impressive on paper but often do not trigger subsequent efforts by member 
states or international organisations.
Usually, the links between global targets and national efforts are not specified 
in international agreements, leaving it up to the individual country how to 
unilaterally determine its contributions towards collective problem-solving. 
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In particular, global goals like the MDGs cannot be treated as uniform 
national standards since this would not take into account different baselines 
and implementing conditions (Vandemoortele 2012). Even in a multi-
stakeholder world with influential non-state, non-executive actors, there is 
no escaping from the fact that adequate provision of global public goods 
to a large extent depends on the contributions of nation states, designed 
and delivered by the respective government at home and in international 
cooperation.
Recognising the danger of an excessive focus on technocratic target-setting 
from the top, a transnational alliance of civil society organisations suggests 
a multi-dimensional procedure for Post-2015. In a first step, a political 
umbrella declaration by the General Assembly should spell out universal 
principles and norms (Reflection Group 2013). Then, absolute goals should 
be defined for important global public goods, e.g. climate stability and 
human rights. Finally, a differentiation at the regional, national and local 
level would take into account specific conditions and respective capacities. 
In a similar approach, the OECD (2013a) speaks out for a small number 
of high-profile goals of global reach which would be complemented by a 
more detailed set of county-specific targets and indicators (‘global light 
and country-focused’, to use a buzzword from the post-Busan Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation).
Strengthening the focus on national implementation comes as a lesson 
learned from previous experiences, for example the global programmes 
designed at world conferences of the 1990s (Schechter 2001). All too 
often, ambitious global targets were missed due to inadequate action on the 
ground. However, this strategic shift raises pertinent questions which need 
to be addressed in the post-2015 framework: Who would be in a position to 
objectively and legitimately determine country-level objectives, considering 
the diversity and variance of local factors as well as the diverging interests of 
stakeholder groups? Who would be charged with monitoring and evaluation? 
Finally, how could governments and other involved actors secure adequate 
funding from domestic and external sources?
The crucial relevance of international cooperation for the post-2015 agenda 
is highlighted in an innovative approach by Kaul (2013) which radically 
rejects top-down programmes. Instead of agreeing on global objectives and 
then hoping that member states will deliver, she advocates a bottom-up 
process which centres on the contributions of individual countries to 
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problem-solving in two dimensions: a) global solidarity, i.e. transfers to low-
income countries, and b) provision of global public goods: “If approached 
in this way, the Post-2015 Agenda would primarily be an agenda of 
commitments to international cooperation” (Kaul 2013, 3). National efforts 
would be subject to a transparent accountability procedure which regularly 
assesses and documents the resources provided by national governments to 
other governments and to multilateral organisations. Aspects of domestic 
implementation are not considered in her concept.
The elegance of Kaul’s model lies in a drastic reduction of parameters 
relevant for the post-2015 framework. The exclusive focus on international 
transfers safeguards national autonomy and policy space. While the concept 
deserves political backing, certain weaknesses need to be resolved. First, 
the post-2015 agenda designed on this basis would not guarantee that 
domestic efforts add up to the desired and necessary level of global action 
and outcome. To provide an example for this from the climate field: Low- 
and middle-income countries could receive substantial assistance from 
outside sources to successfully shift their economies towards low-carbon 
trajectories. Still, their efforts together with possible emission reductions 
in high-income countries might not achieve the global volume required for 
climate stability.
Second, governments would need to establish an impartial institutional 
mechanism which could monitor and coordinate cross-border resource 
flows, ensuring that beneficiary countries and international organisations 
receive adequate external support. The Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation established after the 2011 Busan conference 
on aid effectiveness would like to serve in this function (OECD 2013a). 
However, important developing countries like India and China are 
withholding their political support to this new stand-alone organisation and 
would prefer to delegate the task to the United Nations. At this stage, it 
seems unlikely that member states could quickly find an agreement on the 
institutional framework for international transfers.
The decisive role of the national and sub-national level for post-2015 
underlines the importance of ‘means of implementation’, meaning 
knowledge, administrative capacities, skills, funding, technology and other 
resources which determine the effectiveness of policies and programmes. 
Many low- and middle-income countries expect significant external 
assistance, complementing resources mobilised at home. As discussed in 
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the next section, burden-sharing for international transfers and the provision 
of global public goods is a key parameter for consensus-building in the 
General Assembly. Industrialised countries, rising powers, and other middle-
income countries will need to identify a universally accepted formula which 
determines the allocation of funding obligations among nation states.
4 How to overcome multilateral gridlock?
The political authority mandated to decide on a post-2015 framework is 
the General Assembly of the United Nations where all member states cast 
their votes on the basis of sovereign equality (‘one country – one vote’). 
While consensus is not a formal prerequisite of UN decision-making, it is 
generally accepted that a global agenda depends on the support of (almost) 
all countries in order to be considered a legitimate roadmap for the future. 
Arriving at a universally endorsed agreement of substance is not an easy 
feat, since decision-making at the United Nations is still shaped by historical 
fault lines which pit industrial countries, basically the Western camp, against 
a united front of developing countries, organised as G77 and China.
So far, developing countries continue to pledge their allegiance to the G77 as 
collective representation of interests despite growing economic disparities 
within the group (Wade 2013). However, rising powers such as India, China 
and Brazil are finding themselves in an uncomfortable position. While 
they are getting increasingly involved in policy coordination with leading 
industrial countries, for example in the G20, North-South polarisation at 
the United Nations forces them to align with the developing world at large. 
In the context of post-2015 negotiations, two contentious issues are to be 
resolved: First, member states must decide on the scope of the agenda: 
MDG+ for developing countries or universal sustainability goals? Whatever 
the answer on this issue is, the second conflict centres on the scale and 
distribution of resources to be mobilised by the international community. 
Clearly, the volume of external flows will be smaller for the MDG+ option 
that mostly focuses on social progress in low-income countries. In contrast, 
the sustainability trajectory will require massive investments for structural 
transformation in all countries.
Despite the landmark decision of the General Assembly in 2013 in favour 
of integrating MDGs and SDGs, the details of the post-2015 framework 
still need to be worked out. European countries favour a comprehensive 
Thomas Fues
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)278
concept of sustainable development (EC 2014) while developing countries 
generally speak out for an MDG-based approach mainly concerned with 
poverty eradication. As far as they have taken sides in the debate, rising 
powers like India and China seem to emphasise the MDG+ orientation 
(GoI 2013; GoC 2013). UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (UN 2013a) 
and the High-Level Panel established by him (UNHLP 2013) support an 
integrative sustainability framework. It remains to be seen what influence 
such statements can exert on the process since member states are known to 
reject advice from the United Nations Secretariat, jealously guarding their 
exclusive authority in decision-making.
With regard to resource mobilisation for Post-2105, prospects for consensus-
building also look dim. ODA from traditional donors is in decline (OECD 
2013b). The uncertain economic outlook in many industrial countries gives 
little reason for hope that the negative trend might be reversed in the near 
future. Rising powers which have increasingly become active as providers of 
South-South development cooperation will experience increased pressure 
from two sides in the post-2015 debate. Referring to unprecedented 
prosperity and impressive reserve holdings, traditional donors will openly 
demand that Southern providers make available substantial resources for 
developing countries and international organisations. The expectations of 
low-income countries towards Southern providers will point in the same 
direction while they may be less confrontational in public.
The line of defence by rising powers is unequivocal. Governments emphasise 
their status as developing countries and refer to poverty challenges at home. 
South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma (2013), supported this line of reasoning 
at the 2013 special event of the UN General Assembly on post-2015: “The 
tendency to attempt to delegate some of these historical responsibilities [of 
Western countries (the author)] to new emerging economies in the South 
is unacceptable.” In their rejection of funding obligations, governments 
from the South regularly cite the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities (CBDR)’, dating back to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. CBDR 
has now become a common term in post-2015 and global development 
debates (Besharati 2013).
In global climate negotiations, CBDR has a well-defined meaning 
by excluding developing countries from the obligation for emission 
reductions in the Kyoto Protocol, though this principle is being increasingly 
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challenged. In contrast, the global development discourse so far uses CBDR 
as an abstract standard which lacks practical application. Some voices in 
the South have begun to give operational meaning to the norm. Gerardo 
Bracho, the Mexican representative at the 2011 Busan aid effectiveness 
conference, provides a specific example of the possible differentiation 
between traditional donors and Southern providers: “[I]t will be difficult 
for us to untie the aid as DAC donors, for example … We are not prepared 
to give 0.7 [per cent] of our national income as aid but we are prepared to 
scale up” (Chatham House 2012, 7).
In a similar vein, academic voices from China, such as the renowned liberal 
scholar of international relations, Wang Yizhou of Peking University, 
advocate a stronger role of the country in assuming international 
responsibilities: “According to UN standards, industrialised economies and 
emerging powers should dedicate an equivalent of 0.7 percent of their GDP 
to international aid and development” (Wang 2012, 110). And an influential 
Chinese think-tank, the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, argues: 
“Centering on the making and implementing the post-2015 renewed global 
partnership for development, China will provide more material public 
goods” (SIIS 2013, ii). While traditional donors may be unhappy with the 
limited scope and present low level of realisation, they should acknowledge 
the fact that the notion of international responsibility is being increasingly 
accepted in the South.
Consensus-building on the two major points of contention, namely thematic 
scope and burden-sharing, will not depend on industrial countries and 
rising powers alone. Developing countries can exert considerable influence. 
Particularly low-income countries in obvious need of external transfers 
command moral resources which they can utilise by presenting their case to 
world opinion. In addition, civil society organisations from North and South 
can impact decisions at the United Nations through lobbying activities 
either at home or during intergovernmental negotiations. In some cases, 
their representatives directly participate in the official process as members 
of national delegations. Considering the high degree of antagonism between 
industrial and developing countries in the General Assembly, it is completely 
open, at this stage, whether the post-2015 process can generate any results 
beyond empty rhetoric and political symbolism.
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5 Conclusions
The outcome of post-2015 dynamics will be determined by the political 
will of member states to address the critical issues raised above. Genuine 
success of the intergovernmental negotiations will come about when 
governments converge on the following four points: First, they should 
define comprehensive sustainability goals of universal reach, providing 
general signposts for transformative change to all countries. Second, the 
post-2015 agenda should adopt a ‘global light, country-focused’ approach 
which centres on the contributions of individual countries to low-income 
countries and to the provision of global public goods. Third, member 
states must break the political gridlock in the General Assembly and find 
common ground for collective problem-solving. In order to get to this point, 
industrial countries will need to lead by example with regard to domestic 
structural transformation and international transfers. In parallel, rising 
powers and other middle-income countries should not shy away from their 
responsibilities on the basis of fair burden-sharing.
Finally, the design of broadly accepted institutional innovations will be 
a prerequisite to consensus-building and effective implementation. Two 
concerns stand out in this regard: Member states should mandate an 
organisation to coordinate and monitor the enhanced volume of global 
resource transfers. In addition, the long-term impact of post-2015 will 
depend on effective and legitimate mechanisms for mutual accountability 
and peer review, ensuring that member states stand by their commitments. 
Both functions could be fulfilled by the post-Busan Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation if it can muster universal acceptance. 
Alternatively, the Development Cooperation Forum could be mandated 
if support structures at the United Nations Secretariat are properly 
strengthened.
A final point needs to be made: Member states should not shy away from 
making decisions on Post-2015 even if a small number of countries dissent. 
A remarkable departure from the consensus rule which often blocks 
substantive agreements at the United Nations occurred at the Cancun climate 
conference in 2011 when the Mexican chair overruled the sole opposing 
voice from Bolivia in adopting the outcome document (Sterk et al. 2011).
With intergovernmental negotiations in flux, the public can only hope 
that a new consciousness of the shared destiny of humankind in a highly 
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borderless, interconnected and polycentric world will eventually induce 
member states to opt for ‘smart sovereignty’(Kaul 2013), rather than 
becoming stuck in ideology and short-term, egoistical advantage. The 
significance of a meaningful outcome goes beyond the post-2015 process 
as such. A consensus would be a breakthrough in overcoming the current 
gridlock of global governance (Hale / Held / Young 2013), while failure 
would deepen political divisions in the international community at large.
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Towards a fair and balanced set of Sustainable  
Development Goals (SDGs)
Hongyuan Yu 
Sustainable development is a model of development that gives equal weight 
to the economic, social and environmental dimensions of progress. The 
step in turning sustainable development into Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG) is to fully acknowledge significant economic, social and 
environmental values in quantitative terms. A set of new Sustainable 
Development Goals will be defined in a way that equally reflects the three 
pillars of sustainable development and that maximises the interdependence 
of developed and developing countries.
1  The development of Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs)
The internationally accepted definition of sustainable development comes 
from the report of the United Nations World Commission on Environment 
and Development in their report “Our common future” of 1987, namely 
such development that meets the needs of the present generation without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
Through constant evolution and development over the years, the idea of 
sustainable development has now become the long-term guideline for 
global development. In terms of the content, it is related to the integration of 
sustainable economy, ecology and society. Sustainable development requires 
people to focus on economic efficiency and ecological harmony, to pursue 
social justice, and ultimately to achieve comprehensive human development. 
Though it has originated from environmental issues, the concept has gone 
beyond environmental protection to evolve as a development theory that 
is to guide mankind through the 21st century. Beginning with the UN 
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, political leaders brought 
sustainable development issues to the agenda of international politics. This 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, 
Sweden, in June 1972, marked the emergence of sustainable development 
as a UN topic. The United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992 – known as 
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the Earth Summit – marked a turning point in the history of international 
sustainable development cooperation. There the leaders embraced the 
concept of sustainable development and of common but differentiated 
responsibilities among rich and poor nations concerning the protection of 
global resources. The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development 
in Johannesburg, South Africa, encouraged the creation of more informal 
partnerships among governments, agencies, businesses and citizen groups 
to take action on existing promises related to sustainable development.
The 2012 Rio+20 Conference encouraged enhanced partnerships between 
governmental and non-governmental agencies for the achievement of 
sustainable development at all levels. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 
high-level global sustainability panel, appointed in the lead-up to the 
Rio+20 summit in June 2012, had issued a report recommending that the 
world adopt a set of Sustainable Development Goals. The 2012 Rio+20 
Conference agreed to strengthen the process of defining a new set of global 
goals – the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – which may form 
a part of or replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); most 
importantly, the SDGs were to form a part of a global development agenda 
post-2015 (Pretorius 2012).
2 The coordination between South and North
All states in the world should engage in international efforts to address 
the problem of global environmental pollution. Since no country, by 
itself, would be able to substantially resolve the environmental problems, 
international institutions and norms for the international environmental 
system are needed to overcome the collective action problem that has been 
apparent since the early 1970s with the Stockholm Conference. The harm 
done by environmental disasters also adds a potential threat to human 
existence. It is so serious in nature and so far-reaching in influence that it 
has transcended national boundaries, crossed oceans and expanded to the 
whole world. As these consequences became clearer, governments started 
to work unilaterally and in concert to adapt to and – much less robustly 
– mitigate environmental problems and build a resilient environmental 
system. International environmental issues have attracted wide interest in 
the context of international relations.
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Most important of all, poverty eradication is not only the first priority of the 
MDGs but also the primary objective and implementation basis of SDGs. 
Therefore, developing countries argued that the Rio+20 summit should 
clearly put forward specific standards for sustainable development. Many 
developing countries in the process of industrialisation follow the economic 
model of Western countries from the late eighteenth century which is growth-
oriented, unsustainable and resource-constrained. The developing countries 
today face the crucial need to promote development while at the same time 
protecting the environment and contributing to global economic growth. As 
the former UN Under-Secretary-General of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Sha Zukang remarked, the implementation of agreed commitments and 
obligations should be the first priority (Granit et al. 2012). In the current 
economic situation, developed countries are reluctant to provide financial 
support, technology transfer and capacity building to developing countries.
The SDGs are of common interest to all human beings and, therefore, 
the international community should take effective measures and create 
opportunities for global cooperation. Though there are a great deal of 
conflicts and disputes between developing and developed countries in 
how to balance economic growth and environmental protection, there is 
nonetheless pressure on developed and developing countries to construct an 
international environmental system in order to prevent ecological disasters 
collectively. Developing countries generally require developed countries 
to strengthen their political will, take the lead in action to change their 
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and follow the green 
road of development. Developing countries also strongly urge developed 
countries to maintain funding levels, technology transfer and capacity 
building for developing countries, and play a greater role in helping 
developing countries to achieve the transition towards green and sustainable 
development. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) 
and the Rio+20 Outcome Document both state that the industrial world 
should provide technical and financial assistance to developing countries.
International practices of observing the SDGs should involve three 
levels: First, the national survival level; and second, the economic level. 
One’s economy, society and environment interact with each other. For 
example, rapid population growth leads to social pressure; access to any 
environmental resources in order to develop economic activities will result 
in pressure on the environment. The third level is the political one. One must 
not interfere in other countries’ sovereignty or threaten their economies 
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due to environmental issues. An equal and inclusive society must address 
economic growth, social development and environmental issues through a 
unified strategy and policy. 
Although the current actors of sustainable development governance have 
been diverse, they can be divided into three sectors: The first includes the 
United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, the United Nations Environment Programme, the former United 
Nations Commission on Sustainable Development and the United Nations 
Development Programme, etc. The second sector comprises sovereign 
states. The third level, in turn, comprises all major groups of civil society, 
including non-governmental organisations, the private sector, the media, 
the scientific community, all of which are important players in the global 
governance of sustainable development.
3 The principles of Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs)
3.1  Fairness 
Sustainable development emphasises that development should be pursued 
in two ways: The first is fairness within one generation which also, secondly, 
means intragenerational equity. Sustainable development should meet the 
basic needs of all people and provide the opportunities to have better living 
standards. The reality of the world today is that some are rich and one-
fifth of the whole world is poor. Developed countries account for 26 % 
of the global population but their consumption takes up 80 % of global 
energy, steel and paper, etc. Sustainable development cannot be achieved 
in a world of wealth disparities and polarisation. Therefore, we should build 
a world which provides equitable allocation and equitable development 
rights. Eliminating poverty should be considered as a special priority in the 
process of sustainable development. The second way is intergenerational 
equity: We have realised that the natural resources we rely on are limited. 
One generation should not destroy future generations’ natural resources and 
environment to satisfy their own development and needs.
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3.2 Sustainability 
The core idea of sustainability is that economic and social development 
cannot exceed the carrying capacity of natural resources and the ecological 
environment. This means that sustainable development requires not only 
justice between generations but must also build on a fair arrangement 
between man and nature. Resources and the environment are the basis for 
human survival and development. Without resources and the environment, 
human beings cannot survive and develop. Sustainable development should 
be based on the protection of the earth’s natural systems. Because of this, 
development must be limited to some extent. We must give full consideration 
to finite natural resources. And we must not damage the earth’s atmosphere, 
water, soil and biological and other natural systems as the prerequisite for 
development. In other words, human beings need to adjust their way of life 
and determine their own consumption standards, but – in accordance with 
the sustainable principle – not produce and consume excessively. When the 
material basis of human survival is damaged, there can be no development 
at all.
3.3 Common but differentiated responsibilities
The principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ is the global 
consensus in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). This principle means that the industrialised, 
wealthy countries of the world bear responsibility for global warming because 
of their historic emissions of greenhouse gases for more than three hundred 
years. Furthermore, the developed countries’ per capita emissions remain 
far above those of developing countries, meaning that their responsibility 
continues. Due to differences in history, culture and level of development, 
the specific objectives, policies and implementation steps of sustainable 
development cannot be the same for both groups of countries. However, as 
the goal of global development, the fairness principle and the sustainability 
principles should be observed by all. To achieve SDGs, we must recognise 
that complex interdependencies exist and take joint action. Fundamentally 
speaking, the implementation of sustainable development means promoting 
the harmony between you and me, man and nature. If everyone abides by the 
common principles and builds relationships of mutual benefit between you 
and me, man and nature, sustainable development can be achieved.
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4 Green economy and the differences between  
North and South
The green economy is at the core of the SDGs and aims to promote 
economic recovery and create jobs. The overall goal is to contribute to the 
reform of multilateral cooperation and the state, to help to eliminate the 
social, economic and environmental effects of the financial crisis, as well 
as to solve the problems that have long threatened society such as global 
warming, food, fuel, water crises and other issues.
Countries have different definitions of a green economy. For the post-
industrial countries, domestic environmental problems have been basically 
solved: people enjoy a high standard of living and a good ecological 
environment. Their understanding of a green economy focuses on global 
climate change and other global environmental problems. It also focuses on 
the impact of global environmental change on domestic conditions and on 
the world economy. It pays close attention to the international institutional 
framework that could address global environment problems and build 
cooperative action among nation-states. In developing countries, the 
fragile ecological environment is more susceptible to the effects of global 
environmental change, as they also face a series of domestic environmental 
problems such as ecological deterioration, environmental pollution and 
unsafe drinking water and garbage disposal. Therefore, the meaning of a 
green economy for the developing countries pays more attention to domestic 
economic development, social progress and environmental protection. 
But it is also of high relevance for the developing countries to manage 
domestic natural resources and environmental protection and to deal with 
climate change. The developing countries should closely combine the two 
focal areas, as addressing the two dimensions of environmental problems 
simultaneously can produce synergies.
Till now, the international community has not yet formed a unified and 
authoritative definition of a green economy. Often research efforts are 
separated, dealing with economic growth on the one hand or environmental 
protection on the other. However, both developed countries and developing 
countries have realised that developing a green economy and achieving 
low carbon development is the fundamental way to solve the problems of 
natural resources and the environment. At present, the generally accepted 
conception a green economy is as follows: It is a kind of coordination pattern 
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of resource utilisation, environmental protection and sustainable economic 
development which safeguards the eco-systems relevant for human survival 
and promotes the development of human societies.
Developing countries stress that the concept of a green economy is one of 
the important means to achieve sustainable development. However, this 
conception cannot replace the idea of sustainable development; instead 
it must be placed within the framework of sustainable development and 
poverty eradication. Developing a green economy should comply with the 
basic principles of the “Plan of implementation of the world summit on 
sustainable development” adopted by the Johannesburg Summit in 2012, 
with poverty eradication as its main target. Implementing the concept of a 
green economy must not be used to erect barriers to trade and technology 
transfer, and to weaken the position of the developing countries. Countries 
at different stages of development should be allowed to choose their own 
suitable green path of economic development. Policy space to develop every 
country’s own path of development and sovereignty over natural resources 
should be ensured. The other requirements are as follows: to reform the 
global financial system and to establish a new economic order; to oppose 
trade protectionism; to make poverty eradication a priority. Developed 
countries need to recognise their responsibility to help developing countries 
develop a green economy, rather than imposing it as a condition of trade and 
foreign aid. The developing countries are opposed to the developed countries 
promising grants, loans and debt relief with additional restrictions. Finally, 
the developed countries should establish a new and predictable framework 
of cooperation which increases financial support for developing countries.
Hongyuan Yu
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Post-2015: why is the water-energy-land nexus important 
for the future development agenda?
Clara Brandi / Carmen Richerzhagen / Katharina Stepping
Water, land and energy will play an important role in the post-2015 agenda. 
Their contribution towards poverty alleviation and sustainable development 
has been emphasized in all different post-2015 work streams and in the Open 
Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG-SDGs). They will 
likely be regarded in a post-2015 agenda. However, the inclusion of goals 
related to water, energy and land in a post-2015 regime is important, but not 
enough, if they remain isolated. The new development agenda should mirror 
the linkages among them, i.e. the “water-energy-land nexus”. The nexus 
concept aims at simultaneously transforming the management of water, 
energy and land in order to satisfy the growing demand for these resources, 
while operating within environmental limits. The better management is 
reached by increasing efficiency, reducing trade-offs, building synergies 
and improving governance across sectors. The concept was launched at the 
Bonn 2011 Nexus Conference (see Hoff 2011) and is in the focus of the 
European Report on Development 2011–2012 (European Union 2012).
1 Poverty and the water-energy-land nexus
Water, energy resources and land provide many life-supporting functions, 
e.g. climate stabilisation and regulation of the hydrological cycle, and are 
key resources to satisfy basic human needs and allow for development. 
However, 780 million people lack access to safe water (World Health 
Organization / The United Nations Children’s Fund 2012), about 1.2 billion 
people have no access to electricity (Sustainable Energy for All 2013), 
and for most of the world’s poor in rural areas, arable land is their main 
source of livelihood (World Bank 2013). Access to these resources and 
their sustainable management are the basis for inclusive and sustainable 
development as well as poverty reduction. Yet, the demand for food, water 
and energy is expected to rise by 30–40 per cent by 2030 (European Union 
2012). 
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Reliable access to water and, at minimum, acceptable levels of quality, 
availability and affordability of water are indispensable in the fight against 
poverty. Poor people are most vulnerable to underprovision of water and 
damages due to floods, as they lack the financial means to invest in reliable 
infrastructure. Access to clean drinking water allows for the use of water in 
personal hygiene and household chores. Access to sustainable sources of 
clean, reliable and affordable energy is also fully recognised as being crucial 
to poverty reduction and economic development. Poverty reduction and 
sustainable land use are also closely interlinked because access to land and 
the conservation of ecosystems relevant for food production are essential to 
fight hunger and undernourishment. For instance, in almost every second 
child death, malnutrition is the underlying contributing factor (World Health 
Organization 2013).
The water, energy and agricultural sectors are interlinked: policies affecting 
one resource often include negative externalities for other resources – be 
they in a local, national, regional or global context. Sector policies aiming 
at security in one sector have repercussions on resources in other sectors 
Figure 1: The water-energy-land nexus
Source: Adopted from European Union (2012)
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and can compromise other objectives. Cultivating crops to produce biofuels 
for energy security consumes water and land resources, thereby competing 
with food production and compromising food security. Expanding arable 
land and intensifying agriculture to improve food security compromise 
the protection of forests and increase the pressure on land. Water supplies 
for households, industry and agriculture rely on electricity, but, in turn, 
electricity generation (e.g. hydropower) requires considerable amounts of 
land and water.
Water, land and resources that fuel the energy system (e.g. fossil fuels, 
timber) are already under pressure and being challenged by human-induced 
impacts (e.g. land degradation and desertification, climate change, water 
and nutrient depletion) due to population growth, increasing standards of 
living, changing diets and consumption patterns, and urbanisation. Pressure 
increases if policies do not take into account this interrelatedness and can 
result in scarcity, environmental degradation and/or the destruction of 
livelihoods.
2 Towards the post-2015 agenda
2015 will be a pivotal year and set the course for environmental and 
development policy until 2025 or 2030. A process to formulate new 
development goals in 2015 to succeed the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) has been set up in the context of the United Nations (UN). Initially, 
this process has been split into two strands. The first strand ties in with the 
MDGs and focuses on transforming the current development agenda into a 
post-MDG agenda with a view to removing its weaknesses but maintaining 
its strengths. Five work streams (UN Task Team, UN Global Compact, High-
level Panel of Eminent Persons, the Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network and the UN Development Group) were initiated by Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon in order to produce reports and inputs for the Special 
Event on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that took place in 
New York in September 2013 (Rippin 2013). 
The second strand has emerged from Rio+20 and aims at elaborating 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The idea is, first, to broaden 
the focus of the agenda from human to sustainable development and, 
second, to enlarge the scope of objectives from developing countries only 
to all countries. After some struggles with regards to a balanced regional 
Clara Brandi / Carmen Richerzhagen / Katharina Stepping
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)304
representation, in January 2013 a 30-member Open Working Group (OWG) 
of the General Assembly was mandated to prepare a proposal on SDGs for 
consideration by the Assembly in September 2014. Since the group was 
restricted to 30 seats, some countries (e.g. Germany, France and Switzerland 
or China, Indonesia and Kazakhstan) shared a seat. In February 2014 the 
OWG completed its “stock-taking phase” (Evans / Steven 2013). In eight 
sessions, the members of the OWG considered a range of topics (e.g. 
poverty, water, food security, cities, employment, growth, climate change, 
biodiversity etc.). Since March they discussed a proposed list of goals and 
targets given that their report to the GA is due in September 2014.
At the Special Event on the MDGs, the General Assembly decided to pave 
the way for merging the two processes. Originally, the purpose of the event 
was to review the MDGs and decide how to shape a new development agenda 
after 2015 when the MDGs would expire. However, the outcome document 
of the Special Event provides the countries with a short break and states that 
the intergovernmental negotiations on the post-2015 agenda will only start 
in September 2014 when the OWG on the SDGs will have completed its 
task. Until then, further events under the auspices of the General Assembly 
will take place to set the stage for post-2015 in order to keep the process 
on-going by not anticipating any outcomes (Rippin 2013). Merging these 
two processes implies that sustainable development and poverty eradication 
will become overarching goals of the new post-2015 agenda.
3 Water, energy and land in the MDGs and SDGs
Neither water nor energy or land use is explicitly included as one of the 
eight MDGs. Yet, MDG 7, to ensure environmental sustainability, comprises 
a target for water and sanitation – but the target only takes into account 
social but not economic or ecological issues. MDG 7 also includes a 
reference to sustainable land use, energy efficiency and CO2 emissions. The 
target to reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access 
to safe drinking water was achieved in 2010 (United Nations 2013). The 
biodiversity target – to achieve a significant reduction in the rate of loss by 
2010 – was incorporated into MDG 7 in 2002 but could not be met.
Water, energy and land have to be key topics in the new post-2015 agenda. 
The outcome document of Rio+20 underlines the importance of water, 
energy, land and biodiversity as priority areas for SDGs (Rio+20 Conference 
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on Sustainable Development 2012). In the Secretary-General’s initial input 
to the OWG on SDGs, based on a survey of Member States’ views on 
SDGs, food and agriculture (land), water and energy ranked on the top three 
positions. The list of proposed SDGs discussed in the final meetings of the 
OWG contained individual goals on water and energy. Land issues were 
attributed to goals on hunger/agriculture and ecosystems/biodiversity.
Many ongoing initiatives and parallel processes exist in these issue 
areas and need to be considered when defining the new goals. The MDG 
targets for drinking water and sanitation could be renewed with new time 
limits, while at the same time broadening their scope to the economic and 
ecological dimensions. Currently, water is separately discussed in two 
areas in the context of the post-2015 agenda: on the one hand, as an issue 
related to human development (e.g. safe drinking water); on the other hand, 
as an issue related to oceans, fisheries and pollution. This distinction is 
surprising in view of the circulatory nature of this natural resource on the 
global scale. Water pollution may cause health problems at the local level, 
but may simultaneously jeopardise ocean fish stocks at the global level. A 
water-related SDG should aim for a much more integrated approach, e.g. 
on the basis of the concept of Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM), which promotes the coordination of managing water, land and 
related resources while maximising economic and social payoffs without 
compromising ecosystems. In fact, the Stockholm Statement of the 2013 
World Water Week called for a sustainable development goal on water 
as a cross-cutting resource. By the year 2030, a doubling of global water 
productivity, a realisation of the human right to safe drinking water and 
sanitation, and increased resilience to water-related disasters should have 
been achieved. The concept of a human right to sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses 
for everyone also bundles together many crucial aspects (UN Economic and 
Social Council 2002; United Nations General Assembly 2010). 
For energy, the UN Secretary General’s SE4ALL initiative is an 
illustration of what an SDG could look like. The initiative has already 
gathered substantial support. It includes three targets for 2030: universal 
access to modern energy services; doubling the rate of energy-efficiency 
improvements; and doubling the share of renewable energy in the energy 
mix. According to the Global Tracking Report, which was first published in 
2013 and offers country-level data on the current state of these indicators, 
1.2 billion people lack access to electricity, renewable energy accounted for 
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18 percent of the global energy mix in 2010 and that the improvement rate 
of energy efficiency was -1.3 percent between 1990 and 2010 (Sustainable 
Energy for All 2013). The SE4ALL targets encompass the three dimensions 
of sustainable development by considering energy access (social), energy 
efficiency (economic) and use of renewable sources (environmental). All 
in all, the SE4ALL initiative provides a sound basis for energy goals in the 
post-2015 agenda. The Open Working Group included the three SE4ALL 
targets in their Zero Draft that was published in the spring of 2014.
Regarding land use and biodiversity, existing initiatives and agreed targets 
can help to shape a new agenda. The initiative of the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) aims to reduce the rate 
of land degradation in order to achieve land-degradation neutrality. It states 
sustainable land use for all and by all (in agriculture, forestry, energy, 
urbanisation) and includes three targets: zero net land degradation by 
2030; zero net forest degradation by 2030; drought policies and drought 
preparedness implemented in all drought-prone regions / countries by 2020. 
In addition, new biodiversity targets were negotiated in 2010 by the 193 
parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the so-called Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets. For example, by 2020, the rate of loss of all natural 
habitats, including forests, should be at least halved and even brought close 
to zero, and degradation and fragmentation should be significantly reduced. 
By adopting these targets, the parties of the CBD committed themselves to 
an ambitious plan to stop the loss of biodiversity by 2020. 
4 The nexus in the post-2015 agenda
In order to integrate the “water-energy-land-nexus” into the post-2015 
agenda, any proposed list of goals should go beyond silo thinking and needs 
to meet three requirements: 
1. Balancing the social, economic and environmental dimension: the 
integrative character of the new post-2015 agenda could be fulfilled by 
using second-order conditions. For instance, if environmental protection 
as a second-order condition is integrated into an objective that focuses 
on human development, it can be ensured that human development does 
not result in environmental degradation.
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  In the context of water, for instance, dam construction for hydropower 
plants leads to high economic yields, but provokes the loss of biodiversity 
in the flooded area and has huge social impacts if people need to be 
resettled. A target on universal access to energy should be balanced by 
another target promoting clean energies so that the social and economic 
gains of energy access do not come at the expense of the environment. 
Similarly, targets promoting clean energy may lead to an initial increase 
in energy prices – such targets should then be complemented by targets 
that promote access to affordable energy by all. Likewise, the social and 
economic impacts of targets for sustainable land use and biodiversity 
conservation need to be balanced. The SE4ALL initiative illustrates 
these difficulties. On the one hand, the initiative should become the 
basis for a goal on sustainable energy in the post-2015 agenda, as the 
three dimensions of sustainable development are reflected in the targets. 
On the other hand, the targets have not been integrated, such that the 
achievement of one would depend on the other two.
2. Achieving coherence across goals: taking account of the water-energy-
land nexus requires the formulation of coherent goals that allow for an 
integrated perspective across goals. The design of future objectives should 
take into account the multidimensional context full of interdependencies. 
For example, the construction of reservoir-based hydropower plants 
can jeopardise water security and create water scarcity downstream; 
the creation of a reservoir may also conflict with previous land use 
for agriculture. Energy, in turn, must be supplied in ways that do not 
undermine other development goals, for example by increasing climate 
risks, degrading land and using water unsustainably.
  The problem is that energy is a key driver behind a number of critical 
environmental pressures, including greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
(of which energy-related emissions represent roughly 75 per cent of the 
global total) and land and water use and degradation. If expanded further, 
biofuels, biomass and hydropower may appropriate significant shares of 
available land and water resources. Especially the rapid development of 
biofuels has generated considerable debate regarding their sustainability 
and, above all, the so-called food versus fuel competition. The current 
trend towards large-scale acquisitions of agricultural land may imply 
that access to water is also acquired on a large scale – and points to the 
multiple facets of managing the natural resource base in the context of a 
globalised economy. The implementation of the nexus requires policies, 
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institutional arrangements and procedures that are able to take account of 
trade-offs and synergies.
3. Agreeing on universal goals: the goals in the post-2015 agenda should 
be universal, in that they apply to all UN member countries, regardless of 
the economic, political, legal, social and environmental circumstances. 
To identify and specify universal goals, all countries will have to 
commit to this joint global effort – not only developing countries, as 
happened before. Developing countries’ goals on water, energy and land 
should centre on access and sustainable management, whereas goals 
in emerging and industrialised countries should focus on sustainable 
production and consumption issues. Each goal should include a deadline 
specifying the month and year. To formulate such goals, two options 
seem to make sense. First, each goal should describe comprehensively 
the objective and underlying concept and explicitly specify through 
targets the implications for each country or group of countries. Second, 
the goal should be formulated in an abstract way and the formulation 
of targets should be subject to a national pledge-and-review approach, 
wherein pledges are made on a voluntary basis. 
  Although a detailed discussion of the pros and cons of each option is 
beyond the scope of this paper, some points are immediately apparent: 
the first option facilitates accuracy and precision but is politically less 
feasible and makes communication harder. The second option allows for 
conciseness but requires additional explanations. For instance, the goal 
“to have universal access to water by 2030” would be easily understood, 
but the scope and the points of reference for each country or group of 
countries would need to be defined. Furthermore, a pledge-and-review 
approach can help to overcome negotiation hurdles but bears the risk 
of leading to weak targets. This approach is particularly useful in the 
context of goals for resources, for which limits at the global level make 
little sense, as in the case of water accessibility at the local level.
5 The way forward 
The Special Event on the post-2015 agenda in September 2013 paved the way 
to merge the two ongoing processes for working on the post-2015 agenda. 
Already existing processes, such as the SE4ALL initiative or the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets, should be used and linked in order to identify goals that 
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build upon agreed language and reflect consensus among the stakeholders. 
Goals should be designed in such a way that they take into account second-
order conditions related to other dimensions (i.e. sustainable development 
and the water-energy-land nexus), the different levels (global, regional, 
national, local), and are adapted to countries’ diverse states of development 
(high-income, middle-income, low-income). The true challenge is to design 
integrated, consensual objectives that are easily understood, communicable, 
and cut across various sectors, dimensions and periods of time.
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Conceptualising migration in the context of sustainable 
development in a post-2015 framework
Benjamin Schraven / Niels Keijzer
1 Introduction
Although it is difficult to imagine migration without development – or 
development without migration – the political sensitivity surrounding 
restrictions on human mobility has marginalised migration in international 
development policies. Furthermore, migration stands among the most 
politically contentious topics in the United Nations (UN) system. The 
current MDGs reflect an approach to human development that does not 
involve human mobility. In stark contrast, the prominent place of migration 
policy in nation-states’ domestic-policy debates creates a large community 
of migration policy experts and researchers. 
In the past two decades, efforts have been made to unite the two 
communities of practitioners and researchers under the label “Migration 
and Development” (M&D). Although M&D has been discussed biennially 
by dedicated UN General Assembly committees since the 1990s, destination 
countries blocked an international conference on the subject (ICMPD/ 
ECDPM 2013).
However, efforts by the UN Secretary General led to the first High-Level 
Dialogue on Migration and Development (HLD) in 2006. This meeting 
resulted in ongoing dialogue processes within and outside of the United 
Nations system, which gradually facilitated ongoing discussions that fed 
into the second HLD in October 2013. It was hoped that the second HLD 
would help to improve the prospects for international decision-making on 
migration. Building on these efforts, the most recent UN General Assembly 
felt that migration should be “adequately considered” in the formulation of 
a post-2015 agenda on global development. Many UN members, however, 
sent low-level delegations to the HLD, and despite the strong rhetoric 
following the shipwreck tragedies near Lampedusa that same week (see also 
Box 1), participants adopted an unambitious outcome document that lacks 
agreement on concrete actions (UN 2013). A month later, European heads 
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of state rejected the European Commission’s proposals to facilitate legal 
migration and did not want to go further than stating that action “should” 
be taken to prevent the loss of lives at sea, which was heavily criticised by 
several migration and human rights related organisations like Human Rights 
Watch (HWR 2013).
While not agreeing on concrete steps forward, the UN members were willing 
to state the obvious by recognising that human mobility is a key factor 
for human development. Moreover, they agreed that migration should be 
“adequately considered” in the formulation of a post-2015 agenda on global 
development (UN 2013). Although various options for including migration 
in a post-2015 framework are on the table – ranging from stand-alone goals 
to efforts to “mainstream” it throughout the framework – further progress 
necessitates that migration is reflected in a way that respects the sustainable 
development orientation that the General Assembly has called for. This 
paper recapitulates the discussions and analyses which migration related 
issues have the potential to make migration work for more sustainable 
development but have been widely overlooked in the post-2015 related 
discussions so far. 
2 M&D and the post-2015 development agenda
Due to the dominance of issues like brain drain or rural exodus in policy 
and scientific debates at that time, the connotation of migration in the 
global development discourse was rather negative during the 1970s 
and 1980s. Discussions on M&D during the 1990s and 2000s, however, 
have promoted a more positive notion of migration in the international 
development discourse. Yet, policy debates frequently negate these and 
continue to consider migration as a security threat, or regard development 
cooperation as a means to help “avoid” migration. The dominant orientation 
of international policy discussions, moreover, has a strong functionalist bias 
that results in a focus on aspects such as remittances, high-skilled migration 
and brain drain, as well as the contribution of diaspora communities. This 
functionalist bias leads to development policies portraying migration as a 
means to development, as opposed to an act of development itself. This bias 
is accompanied by a lack of consensus on defining key aspects of migration 
policy, for example a lack of consensual definitions of key terms such as 
“migration”, “internal migration” versus “refugees”, as well as ideologically 
predisposed concepts such as “illegal migrants”. This feeds into a larger trend 
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of criminalising migrants. Medium-term demographic trends in Europe and 
other regions, however, point to the benefits of facilitating migration for the 
country of origin, the destination country as well as for the migrant (de Haas 
2012; de Haas 2005; Bakewell 2008).
Box 1: Lampedusa: human tragedies legitimising border control?
Although they involve grave human tragedies, the October 2013 
Lampedusa accidents, in which all in all more than 300 people lost 
their lives while trying to reach the small Italian island, can hardly be 
perceived as isolated incidents. There is evidence that these tragedies are 
directly linked to the EU’s policies of criminalising migration to Europe. 
Oxford University Professor Hein de Haas has compared the European 
policies and actions to a “waterbed” approach, whereby once pressure is 
applied somewhere along its borders, the migrants automatically move 
to another spot. By forcing them to take ever more dangerous sea routes 
from less politically stable destinations, the EU’s policies may in fact be 
directly contributing to the loss of lives they lament. Whereas the Italian 
migration minister called for the EU to move away from this policy by 
decriminalising migrants, European Commission President José Manuel 
Barroso’s Lampedusa response mainly involved referring to the work 
of the European Union’s external border management and cooperation 
agency (Frontex) and stressed the need to strengthen search and rescue 
capacities and boat surveillance systems.
(see also: http://publications.europeintheworld.com/waterbed-effect-
eus-immigration-policy/)
Based on these prospects, some stakeholders argued for including migration 
in a post-2015 framework that is under preparation. In recent discussions, 
several options have emerged as possibilities for doing so. First of all, one 
could envisage a stand-alone goal related to migration with individual targets 
and indicators. Although it would give it the priority it deserves, this option 
seems unlikely, given the fierce competition of other goals and the fact that 
these other goals are less politically contentious. A second option would be 
to reflect separate (sub-)objectives for migrants and migrant populations 
under other goals expressed by clear targets and indicators. This seems 
to be a more feasible option, but it would invite reductionist “shopping” 
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for particular migration aspects and neglect the wider relation between 
migration and development. A third option would be to view migration 
as a key enabler for development more broadly. Such an option views 
international migration as a cross-cutting issue relevant for several aspects 
for development and requires its mainstreaming. Although reflecting that 
migration is relevant to many development factors, it risks to “awaystream” 
it if there are no clear goals and targets designed. A combination of these 
three options would provide for a fourth one: a goal that, similar to the 
current 8th Millennium Development Goal, would commit UN members to 
giving shape to a global partnership on international migration. The history 
of MDG8, however, shows the difficulties of ensuring accountability to such 
a goal and that it alone does not facilitate collective action. (Knoll / Keijzer 
2013).
These options have been raised in discussions about a post-2015 framework 
which, as the General Assembly has agreed, have to be merged with the 
ongoing Open Working Group discussions on Sustainable Development 
Goals. This implies that discussions on migration in relation to a post-
2015 framework on development should be taken forward in a broader 
sustainable development context that also addresses the social, economic 
and environmental dimensions of migration. 
It should be emphasised that the situation of migrants will not be 
meaningfully improved by development projects targeting issues such as 
circular migration, but instead requires concrete progress in international 
legislation facilitating human mobility. This involves facing up to non-ratified 
international conventions as well as dealing with the inequality in human 
mobility that is tied to one’s given nationality or regional background. More 
fundamentally, it relates to confronting widespread negative perceptions 
and misconceptions about migrants in receiving countries as well as the 
tendency of the political class to frequently exploit these for short-term 
gains. 
3 Migration aspects that need to be considered
Regardless of the option chosen to include migration in the post-2015 
development agenda, it should not be reduced to a functionalist view. 
An M&D approach that serves a universal, inclusive and sustainable 
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understanding of development should also consider and address the 
following interrelated aspects:
Migrants’ rights as well as living and working conditions: Reports about 
terrible and life-endangering living and working conditions for South Asian 
migrant workers in Qatar, which among other things build the stadiums for 
the 2022 football world cup, are only the tip of the iceberg. Worldwide, 
many migrants suffer from labour exploitation; insufficient housing 
conditions; low access to public infrastructures, educational facilities and 
social protection; and/ or lacking opportunities for societal and political 
participation (see also IOM 2013). Only a small number of states have 
signed at least one of the three international instruments related to migrant 
workers’ rights that would commit them to do something about this (in 
particular the ‘International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’). States having 
signed at least one of the conventions host merely a third of the total global 
migrant population (Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations 
2013, 34). Furthermore, there are growing manifestations and expressions 
of xenophobia, racism and intolerance against migrants worldwide. Thus, 
an improvement in migrants’ living conditions is also about intensifying 
integration efforts in the destination countries. Work in this area should also 
involve redefining the term “migrant” as there are no generally accepted 
criteria concerning who can be perceived as a migrant and who cannot. 
Internal migration: The global number of migrants moving within the 
borders of their own countries is several times higher than the number of 
international migrants (UNDP 2009). As is the case with international 
migration, internal migrants’ remittances are essential for their families and 
home communities, and their labour is willingly “utilised” in the destination 
areas. But internal migrants also face problems relating to social, economic, 
political and legal marginalisation, and many governments are reluctant to 
address internal migration politically. They should not remain off-radar in a 
post-2015 framework that deals adequately with migration. 
Environmental change and migration: Fears that climate change and 
environmental degradation may create millions upon millions of 
“environmental refugees” and related security and humanitarian concerns 
have turned out to be both inappropriate and baseless. In fact, recent studies 
have come to the conclusion that migration can be an important form of 
adaptation to processes of environmental change (Foresight 2011; Schraven 
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2012). But so far, migration has hardly been an issue in international 
and national adaptation policies. Rather, the times that it has featured in 
discussions on climate change, the defined goal has been to reduce or 
“prevent” migration via (other) adaptation measures (Martin 2010).
Low-skilled migration: Whereas many receiving countries welcome highly 
skilled professionals – as some of their economic sectors are threatened 
by a (future) shortage of skilled labour – the immigration of low-skilled 
workers is usually met with refusal. However, studies confirm that more 
low-skilled migration from developing to developed countries or emerging 
economies would not only be beneficial for the sending countries (e.g. via 
higher remittances to poor households or an increase in unskilled wages due 
to the decreasing supply); the receiving countries can also benefit, as labour 
shortages likewise appear in low-skilled job sectors. Finally, facilitating 
low-skilled migration would be a way of mitigating the human security risks 
of irregular migration as well as to some extent reducing the large funds 
now spent on border control (ICMPD / ECDPM 2013).
Circular migration: Circular migration is said to have the potential to create 
“triple-win situations” since: 1) destination areas and sectors benefit, as 
the required labour force can be recruited for a desired period of time, 2) 
sending areas / countries benefit via remittances and the acquired skills and 
knowledge of the migrants and 3) the migrants themselves benefit from 
the income and experiences gained abroad. Yet, immigration regulations of 
many receiving countries virtually prevent circular migration, as they only 
allow temporary (one-time) stays instead of multiple stays. Because they 
do not want to lose their admission status, migrants usually tend to stay in 
the destination country as a result. Accordingly, the potential of circular 
migration cannot be excluded from the post-2015 discussions (Skeldon 
2012; ICMPD / ECDPM 2013). 
4 Outlook: broaden and intensify the discussion
The relatively basic nature of the different migration aspects presented 
here is indicative of the challenging nature of the ongoing discussions. 
An adequate contribution of a post-2015 framework towards promoting 
migration in a way that balances the social, economic and environmental 
pillars of a sustainable development approach requires more fundamental 
changes to today’s global institutions. So far, these are largely inadequate for 
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fulfilling this purpose. Regardless of the recent calls for a “transformative 
framework”, the history of the development of these institutions indicates 
that such an expectation is not really realistic. Instead, recognition of the 
need for transformation should inform three incremental, yet important, 
steps to realise this. 
1. First of all, the UN needs to continue its efforts to promote the discussion 
of migration in a broader sustainable development context, avoid 
functionalist or instrumental approaches and call for more intensive 
high-level discussions on the matter. 
2. The discussions on migration and its management need to consider 
the subsidiarity principle and determine an optimal division of labour 
between the global, regional and national levels, as well as establish 
avenues to devise coherent policies between those levels. 
3. One should not assume that actions can be informed by existing data-
collection processes: if there is any area in need of a “data revolution”, 
then it is the one related to migration. Poor data on migration reflects 
the lack of consensus on key terms, a lack of investment in empirical 
research as well as absent data on aspects such as remittances, illegal 
migration and information on migrant rights in different countries.
The first two actions can help promote discussions on migration in 
UN member states and avoid the political exploitation of migration 
misconceptions, which, however, ultimately depends on governments’ 
willingness to take responsibility in promoting migration for sustainable 
development.
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The international battle against tax fraud and evasion:  
a key part of the post-2015 agenda1
Christian von Haldenwang / Uwe Kerkow
1 Introduction
Reports on worldwide tax fraud and illicit global financial flows have been 
appearing more and more frequently in recent times. In spite of the attention 
which such revelations attract, however, the international community is still 
far from an effective system of controls. While it is true that the G20, the G8, 
the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and other international organisations are advocating 
more international cooperation and control in this area, implementation of 
the related resolutions has proven to be difficult.
In its first major report, at the end of May 2013, the United Nations “High-
Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda” 
now proposes that the reduction of illicit flows and tax evasion and the 
recovery of stolen assets be included in the new global agenda. This initiative 
deserves support, precisely because many of the poorer countries labour 
under a disastrous combination of weak national tax and control agencies 
together with international tax loopholes and regulatory gaps.
Large international companies above all use this constellation to shift their 
profits with the help of internal transfer prices to countries with particularly 
low tax burdens (so-called “tax havens”). And it is often much too easy 
for persons with large private assets to circumvent tax obligations in their 
own countries. While it is true that no reliable figures are available about 
the extent to which developing countries are damaged by such behaviour, 
even the most conservative estimates make it clear that these illicit capital 
outflows lie on an order of several magnitudes above inflows from official 
1 This is the revised and expanded version of a document on tax fraud and evasion that 
was published as DIE Briefing Paper No. 16/2013. We gratefully acknowledge useful 
comments by our colleagues from DIE Jörg Faust, Stefan Leiderer and Markus Loewe 
and Yu Ye from SIIS.
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development assistance (ODA), not to mention their negative impacts 
regarding governance and corruption. 
Most of these “tax havens” are found in OECD countries or smaller states 
and territories which are dependent on them. At the same time, it is the 
OECD countries which have the market power and public infrastructure to 
effectively implement controls and plug existing legal tax loopholes. But 
the major emerging countries too, along with resource-rich developing 
countries, must be integrated into this effort if actions which have been 
decided upon are to take effect on a worldwide basis. This topic is thus 
particularly relevant for a global agenda “Beyond Aid”.
The new agenda should tackle the problem at several points: in order to 
increase market transparency, reporting and accounting obligations of 
companies must be expanded and standardised. What is also of major 
importance is to improve international cooperation and the exchange of 
information between tax authorities. Bilateral accords like those presently in 
place are not enough for this; rather, multilateral actions by the international 
community are required. These may be initiated by individual groups of 
countries, but must then be implemented on a global scale.
2 Developing countries are hit hardest 
For a long time, the public debate on tax fraud and financial outflows 
concentrated on private assets in OECD countries. This, however, touched 
only the tip of the iceberg. Many developing countries also make it too easy 
for those with large assets to circumvent their tax obligations. Members 
of the elite often use their position to block investigations by national tax 
authorities. Once the funds have left the country, lax controls in so-called 
“tax havens” help to conceal the origin of such wealth. As a result, some 
of the world’s wealthiest persons come from very poor (but often resource-
rich) countries where governance is badly managed.
In addition, many companies veil their activities by carrying out their 
operations in part or wholly via “tax havens”. This is especially true of 
the financial sector. In other areas such as extractive industries and the 
international transportation industry, such patterns of behaviour are likewise 
common. An important role is played here by transfer prices for goods and 
services delivered or rendered within a company or consortium on a cross-
country basis (transfer pricing).
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All over the world, tax authorities struggle to monitor transfer prices 
even for standardized products – not to mention highly specific financial 
services or internally licensed intellectual property rights. For example, a 
study carried out by the United States Congress in the year 2010 found 
that the officially documented profits of US American company subsidiaries 
on the British Virgin Islands were 2.5 times in excess of that country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Profits on the Cayman Islands were 4.5 
times greater than the local GDP, and even 5.5 times greater in Bermuda 
(Gravelle 2013). This means that a major share of the value-added of these 
US companies is transferred artificially to states which levy extremely low 
taxes. Poor countries with weak public sectors have even greater problems 
in monitoring large companies. Here the disproportion between the market 
power of such companies and the effectiveness of taxation and supervisory 
authorities is usually especially glaring. As a result, the public hand collects 
only a fraction of the funds which are actually due to the state.
It is no accident that the above-mentioned figures refer to an industrialised 
country, the USA. True, research has long focused on the problem of measuring 
capital drains from developing countries. But whereas industrialised 
countries often provide data on the level of companies or taxpayers, such 
detailed information is usually unavailable in developing countries. In its 
place, macro-economic data (e.g. trade and debt statistics) are used to assess 
the dimensions of the problem. Even though the methodological problems 
entailed by this do not permit a presentation of robust results, all available 
evidence indicates that the problem of negative capital outflows places a 
serious burden on many developing countries. Depending on the source, 
taxes lost by the developing countries are estimated to total between one-
and-a-half to 10 times the amount of official development aid (ODA).
To be sure, very diverse circumstances are hidden behind these aggregate 
figures. If the statements of the international non-governmental organisation 
Global Financial Integrity (Kar / LeBlanc 2013) are taken as a basis, nearly 
19 per cent of all illicit capital outflows in the years 2002 to 2011 fall to 
the account of the People’s Republic of China. In part, these are circular 
flows of capital which bleed enormous amounts of tax revenue out of the 
Chinese State and promote corruption and illegal enrichment in their place. 
The second largest exporter of illicit capital is Russia, which even overtook 
China in the year 2011 and accounts for 15 per cent of cumulative outflows 
for the period 2002 to 2011. On the other hand, when such outflows are 
seen in relation to the GDP, other countries – oil exporters like Nigeria, for 
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example – are much more heavily involved. At any rate, the outflows appear 
to have increased significantly in most developing regions in the last decade 
(see Figure 1).
Figure 1:  Illicit financial flows from developing countries 2002-2011  
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3 Possible elements of a post-2015 agenda
There are signs that the battle against tax fraud and evasion could become 
a significant aspect of the post-2015-agenda. The relevance of this issue is 
now generally recognized on the international stage. The United Nations 
as well as the OECD have long been aware that poorly regulated financial 
markets and illicit capital flows pose hurdles to the sustainable financing of 
development. The G20 and G8 emphasized the need for better regulation at 
their most recent meetings. In order to deal with the problems, institutional, 
regulatory, tax-related and penal reforms are required. These range from 
combating tax dodging and eliminating tax loopholes for financial institutions 
and companies to the restriction of possibilities for acting secretively and an 
intensified fight against money laundering and corruption.
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As a first step, international cooperation among tax authorities must be 
further improved. Automatic exchange of information should become the 
general norm. In most cases, it has been the rule up to now that information 
is given out only upon request. In April 2013 the finance ministers of the six 
largest EU countries (Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain and Poland) 
signalled their readiness to orient themselves to the Fair and Accurate 
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) of the USA from the year 2003 and to set 
up an automatic exchange of information about capital income. However, 
this intensified cooperation in the club of industrialized countries is only 
an intermediate step, beyond which it is important above all to involve the 
major emerging countries and those developing countries which are rich in 
raw materials. There has been almost no discussion of this to date.
Secondly, the responsibilities of companies regarding bookkeeping, the 
rendering of accounts, and the presentation of reports must be expanded 
and harmonised. In order to make internal transfer pricing transparent, 
mandatory disclosure is under discussion, above all on a project-by-project 
and country-by-country basis. This is where sectorial initiatives like the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) play a trailblazing role. 
The disclosure obligations anchored in the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 for 
extractive industries also represent an important step on the road to more 
transparent financial behaviour on the part of multinational companies. This 
is all the more true as the EU (Parliament, Commission and Council jointly) 
launched a comparable directive in April 2013. It binds companies listed 
in the EU as well as major non-listed companies to disclose all payments 
of more than 100,000 Euros earned from the production of natural oil and 
gas and from mining and logging operations and made to public entities 
worldwide. Once this information has been received, it can be combined 
with technical assistance targeted specifically to resource-rich developing 
countries.
Another important step would be to oblige every corporate entity recognized 
as such by law – including corporations, trusts and foundations – to procure 
and provide information about natural persons who profit from that entity’s 
activities (beneficial ownership). The lack of such information is the 
central business basis of the so-called “tax havens”, which advertise that 
the asset-holder’s true identity must not be revealed. This is a point where 
resistance to reforms (or the gap between formal rules and their effective 
implementation) is thus especially strong.
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Thirdly, additional steps to harmonize tax regimes and financial market 
regulations are required. Large companies often use country-specific rules 
and diverging interpretations of laws to lower their tax burden. In addition, 
it is now customary to situate valuable intellectual property with company 
subsidiaries in low-tax countries so that profits from the use of property 
rights accumulate there. Such behaviour may be legal in many cases, but is 
by no means legitimate. An important aspect of harmonization in light of 
this would be a uniform basis for the assessment of corporate income tax, 
i.e. a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, CCCTB, with the aim that 
company profits should be derived at the place where real value added does 
in fact occur. This instrument has been under discussion for years within 
the EU, but has still not been implemented. Here too, emerging powers and 
the developing countries must be integrated as soon as possible in order 
to prevent rules from being circumvented practically as soon as they are 
decided upon.
4 Implementation in the framework of the  
post-2015 agenda
Some of the above-mentioned steps are within the area of competence of 
national governments. In other cases, unilateral actions of individual states 
or groups of states could quickly have the result of closing international 
regulation gaps. However, a truly sustainable control of illicit financial flows 
requires multilateral action within the framework of a global agenda. To be 
specific:
Actions by national governments: Every state has the responsibility to 
formulate tax and finance policy regulations and ensure that they are 
effectively applied. In the poorer countries, however, the capacity gap between 
governmental agencies and the major companies and owners of assets is 
particularly wide. As part of the post-2015 agenda, therefore, development 
cooperation must be more clearly focused on strengthening tax agencies 
and supervisory bodies in the developing countries. This is already being 
carried out today to some extent in cooperation with regional associations, 
above all the Latin American association of tax authorities (CIAT) and its 
African counterpart (ATAF), which was founded in 2009. To some extent 
international organisations are also already being integrated, in particular the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) with its regional training centres.
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The experience of the EITI mentioned above shows that it is possible to 
provide specifically targeted support to reform-oriented governments relying 
on a lean, multilateral structure. In this context mechanisms of voluntary 
self-commitment and accountability are particularly relevant, especially 
when accompanied by civil society organisations in the countries involved 
and on the international level.
To a certain extent, unilateral initiatives of powerful individual states 
or groups of states have the potential to bring about changes on the 
international level (or conversely to prevent them). This is especially true 
for the USA as the largest national economy. The above-mentioned laws 
governing the exchange of information regarding capital income (FACTA) 
and the disclosure of payments rendered in the extractive industries (Dodd-
Frank) have probably brought about more progress in the fight against illicit 
financial flows than years of deliberations in the EU or OECD. However, 
even the USA become increasingly aware of the fact that unilateral 
implementation of power positions alone will hardly suffice to put an end 
to illicit flows. Important impulses in this regard are coming from so-called 
“club governance” structures such as the G8 or the G20. These act as 
forums for the international concertation of political initiatives, can propose 
effective measures or even provide international organisations with the 
mandate to take action in a corresponding manner.
Multilateral approaches: a key lesson learned over the past decade refers 
to the fact that without the major emerging powers and resource-rich 
developing countries the problem of tax fraud and evasion cannot be 
brought under control. In recent years, the OECD in particular has launched 
several initiatives to fight tax evasion and avoidance, addressing the club 
of industrialised countries as well as non-member states and developing 
countries. Examples to be named here are the OECD Informal Task Force on 
Tax and Development, founded in 2010, which works on several of the topics 
discussed above, and the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes, currently with 120 members (including many 
of the so-called tax havens). In addition, the Financial Action Task Force 
on Money Laundering (FATF) which was called into being in 1989 by the 
G7 strives to promote a stronger involvement of developing and emerging 
countries through its associated regional groups. Within the UN system, the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, which took effect in 2005, 
offers a framework of standards for international cooperation which in turn 
takes such important aspects as the return of stolen assets into consideration.
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On the whole, the conditions for an international monitoring of the 
behaviour of states and private actors have improved at several points in 
recent years. However, they are still inadequate to bring about changes on a 
broad front. The report of the “High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda” at the end of May 2013 has proposed that 
the reduction of illicit flows, tax evasion and the recovery of stolen assets 
be included in the new global agenda. This proposal is in need of further 
elaboration. In this, the initiative is dependent on the support of member 
states and international organisations.
A major opportunity offers itself here for a global agenda “beyond aid”. It 
is certainly possible to formulate targets which can be applied with equal 
validity to industrialised, emerging and developing countries. The indicators 
to be used for monitoring could be identical for all states, e.g. a (weighted) 
tax ratio, indicators measuring banking secrecy and corruption, and 
documented proof of active collaboration in selected international bodies 
and initiatives that serve to improve transparency in financial flows and fight 
unfair tax competition. The value-added of the post-2015 process could lie 
in providing a broader footing for these measures.
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The post-2015 development agenda: the role of the  
United Nations
Timo Mahn / Pio Wennubst1
1 The United Nations and the post-2015 
development agenda
What role has the United Nations (UN) in the Post-2015 development 
agenda? The UN were instrumental in the success of the original agenda 
– the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which expire in 2015 
and they are again the center of debates regarding the successor agenda. 
However, it is a lesser-known fact that the MDGs also had a tremendous 
impact on the three dozen UN entities which are active in the field of 
development and which together are known as the UN development system. 
Indeed, the role, functioning and funding of development activities of the 
UN development system were substantially influenced by the adoption of 
the MDGs as institutions were shaping their response and contribution to 
the implementation of the MDGs. With debates about the post-2015 agenda 
in full swing, further change for the UN is looming on the horizon. In order 
to guide the coming change, the international community should bring to 
mind how the MDGs impacted the UN. Learning the lessons of the MDG’s 
impact on the UN development system is a crucial step in preparing the 
ground for realizing the post-2015 agenda.
1.1 Unravelling the mandate of the UN in development
The UN development system has traditionally suffered from a blurred profile 
and its engagement in development has been diverse and multifaceted 
(Weinlich 2010, 22). The Charter defines its respective purpose only in broad 
terms as achieving “international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character” 
(United Nations 1945, Art. 1). Member states have traditionally spelt out 
1 The views expressed here are solely those of the authors.
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this mandate in a decentralised manner through the different executive 
boards of the various entities forming the UN development system. Prior to 
the year 2000, further general guidance emanated from the “Development 
Decades”, whose reach and associated levels of investment have however 
been limited (Fukuda-Parr 2012, 17). 
In the end, it was the MDGs which came to have a major impact on the 
UN development system by offering a unifying set of goals for human 
development. The MDGs were drawn from the Millennium Declaration 
adopted by a UN summit in the year 2000, which in turn “recapitulated” the 
major commitments made by the international community during a series 
of UN world conferences throughout the 1990s. This is why Vandemoortele 
(2013, 2) describes them as the “culmination” of previous gatherings and 
commitments. As a global policy framework, the MDGs have had their 
effect on virtually all development organizations. For the case of the UN, 
the evidence suggests that the MDGs and other development goals have 
effectively become the UN’s main guideposts for development activities 
(Jenks / Jones 2013, 103).
1.2 Contours of the UN development system
The UN development system is formed by 37 funds, programmes and 
specialised agencies which generally provide capacity-building and 
technical support in specific areas of activity. Because member states have 
opted for a sectoralized system of management, the relationships among the 
different UN entities are generally characterised by coexistence and loose 
coupling (Righter 1995). This carries the dual burden of fragmentation and 
complexity. In a nutshell, the UN development system has compartmentalised 
how it handles development challenges (Jenks / Jones 2013, 104). 
The ‘compartmentalised’ structure of the UN development system goes back 
to the concept of ‘functionalism’ developed in a groundbreaking article by 
David Mitrany (1943). Functionalism has historically been at the heart of 
the UN development system’s setup. Its influence has been traced back to the 
debates among member states prior to establishment of the United Nations 
(Righter 1995, 32). In essence, functionalism views international objectives, 
above all peace and stability, as an intended spill-over effect of increased 
technical and issue-driven cooperation. There is a close linkage between 
functionalism and the proliferation of institutions. Moreover, since sectors 
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for cooperation are principally limited, there is also an in-build tendency 
for increased differentiation and compartmentalisation of development 
cooperation activities. Preserving the organizational autonomy of individual 
entities has been an integral component of functionalism. 
In addition to the compartmentalized concept and setup, the UN development 
system has further suffered from its subsequent growth and expansion 
“without a pre-established blue-print” (Fomerand 2003, 2). More recently, it 
has been suggested that institutional growth may also have been stipulated 
by the overarching policy agenda, namely, the MDGs. Notwithstanding the 
positive effect the MDGs undoubtedly had for the promotion of development 
cooperation and for rallying and aligning the international community 
around a common set of goals, it has been suggested that they also affected 
the institutional setup of the UN development system in a less than positive 
way. In essence, the MDGs may have “helped to proliferate institutional 
structures” (Jenks / Jones 2013, 104). The fragmentation of efforts and 
activities across various entities and projects and programmes within those 
entities, as well as the institutional proliferation may be seen as the two main 
legacies that beleaguer the UN development system today.
2 The dual role of the UN in the post-2015 agenda
With regard to the post-2015 agenda, the United Nations have a crucial role 
in two respects. 
First, the UN is the institutional guardian of the post-2015 process until its 
culmination in the adoption of a new agenda in the fall of 2015 and is the 
main driving force in the agenda’s formulation. It has this role because it 
is the only global platform of nations that is both legitimate and universal, 
which makes it a natural forum for debating the post-2015 development 
agenda. Much like the UN had a major role in the emergence of the MDGs 
based on the Millennium Declaration adopted in the year 2000, the world 
is again looking to the UN to manage the post-2015 process. Indeed, goal 
setting has been one of the major contributions of the UN to the field of 
development of the last fifty years. In the words of some UN experts, it has 
been an idea that “changed the world” (Jolly / Emmerij / Weiss 2009, 87). 
Without the UN and the MDGs, global development policy would have been 
much less conjoint. 
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At any rate since the Rio+20 conference, the UN has been heavily engaged 
in the post-2015 process. During the high-level event in September 2013, 
UN member states decided to launch intergovernmental negotiations 
starting in September 2014 which will lead to the adoption of the post-2015 
development agenda. The UN Secretary-General summarized previous 
inputs and reports, in particular by the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons 
on the post-2015 development agenda, in his report “A Life of Dignity 
for All” (UNGA 2013) which serves as the basis for negotiations. The 
adoption of the “The Future We Want” outcome document at the second 
UN Conference on Sustainable Development (“Rio+20”) in 2012 generated 
the concept of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and therefore was 
another crucial cornerstone. Since the conference, an “Open Working Group 
on SDGs” has been negotiating an SDG framework that is to reconcile the 
economic, social and environmental dimensions of development. According 
to some, these agendas have been “separated at birth” (Melamed / Scott 
/ Mitchell 2012) and reuniting them again is a challenging task that UN 
member states resolved to do. 
Second, reflections are needed about how the UN development system can 
best contribute to realizing the post-2015 development agenda. The post-
2015 development agenda is bound to call for action by the public sector, 
private enterprises, civil society and individuals alike. The High-Level 
Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (HLP 2013, 3) put forward 
the concept of a renewed “global partnership” involving a multiplicity of 
actors. This demand requires an interpretation of the particular purpose and 
contribution of the UN development system within the broader landscape of 
international (development) actors.
Indeed, while UN member states will only come to a decision on the final 
content and shape of the post-2015 development agenda at a summit at the 
level of Heads of States / Governments in September 2015, key perimeters of 
the agenda are already shaping up. The concept of sustainable development, 
on which the SDGs will draw, constitutes a fundamental shift of paradigm in 
global development cooperation. The UN was instrumental in the evolution 
of the concept (Jolly / Emmerij / Weiss 2009, 150) and has a long-standing 
legacy of engagement in this regard. The UN development system is also 
faced with increasing demands to engage further in this area. For example, 
a survey of programme countries revealed that a sustainable development 
agenda is their highest priority (UNSG 2012, 9) and the Secretary- General 
has placed the issue at the top of his agenda (UNSG 2012b). The former 
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President of the General Assembly Vuc Jeremi‐ in a paper written with Jeffrey 
Sachs therefore foresees a “UN in the Age of Sustainable Development” 
(Jeremi‐ et al. 2013). With regard to the implementation of the sustainable 
development agenda, the existence of a “normative gap” (Thakur / Weiss 
2009, 212) has been identified. Operationalizing the agenda is expected to 
be largely a matter of adjusting regulatory frameworks to facilitate equitable 
and sustainable access to livelihood assets. Sustainability of access, on 
the other hand, implies that livelihood assets are available, a precondition 
that might be increasingly difficult to ensure if the natural resource base 
continues to be depleted.
Given some of its characteristics and capacities at its disposal, the UN 
development system has been identified to be particularly well placed 
for making a meaningful contribution to the realization of the post-2015 
development agenda in addressing this normative gap. The UN remains 
the only truly universal global entity that has high input legitimacy, which 
is a fundamental ingredient for the acceptability of outputs and services, 
and a demonstrated capacity for convening multiple stakeholders to pursue 
common objectives. Most crucially, it has an absolute advantage in the 
close linkage between operations and norm-setting that sets it apart from 
other actors. Accordingly, the UN development system, in principle, seems 
well placed to focus on the formation and operationalisation of a normative 
foundation of the post-2015 development agenda and to guide operations 
geared towards sustainable development.
3 Preparing the UN development system for the post-
2015 development agenda
As the year 2015 is coming closer, UN member states are called upon 
to prepare the UN development system for its particular contribution to 
realizing the post-2015 development agenda. This endeavour concerns 
the functional dimensions of “What” and “How” of the UN development 
system, as well as the “Means” of achieving them. Below we formulate a 
number of recommendations relating to these dimensions. 
Adoption of a system-wide mandate (‘what’): In order to give the UN entities 
some broad guidance as to their contribution and role in implementing 
the post-2015 development agenda, it is recommended that the General 
Assembly adopts a system-wide mandate for the UN development system. 
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While the various entities’ executive boards would continue to shape the 
respective operational policies, the benefits of such a broad mandate lie in 
clearly demarcating and setting the necessary boundaries for the system’s 
functioning.
Such a system-wide mandate would fill the gap left by the expiring MDGs. 
As it has been argued above, the MDGs have effectively become the main 
guideposts for the UN development system (Wennubst / Mahn 2013, 14). 
That function was slow and cumbersome to come, however, since the MDGs 
had to be adopted decentrally by each executive board of the individual 
entities. Today, most of the UN’s entities in the field of development have 
signed on to the MDGs and incorporated them into their work programmes 
(Browne / Weiss 2013, 2).
In order to maintain its relevance, UN development system’s mandate would 
have to be reviewed on a regular basis with a medium-term perspective. 
A reasonable period would be every four years, in order to align with the 
regular planning processes of the various entities within the UN development 
system (“fit for purpose”). The High Level Political Forum (HLPF) that 
was created at the Rio+20 conference on sustainable development in 2012 
would be a suitable forum in which member states could adopt the system-
wide mandate, as it has been tasked to “permanently anchor sustainable 
development at the political level”. An opportune time would be in 2016 
when the post-2015 development agenda is in existence. Using the HLPF as 
a venue to establish the system-wide mandate seems suitable as well because 
it meets every four years at the level of heads of state and government 
(Beisheim 2014, 5).
Connecting the UN development system (‘how’): The setup of the UN 
development system, which follows a compartmentalized logic appropriate 
for the MDGs, is increasingly becoming inadequate to address interconnected 
global development challenges such as climate change, migration flows 
and water scarcity. The post–2015 development agenda therefore portends 
significant change.
Along this line, a number of institutional reforms are recommended to get 
the UN development system better prepared. First, the UN development 
system should strengthen decentralisation efforts in order to respond more 
adequately to the specific challenges that countries face. In particular, 
creating a stronger role for the UN Resident Coordinator with enhanced 
managerial authority to allocate funds within country programmes would 
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ensure national priorities are met (Wennubst / Mahn 2013, 28). Second, 
it seems necessary to strengthen and link better structures for inter-
governmental oversight and interagency management. It has been argued 
that “the authorizing environment, the mission, and the capacity of the UN 
development system are not mutually reinforcing […]” and are in fact “often 
pulling in different directions” (Jenks / Jones 2013, 99). The Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) should take on the role of system-wide 
executive board and on the interagency side, the UN Development Group 
(UNDG) needs to transformed into an appropriate interlocutor of system-
wide managerial tasks by clarifying its legal status and giving it the capacity 
for decisive action vis-à-vis the executive boards of the funds, programmes 
and specialised agencies. Having an established interplay between the two 
would establish clear lines of accountability at the core of the system to 
align with the post-2015 development agenda. Third, operational business 
practices which currently hinder interoperability and collaboration within 
the UN development system should be harmonized across all entities. 
Such technical reforms would invariably increase the ability of entities to 
communicate with one another and enhance the cohesive operation within 
the UN development system. 
Work towards system-wide reliable funding (‘means’): The UN development 
system continues to rely largely on supply-driven, headquarter-centred 
and agency-oriented funding, which stipulates fragmentation. It therefore 
seems necessary that reforms are grounded in a new system-wide funding 
mechanism that supports a decentralised and demand-driven approach to 
development. Concrete steps should be taken to broaden and diversify the 
funding base and reduce reliance on a limited number of member state 
donors that primarily contribute earmarked funds. The financial transaction 
tax pushed by the European Union within Europe offers one possible model 
(Wennubst / Mahn 2013, 34). 
4 Conclusions
In the run-up to the post-2015 development agenda, there is a danger that 
political attention is focussed primarily on the consensus-building around 
the agenda’s content, while the subsequent implementation is neglected. We 
argue that the focus of the international community on the process needs 
to be balanced with the requirements for a successful implementation that 
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includes all stakeholders and maximizes their respective contributions. 
Alongside other actors, the UN development system will have to get prepared 
for the coming “age of sustainable development”. For the UN development 
system to adequately contribute to the post-2015 agenda requires political 
willingness by member states to position the UN development system as a 
relevant actor. Part of this willingness is the realisation that its fragmented 
structure impedes a truly important role. We argued a possible way out 
would be to strengthen the system’s institutional setting, way of working 
and funding in response to a clearly spelt out system-wide mandate. 
Member states should develop a comprehensive system-wide strategy that 
better ensures the UN development system contribution to the post-2015 
development agenda.
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The G20’s development agenda and its role  
in the post-2015 process
Haibing Zhang
1 Introduction 
In this paper, the author discusses the G20’s development agenda and the 
issue of how to make the G20 play a constructive role in the post-2015 
development agenda. In the author’s view, compared to the United Nations, 
the G20 has a small-scale membership which may be conducive to better 
coordinating the positions of different countries and hence playing a 
complementary and supporting role for the post-2015 development agenda. 
What is more important, the G20 can make substantive efforts in critical 
development areas such as infrastructure. 
Development has always been an issue closely linked to the situation of 
the world economy, whether in the gloomy period of the global financial 
crisis or in the period of prosperity with a steadily growing world economy. 
Although the concept of development has been given different definitions 
and conditions in respect to differing historical backgrounds, the efforts in 
achieving the goal of poverty reduction and economic growth have never 
changed for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) around the world. With 
the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) coming to 
the end, it has been under debate whether to continue centring on MDGs 
or to expand to the broader Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Such 
debates have reflected the reality of the different development stages that 
various countries are facing and correspondingly their diverse interests and 
demands, which, in turn, has led to the mismatch of visions and strategic 
focus while drawing up a blueprint for common global development. What 
is more important for the time being is to take real action in respect to global 
development rather than constantly proclaiming new initiatives, visions 
and plans. With the current state of fragmentation in the area of global 
development, it is uncertain whether the post-2015 agenda sponsored by 
the United Nations can unify different development views into one common 
vision of the international community and provide guidance on coordinated 
global efforts in promoting development. This text will analyse how the G20 
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can play a supportive role in the implementation of the post-2015 agenda 
based on an exploration of its development agenda.
2 The development agenda of the G20
The development agenda has not been a new issue for the G20. It was just 
that the G20 ministerial meetings held before the global financial crisis 
in 2008 received much less international attention than the G20 leaders’ 
meetings. In June 2010, the G20 Toronto summit communiqué touched 
upon the development topic and announced the setting up of the working 
group on development (DWG). As the communiqué pointed out, 
[n]arrowing the development gap and reducing poverty are integral 
to our broader objective of achieving strong, sustainable and balanced 
growth and ensuring a more robust and resilient global economy for all  
(G20 2010a, Para. 47).
However, development was not regarded as a core item of the G20 agenda 
until the 2010 Seoul summit.
There were mainly two reasons why development became one of the 
core items on the agenda of the G20 Seoul summit: one was the strategic 
consideration of South Korea; another was the inevitable demand for 
economic globalisation. As a new member of the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), South Korea wanted to promote its international 
clout through the multilateral forum of the G20. With the experience of 
rising from being a recipient country to being a member of the club of major 
donor countries, the step was meant to enhance the soft power of South 
Korea by promoting experience-sharing for international development 
cooperation. For this, the G20 summit provided a useful stage.
As a consequence of economic globalisation, there has been much 
international consensus over the development agenda becoming a core 
item on the G20 agenda. Since the deepening of globalisation and the 
global spillover effects of financial crises have fully demonstrated the 
interdependence and interconnectedness of the global economy, it would 
be impossible to realise the goal of strong, sustainable and balanced growth 
without full development of the developing countries. To promote global 
economic growth, sources of new momentum need to be found in order to 
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increase aggregate demand, with increased contributions from developing 
countries, including low-income countries (LICs) being an essential 
component.
The Seoul Development Consensus on Shared Growth succinctly lists 
four reasons for focusing on the development agenda (G20 2010b): i) For 
prosperity to be sustained it must be shared. ii) The impact of the recent 
crisis demonstrated a global interconnectedness that is disproportionately 
affecting the most vulnerable in the poorest countries. It has been estimated 
that, as a result of the recent crisis, an additional 64 million people were 
living in extreme poverty (that is, living on less than USD 1.25 a day) 
by the end of 2010. iii) As the premier forum for international economic 
cooperation, the G20 has a role to play, complementing the efforts of aid 
donors, the UN system, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and other 
agencies in assisting developing countries, particularly LICs, to achieve 
the MDGs. iv) The rest of the global economy, in its quest to diversify the 
sources of global demand and destinations for investing surpluses, needs 
developing countries and LICs to become new poles of global growth – just 
as fast growing emerging markets have become in the recent past. 
There were four major issues on the Seoul summit agenda, with development 
for the first time listed among them, together with three others, namely 
exchange rates, a global financial safety net, and reform of international 
financial institutions. The Seoul summit published the Seoul Development 
Consensus for Shared Growth and set up a Multi-Year Action Plan (MYAP) 
which established nine pillars for the development agenda: infrastructure; 
human resources; trade; private investment and job creation; food security; 
flexible growth; financial inclusiveness; domestic resource mobilisation; and 
knowledge sharing. In order to realise the objectives in the above-mentioned 
nine aspects, the MYAP laid out the following six principles (G20 2010b): 
 • Be economic-growth oriented and consistent with the G20 Framework 
for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, which requires narrowing 
the development gap. More robust and sustainable economic growth in 
LICs will also go hand-in-hand with their capacity to achieve the MDGs. 
 • Global development partnership: Engage developing countries, 
particularly LICs, as equal partners, respecting their national ownership 
and recognising that the most important determinant of successful 
development is a country’s own development policy. 
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 • Global or regional systemic issues: Focus on systemic issues where there 
is a need for collective and coordinated action, including through South-
South and triangular cooperation, to create synergies for maximum 
development impact. 
 • Private sector participation: Promote private sector involvement and 
innovation, recognising the unique role of the private sector as a rich 
source of development knowledge, technology and job creation. 
 • Complementarity: Differentiate, yet complement existing development 
efforts, avoiding duplication, and strategically focus on areas where the 
G20 has a comparative advantage and can add value focusing on its core 
mandate as the premier forum for international economic cooperation. 
 • Outcome orientation.
The Seoul summit showed that the G20 has a clearly recognised focus in 
the development area, stressing its role as complementary with a view to 
improving the inadequacy of the current international development aid 
system, rather than replacing the latter. International development aid has 
long been obsessed with the problem of fragmentation, with donors, aid 
distribution and aid funds all manifesting such a trend. The international 
community has never reached a definite conclusion over the necessity 
and effectiveness of development aid. As for the G20, it is important to 
play a different role while stepping into the international development aid 
system which already has overlapping institutions. The Seoul Development 
Consensus for Shared Growth designated the G20’s focus in the development 
area as ‘development partnership’ and ‘outcome-oriented’.
The Seoul summit may have formulated the prototype of the G20 
development agenda, however, with the group being more of a contingent 
mechanism, managing and solving the crisis have always been the focus of 
G20 leaders’ meetings. In subsequent G20 summits, the development issue 
has more and more turned into being purely a decorative topic. In the 2011 
G20 Cannes summit, the development issue was still included as a major 
topic, yet only in last place. Responding to the deteriorating situation of 
the Euro zone, the Cannes summit put the issue of restoring confidence 
in the Euro zone at the top of the agenda, with the following topics being 
the international monetary system, social issues, financial regulation, and 
development. The Cannes summit continued with the nine pillars designated 
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at the Seoul summit, with a special focus on food security, infrastructure 
and financing of development. At the 2012 Los Cabos summit, the G20 
focused on the topics of infrastructure and green growth.
Mexico also created the ‘two-track’ working method: the troika composed of 
the previous, incumbent and succeeding presidency being the first track, which 
mainly focused on political and non-financial issues such as employment, 
agriculture, energy, anti-corruption and development. The second track 
was the finance track, mainly composed of the Financial Stability Board, 
the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion, the International Structural 
Finance Working Group, and the Energy and Commodities Working Group. 
The 2013 St. Petersburg summit laid its focus on four of the nine pillars of 
the Seoul Action Plan: food security; financial inclusion and remittances; 
human resources; infrastructure as well as the mobilisation of domestic 
resources. However, all these initiatives have usually seen little follow-up 
action, which reflects the long-lasting problem of a missing implementation 
mechanism for the G20.
Among the issue areas in the G20 development agenda, infrastructure, food 
security, human resources, and green growth have been of most concern to 
the G20. It regards economic growth as the basis for these four development 
goals. The four aspects coincide with both the MDGs and SDGs. With 
the coming of the post-2015 era in the near future, the planning of a new 
global development agenda has also entered the count-down stage. Can the 
G20 play a certain complementary role in the future global development 
agenda and does it have its own position in international development 
cooperation? It seems that at least until now the answer to this question is 
still uncertain.
3  Debates on the G20 development agenda
Although the development agenda has been embedded into major debates 
at G20 summits, there have been more and more critical discussions as to 
whether the G20 should focus on development at all and whether such focus 
can really make a difference.
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3.1 Views doubting the inclusion of development in the  
G20 agenda
The views objecting to the G20’s focus on a development agenda are mainly 
based on two arguments: first is the charge of an inappropriate mechanism; 
second is criticism of overlapping mechanisms. The perception of an 
inappropriate mechanism focuses on the G20’s institutional structure and 
inherent nature. The G20 has a rotating presidency which is not appropriate 
for a long-term focus on topics such as development which are in need of 
continuous attention. This may damage the effectiveness of the G20. Besides, 
the G20 is more a decision-making mechanism than an implementation 
mechanism. The lack of implementation capacity makes it hard to achieve 
substantive outcomes in the development field. In terms of its nature, G20 
is a political organisation which has a strong political clout. So the more 
efficient way is to persuade other institutions to provide more contributions 
to development and aid, rather than doing all these things by itself. If the 
G20 had a much wider agenda, this would hamper the G20 from playing a 
major role in its core business of stabilising the world economy, and would 
lower its efficiency.
In the view of Barry Carin (2013b), the development agenda is the G20’s 
white elephant with certain decorative but no substantive effects. So a better 
choice would be to keep global development on the G20 agenda but not 
having it mainstreamed across the G20’s overall work. As Carin observes, 
the G20 adds an issue to its agenda if there is a vexing problem with major 
implications for all its members that is unlikely to be resolved elsewhere. 
Hence the G20’s role should be focused on strengthening other international 
institutions and working for positive outcomes, a strategy that would 
enhance the credibility of the G20 (Carin 2013a).
The charge of overlapping mechanisms is based on the following reasoning: 
In global development there are already so many international institutions, 
including the United Nations, the World Bank and the OECD at global level 
and various regional development banks such as the Asian Development 
Bank and African Development Bank as well as many bilateral development 
aid institutions. This is why the G20 does not need to duplicate such efforts. 
Compared to existing development institutions, the G20 has no special 
advantage, which renders it hard to make a prominent contribution in the 
development area. Professor Robin Davies from the Australian National 
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University frankly criticises the current development agenda of the G20 as 
lacking substance, being loose in structure and toothless (Davies 2013).
On the other hand, a more practical factor is that, as a leaders’ summit, 
the G20 can hardly influence leaders of G20 member countries in terms 
of agenda-setting at the national level, in particular the leaders of major 
powers. At the Seoul summit, it had been hoped that the development topic 
could become its largest highlight. However, due to the US Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy change or the so-called Quantitative Easing (QE), the topic 
of a possible ‘currency war’ unexpectedly became the focus of this summit. 
Countries at different national income levels or from different continents 
all showed great concern in this regard, including a developed country 
like Germany and emerging economies like Russia, Brazil and South 
Africa. The immediate effect of the Quantitative Easing of the US Federal 
Reserve was to lead to a substantial depreciation of the US-dollar, which, 
in turn, led to rising commodity prices and speculative capital flows into 
emerging markets. Thus, the stability of global financial markets and the 
steady economic development of emerging market economies were greatly 
endangered. This also showed clearly that the then only three-years-old 
G20 summit arrangements had the very obvious feature of serving as an 
emergency mechanism.
Such kind of a situation still exists today. Even though everyone recognises 
the importance of the development agenda, it is impossible to elevate it 
to the most important and urgent topic on the agenda. At the 2013 St. 
Petersburg summit it was the Syrian crisis that became the focus rather than 
the development agenda.
3.2 Views in support of the G20’s increasing focus on the 
development agenda
The arguments in favour of including the development topic in the G20 
agenda have been mainly based on enhancing the legitimacy of the G20 and 
the long-term development of the G20 mechanism. Since the setting up of 
the G20 summits, the G20 has been confronted with a problem of legitimacy. 
Although G20 member countries account for 85 % of the world’s GDP and 
almost 2/3 of world population, those countries excluded are still greatly 
dissatisfied with it. In the eyes of non-G20 member countries, the G20 has 
exercised discourse power over global economic governance. Yet most of the 
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members of the international community have been excluded from this new 
bloc. To solve this problem, the G20 has been making great efforts in the 
past five years to enhance its representativeness and legitimacy by soliciting 
opinions from such forums as Think 20, Civil Society 20, and Business 20. 
It was against this backdrop that the development issue gradually became 
one of the core items on the G20 agenda, since it is concerned with the 
interests of the large group of developing countries. In the view of Professor 
Mike Callaghan from Australia’s Lowy Institute, development is a priority 
for the G20. At the most basic level, G20 members must be concerned not 
only with their own economic prospects, but also with the implications of 
their policies on non-G20 members, particularly low-income countries. 
Moreover, the advancement of developing countries should be an important 
focal point in the quest for strong and sustainable global growth (Callaghan 
2013).
In the interest of the long-term evolution of the G20 mechanism, the 
inclusion of development is conducive to the transformation of the G20 
from a contingency mechanism to the steering committee of global 
economic governance. There is no doubt that it was due to the global 
financial crisis that the G20 was upgraded from the ministerial level to the 
leaders’ summit. In 2007 the subprime crisis broke out in the United States, 
which later turned into a global financial crisis. In November 2008, the first 
G20 Summit was held in Washington, DC. Then, in April and September of 
2009, the G20 leaders held their second and third summits in London and 
Pittsburgh, respectively. The three summits held within one year provided 
the opportunity for the leaders of major economies to meet with each 
other and advocate for cooperation and consensus-building. This played an 
indispensable role in terms of stabilising global financial markets, taking 
joint measures to address the economic recession and consulting on the 
future development of the world economy. However, with the gradual easing 
of pressures from the financial crisis, the issue of how to transform the G20 
smoothly into a regular mechanism managing global economic governance 
became more and more obvious. It can be seen that the legitimacy of the 
G20 has mainly come from its effectiveness in addressing the crisis. Yet 
it is difficult to make the G20 continue to play an effective role in global 
economic governance.
In view of this, the development issue is suitable for being a core item 
on the post-crisis G20 agenda. As we know, the outcome of development 
cooperation has been influenced by various factors, with a significant 
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one among them being the issue of fragmentation. Such fragmentation 
mainly manifests itself in the actions on development and financing for 
development. Therefore, if the G20 could become the coordination centre 
of global actions on development, this would definitely be good news for the 
global development agenda. In brief, the debates over the G20 development 
agenda show that, after five years from the holding the first G20 summit, 
there is still great uncertainty over the future of the G20 mechanism and 
its competence and role. There is also the possibility that the United States 
may gradually reduce its attention to the G20 in the post-crisis era and the 
G20 may be marginalised. Hence the G20 needs to include more long-term-
oriented economic issues such as development. The development issue also 
has interconnected and inseparable relations with other global economic 
issues. So the problem lies in how to make the G20 play the role as the 
major forum in coordinating global development issues. The focus is now 
definitely the post-2015 development agenda.
4  How does the G20 play its role in post-2015 
development agenda?
The formal attention of the G20 towards the post-2015 process started at 
the 2013 St. Petersburg summit. The Russian government clearly mentioned 
this point in its summary of the summit outcome: “The UN is currently 
shaping its post-2015 development agenda, and the G20 is committed to 
assisting the UN in this endeavour” (G20 2013a, 1). The St. Petersburg 
Development Outlook (G20 2013b, 2) includes the following statement: 
The G20 seeks to complement international efforts towards further 
progress on internationally agreed development goals. The agenda takes 
account of the outcomes of the UN High-Level Plenary Meeting on the 
MDGs, as well as with processes, such as the Fourth UN LDC Summit, 
the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and the United Nations 
Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). We seek to ensure that 
the future G20 development agenda is flexible enough to respond to the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda.
What kind of role can the G20 play in international development cooperation 
as well as in the post-2015 process? In the view of Barry Carin (2013a) 
in the development area, the G20 is a secondary player. Although the 
G20’s declarations and leaders’ statements have widespread effects, it has 
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significant competition in shaping the discussions. The president of the World 
Bank is pushing for the eradication of poverty by 2030. The United Nations 
will monopolise the debate for the next 18 months discussing the Rio+20 
sustainability goals and the post-2015 successor to the UN Millennium 
Development Goals. Nonetheless, the G20 can influence the future research 
agenda, posing specific questions and issuing remits to be reported on at 
future G20 meetings. Yet constrained by its limited implementation capacity, 
it is difficult to attract the limited resources of the international development 
organisations to be put under the G20’s framework. In another article Carin 
(2013b) proposes that the G20 could have a try in simplifying the post-2015 
agenda, since it may be easier to reach consensus within the G20 than at the 
United Nations. He proposes merging the visions and objectives of the post-
2015 agenda and then defining a limited number of commitments which 
have substantive content and time lines.
Actually, the G20 has played a role in the setting of the post-2015 agenda. 
On the one hand, at the Toronto summit, it established a working group 
on development, to be followed by the Seoul Development Consensus for 
Shared Growth. The subsequent Cannes, Los Cabos, and St. Petersburg 
summits have demonstrated sustained focus on the development issue. The 
2013 the St. Petersburg Development Outlook clearly stated that the G20 
will assist the United Nations in pushing forward the post-2015 agenda. On 
the other hand, since the start of the global financial crisis, every G20 summit 
has stressed the importance of realising the goal of strong, sustainable, 
and balanced growth. To bring growth and development together into the 
discussion has been a great contribution by the G20 as the premier forum in 
coordinating international economic affairs.
In 2014, Australia takes over the presidency at the G20 Brisbane summit. In 
his speech of January 2014 at the Davos World Economic Forum, Australian 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott spoke highly of the achievements made in 
global poverty reduction and development during the past decade. He 
stressed again that Australia would make strong growth the thematic issue 
of the 2014 G20 summit, since economic growth has been the key to solving 
all global problems. Mr Abbott also in a much entertaining way compared 
himself to an “infrastructure prime minister” and hoped that G20 Brisbane 
summit could have decision-makers, financing institutions and contractors 
join together in forging a feasible infrastructure financing plan for a long 
period of time (Abbott 2014). In a sum, the contribution of the G20 to the 
post-2015 agenda has not been limited to the setting of goals and principles. 
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What is more important has been its substantive contribution and guidance 
on the realisation of global development goals.
If the G20 is to play a greater role in the development field, in particular 
the post-2015 agenda, it should not be limited to just presenting advice and 
reporting to the United Nations. The G20 is able to create a new institution to 
fill a gap in the global governance architecture for development, as it did with 
the Financial Stability Board. A new Global Development Council could be 
established on the basis of a working group on development. Currently there 
are many global, regional and bilateral development and aid institutions, 
as well as even more non-governmental development organisations, which 
have great difficulty in coordinating with each other. Hence the G20 
may make use of its status as a premier forum of international economic 
affairs to make a difference in international development cooperation. 
Based on fully harnessing the role of the leaders’ summit, the G20 could 
improve or solve its weak implementation capacity through an approach of 
national commitments and mutual assessment, so as to make substantive 
contributions to the post-2015 development agenda. The leaders attending 
G20 summits are representing their own countries. Therefore, even if the 
commitments of the leaders have no binding effect under international law, 
they are manifestations of national image and national action which have 
intangible but relatively strong soft binding effects.
Just as Mr Wu Hongbo, the United Nations Under-Secretary General 
for Economic and Social Affairs, has put it, the post-2015 development 
agenda led by the United Nations should turn human development into real 
sustainable development. The MDGs are the founding stones and basis of 
the SDGs. The MDGs could ensure that a poverty-free, sustainable world 
for future generations is built in our life-time (Wu 2013). As the premier 
forum for coordinating international economic affairs, the G20 has both the 
responsibility and the capacity to build a sustainable world with common 
development.
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